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ABSTRACT 
Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa ' s rising population growth rate and declining 
agricultural productivity , there is much debate about whether communal land tenure 
institutions are a constraint on agricultural productivity and transformation in the region. 
Some argue that tenure institutions have adapted to the needs of the local communities , 
while others contend that the evolution of tenure institutions is constrained by the actions of 
vested interest groups and prohibitive transaction costs. This study empirically tested the 
relationship between land tenure security and agricultural productivity in the Zimbabwean 
small farm sector. Specifically , the study investigated the interaction between land tenure 
security and credit use, long-term on farm investments , complementary short-term input 
use and yield from a sample of 119 Zimbabwean households interviewed during 1995 . 
Implications for land reform in South Africa were derived from the empirical results. 
The study area was stratified so as to maXImIse the variation on the tenure variables 
measured. Three strata were identified, namely the privately owned small scale commercial 
sector , the traditional communal area and the government initiated Model A Resettlement 
Area. Tenure security was estimated as an index, capturing the breadth, duration and 
assurance of an individual's property rights to land. A simultaneous equation model was 
estimated using two-stage least squares regression analysis . Empirical results indicate that 
households with more exclusive and assured property rights invested significantly more in 
long-term on-farm improvements , applied greater levels of short-term inputs and attained 
higher yields compared to households with less secure property rights, ceteris paribus. 
Credit use was too infrequent in the sample to warrant statistical analysis. 
Given similarities between the Zimbabwean and South African agricultural sectors , the 
result has two important implications for proposed land reform in South Africa. Firstly , the 
result lends support to the notion that communal tenure in South Africa is likely to be a 
constraint on agricultural development. Secondly , any national land reform policy must be 
accompanied by innovative tenure institution which facilitate economic interaction and 
internalise externalities on land resettled to individuals or groups . In this regard, the 
process of institutional change must be impartially administered and well adapted to the 
particular needs and resource constraints at community level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture in Zimbabwe is characterised by an inherent dualism (Bratton, 1990: 268). In 
1989 - after a decade of land reform and redistribution aimed at ensuring a more equitable 
distribution of land - 4660 large scale commercial sector (LSCS) farmers held 34.7 per cent 
of Zimbabwe 's agricultural land. By contrast, over one million families occupied 50. I per 
cent of Zimbabwe's agricultural land in the Communal Areas (CA) , while 53 968 households 
had been resettled on 3.2 million hectares (10 .2 per cent) of farm land acquired by the state 
for redistribution. Approximately 8 500 small scale commercial sector farmers (SSCS) 
occupied 4.3 per cent of the agricultural land. 
Apart from land distribution differentials , agricultural productivity and levels of resource 
conservation differ markedly between the large and small famr sectors , despite significant 
government investment in Communal Area infrastructure and marketing facilities since 1980. 
Maize yields in the LSCS averaged 4.5 tons per hectare, compared to 1.6 tons per hectare in 
the small scale commercial sector (SSCS), 1.3 tons per hectare on land resettled since 
independence and just under one ton per hectare in the CA for the decade ending 1989/90 
(Ashworth, 1993) . Taking the agricultural potential of land in the different sectors into 
account, maize yields on the highest potential arable land in the LSCS are 3.6 times as great 
as yields from the same potential land in the Resettlement Area (RA) and CA (Ashworth, 
1993) . Moreover, Cliffe (1988) demonstrated that increased yields and marketed production 
following government investments in the CA and RA are heavily concentrated in the hands of 
a few individuals . 
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There is also a degree of differentiation between households within the small farm sector. 
Small scale commercial farmers achieve higher yields and show increased adoption of 
production improving technologies and conservation compared to CA farmers in areas of 
similar agricultural potential (Ashworth, 1993). It is also apparent that income from livestock 
production in the SSCS is of a greater magnitude and importance than in CAs and RAs 
(Ashworth, 1993). 
One reason for the poor performance of the small farm sector is that, compared with the large 
scale commercial sector, the small farm sector has historically received little technical and 
state support (Rukuni, 1990). A second reason for the poor performance of the small farm 
sector in Zimbabwe is the apparent lack of investment incentives under communal or group 
ownership . Insofar as property rights in Communal Areas ensure an individual the ability to 
use land for a certain period of time and for a defmed purpose, tenure is secure. However, 
these limited property rights do not guarantee that individuals can co-ordinate economic 
activity and reap the benefits of individual effort. Individual property rights to resettled land 
are even less secure, as individuals are resettled in groups and remain tenants of the state on 
highly conditional lease agreements (Bratton, 1990: 288). 
Of primary importance in this regard is the role of property institutions in manifesting 
economic incentives within a society. Property institutions facilitate economic co-ordination 
amongst people by helping them form expectations that can be reasonably held in their 
dealings with others. By establishing expectations about the rights to resource use in economic 
activity and about the partitioning of the income stream resulting from economic activity, 
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different property institutions can be expected to provide different economic incentives to 
. individuals in society . 
It is hypothesised that the effectiveness of a particular property institution in manifesting 
economic incentives depends on the level of tenure security afforded by the institution. Within 
the broader context of sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) rapid population growth and declining 
agricultural productivity , this has led to a growing debate about whether indigenous land 
tenure systems are a constraint on agricultural productivity and transformation in the region 
(Feder and Noronha, 1987; Bromley , 1989; Nieuwoudt, 1990; Kille and Lyne, 1993; Place 
and Hazell, 1993; Bromley and Cochrane, 1994; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Lyne and 
Roth, 1994; Van den Brink et ai, 1994; Thomson and Lyne, 1995) . The debate is somewhat 
controversial. Some argue strongly for communal ownership (Bromley , 1989; Bromley and 
Cochrane , 1994; Van den Brink et ai, 1994) while others argue for individual ownership 
(Feder and Noronha, 1987; Feder and Onchan, 1987). Yet others contend that alternative, 
more binding, constraints result in land tenure security having a limited impact on 
productivity and investment (Place and Hazell , 1993). 
Nonetheless, the issue is of particular importance to South Africa as the country is on the 
threshold of widespread land redistribution and tenure reform (Department of Land Affairs, 
1996), and is the focus of the thesis. Specifically , the thesis empirically tests the relationship 
between land tenure security and agricultural productivity in small scale agriculture . For this 
purpose, survey data were gathered from the Zimbabwean small scale agricultural sector by 
the author in April 1995 . A follow-up survey of the same households was conducted in 
August 1995. Background information on tenure institutions and land reforms initiated in 
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Zimbabwe was researched in collaboration with the University of Zimbabwe, Harare , III 
1993. The analysis was confined to the small farm sector since government policies have in 
the past purposefully favoured large scale commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe , invalidating 
comparisons between the LSCS and the small farm sector (Ashworth, 1993). 
Besides historical similarities between the South African and Zimbabwean agricultural 
sectors , the Zimbabwean small farm sector was considered appropriate for the study for two 
reasons . Firstly , the Zimbabwean small farm sector allowed the investigation of the 
interaction between land tenure security and economic incentives under a wide range of 
geographically adjacent tenure institutions , including freehold tenure in the SSCS, traditional 
communal tenure and a government resettlement programme. The co-existence of these tenure 
options is unique (in sub-Saharan Africa) to the Zimbabwean small farm sector. Secondly, 
Zimbabwe has experienced more than a decade of land reform and redistribution, following 
the introduction of land reform policies at independence in 1980. 
The analysis is likely to have important implications for land reform in South Africa, 
especially regarding the effect of incentive distortions under communal land ownership, and 
the likely impact of a proposed group ownership resettlement model on economic incentives . 
The latter is particularly important in South Africa where groups of up to 300 families are to 
be settled on commercial farm land under a group ownership model (Cousins, 1996). 
The first two chapters form the theoretical background to the study . Chapter one discusses the 
nature and role of property rights in economic relations , and introduces the theory of 
institutional economics . An understanding of institutional economics is imperative since, in 
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the context of this thesis , land refonn implies a change in the existing land tenure institution. 
Chapter two describes the economic incentives manifest in four idealised property institutions. 
The chapter concludes with a critical discussion on the prevailing theories of institutional 
innovation. 
Chapter three introduces the conceptual model describing the link between land tenure 
security and agricultural productivity . Specifically , it describes the relationship between 
exclusive and assured property rights to land and (a) investment incentives, (b) the availability 
of resources to finance such investments and (c) the operation of an efficient land market. The 
data collection and estimation techniques are described in Chapter four. The choice and 
description of the study area is included in this chapter. One hundred and nineteen small fann 
sector households were interviewed, in the following three strata; the small scale commercial 
sector (40) , the Communal Area (39) and the Model A Resettlement Area (40). 
Chapter five reports the descriptive statistics observed in the sample, after which empirical 
results are presented. The conceptual model is estimated as a simultaneous equation system 
using two-stage least squares regression analysis . The results from the empirical models are 
discussed in the remainder of the chapter. 
Before deriving implications for land refonn in South Africa, it is first necessary to gain a 
clear understanding of the requirements of a land refonn policy in South Africa. Chapter six 
provides a selective synopsis of the relevant legislation that shaped land tenure institutions in 
South Africa since the passing of the Land Act, Act 27 of 1913. Included is a detailed 
description of the tenure institutions and resultant land use patterns in the commercial and 
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small farm agricultural sectors. Of importance in this regard is the level of tenure security 
afforded by the different tenure institutions. Land reforms proposed in the South African 
government's Green Paper on South African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1996) 
are introduced at the end of the Chapter. 
In the final Chapt.er the implications of the empirical results for proposed land reforms in 
South Africa are discussed, with specific reference to the requirements for sustainable land 
redistribution and communal area tenure reforms. 
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Cl-IAPTER 1 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRANSACTION COSTS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: 
NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
Over the past several decades there has been a renewed interest in institutional economics, 
giving consideration to the influence of property rights structures and transaction costs on 
economic incentives and behaviour (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 1). This has arisen 
because of a recognition that standard neo-classical analysis is overly abstract and is unable 
to deal effectively with many problems of interest to policy makers - particularly when 
transaction costs are greater than zero, and where property rights structures are diverse. 
This chapter considers the theoretical relationship between property rights and property 
institutions, introducing the concepts of transaction costs and economic efficiency. The 
overview is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of the theory. Rather, it 
emphasises issues relevant to the efficient utilisation and allocation of agricultural land, 
discussed more fully in Chapter Two. 
1.1 Institutions defined 
In the context of this thesis, an institution is defined as the set of behavioural rules that govern 
a particular pattern of actions and relationships in society (Ruttan, 1978). The institutions of a 
particular society thus reflect the unique social, political and economic setting within which 
that society finds itself. The ways in which institutions are formulated and enforced make up 
the legal system of that society (Bromley and Cochrane, 1994). 
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Institutions are thus attempts to reduce uncertainty in exchange by defining the rules of the 
game (Beghin and Fafchamps, 1995) . In the area of economic relations, institutions have a 
crucial role in establishing expectations about the rights to resource use in economic 
activities and about the partitioning of the income stream resulting from the economic 
activity (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985 : 95). However , the right to a benefit stream defined by a 
property institution is only as secure as the duty of others to respect the conditions that 
protect that stream (Bromley and Cochrane , 1994) . If the state is unwilling , or unable , to 
assure the compliance of others with regards to an individual's rights, then the rights are 
meaningless. 
Institutions have a profound effect on the behaviour and future expectations of individuals . In 
essence , the effectiveness of a particular property institution in manifesting economic 
incentives that encourage desired behaviour depends on two requisites; how exclusively ' -----property rights are defined and how well transaction costs have been curtailed (Nieuwoudt, 
1990) . These two concepts are introduced in the following section, and are then described in 
more detail in Chapter Two. 
1.2 Property rights defined 
Property rights are a particular characteristic of property institutions , a subset of all 
institutions (Runge, 1985) . Property rights specify the nonns of behaviour with respect to 
things that each person must observe in his or her interactions with others, or bear the 
consequences of non-observance (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 2). Since economic agents do 
not operate independently from one another, they face uncertainty as to how the actions of 
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others affect the way in which their own decisions will result in them receiving economic 
benefits. Property rights attempt to reduce this uncertainty -by providing individuals with 
information enabling them to form expectations which can be reasonably held in their dealings 
with others (Demsetz, 1967) . 
As such, property rights are an endogenous response to the need for economic co-ordination 
in the face of interdependence , and together with the market serve to reduce real resource 
losses faced by individuals as a result of imperfect information. These losses are grouped 
together under the term 'transaction costs '. A broad definition of transaction costs includes , 
costs associated with: (a) the creation or change of an institution; and (b) the use of the 
v 
institution (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 8). Dahlman (1979) defines the concept of 
transaction costs to include search and information costs, bargaining and decision making 
costs and policing and enforcement costs, as well as the risk and uncertainty associated with 
the transfer of rights owing to imperfect information. 
From an economic perspective, property rights play a crucial role by channelling net 
economic benefits associated with economic activity to a particular agent. The structure of 
property rights in a society not only determines who has what claims with regard to income 
flows generated by the use of a resource such as land, but also the magnitude of these flows. 
Thus the particular structure of property rights in an economy influences the allocation and 
~ 
utilisation of economic resources in specific and predictable ways (Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1972: 1139) . Furthermore, by reducing transaction costs and uncertainty, property rights 
should facilitate land market transactions (Beghin and Fafchamps, 1995). 
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Since property rights facilitate economic co-ordination in the face of interdependence and 
imperfect information, the equilibrium choice of property rights is determined by the market 
for predictable behaviour. Through the forces of demand and supply of predictable behaviour, 
the optimal structure of property rights will be established. 
1.3 Property rights in economic theory 
Traditional neo-classical economic theory regards property institutions as exogenous 
variables , with individuals being endowed with property rights in much the same way as they 
are endowed with natural resources (Ruttan, 1978: 334). Although an understanding of 
general equilibrium theory is important in dealing with market relations involved in 
production and exchange, in the real world the idealised Pareto conditions may not be 
satisfied. This thesis thus contends that the extension of neo-classical economics to include 
property institutions as endogenous variables in the econ~mic system is justified for three 
reasons that will be discussed in the ensuing sections . Before the justifications for this 
extension are elaborated upon, it is necessary to briefly describe the role of property rights in 
neo-classical economic theory. 
1.4 Neo-classical economic theory 
Neo-classical economics is , largely concerned with the allocation of resources in a market 
economy, and is based on two theoretical pillars; the principal of optimisation by individual 
economic agents, and the co-ordination of their activities through the market (Arrow, 1985: 
107). Neo-classical economic theory assumes that the economic system is one in which: (1) 
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transactions costs are zero and the decision maker operates with "unbounded rationality" (i .e ., 
information desired by the decision maker is obtained and processed at zero cost); (2) firms 
and individuals act rationally and are profit maximisers ; and (3) institutional arrangements 
play no role in determining equilibrium solutions (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 11). 
1.4.1 Economic efficiency in neo-classica1 economics 
Economic efficiency in neo-classical economics refers to efficiency of resource allocation 
under market conditions. According to the dominant paradigm of neo-classical economics , the 
Walrasian general equilibrium model , costlessly determined prices suffice for all allocation 
problems and a Pareto optimal solution is attained via the market exchange of property rights. 
In the absence of transaction costs , the initial distribution of property rights does not matter 
from an efficiency point of view since these rights can be voluntarily and costlessly adjusted 
to attain the Pareto optimal allocation of rights . Consequently , the concept of efficiency and 
equity become separable if the neo-classical assumptions hold (Bardhan, 1989: 5) . When 
equilibrium is disturbed in the Walrasian model , a new equilibrium is instantaneously attained 
because , given zero transaction costs , the cost of adjustment is zero . Under these conditions , 
all Pareto-relevant externalities would tend to be eliminated in the process of free exchange-
contract among affected parties (Coase, 1960) . Prices alone are sufficient to ensure that 
resources are allocated to their highest-valued use , and economic efficiency is ensured 
(Barzel , 1989: 9) . 
Economic efficiency is measured usmg the supposedly value-free criterion of Pareto 
optimality . A social state is regarded as Pareto optimal if, and only if, no agent's position can 
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be improved without causing a deterioration in the position of some other agent. Under the 
neo-classical, costless transactions assumptions , a Pareto optimal outcome will be attained 
when a set of three marginal equivalencies are satisfied: equal marginal rates of substitution in 
consumption between consumers; equal marginal rates of transformation in production 
between producers; and equal overall rates of substitution and transformation. An infinite 
number of Pareto optima abound, each reflecting different initial allocations of property rights 
and different power structures in society . 
1.4.2 Limitations of the neo-classical model 
1.4.2.1 The cost of imperfect information 
The process by which resources move to their highest valued use relies on an exchange of 
property rights (Furubotn and Richter , 1990: 6). In the Walrasian model , commodities and 
markets are homogeneous, concentrated at a single point in space and exchange is 
instantaneous . This is not so if transaction costs are positive. In order that rights to an asset be 
complete, or perfectly delineated, both the owner and the other interested individual in the 
exchange must possess full knowledge of all the rights' valued properties. While property 
rights provide information and thereby reduce transaction costs faced by individual economic 
agents , the processes of defining and enforcing a property rights system are themselves not 
costless and information is scarce (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 3) . With positive transaction 
costs, the attributes of the asset are not fully known and exchange that would have otherwise 
improved resource allocation may be forsaken (Coase, 1988: 12). Under these conditions , ~ 
prices alone will not ensure the optimum allocation of resources. The level of transaction 
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costs thus detennines the extent to which individual economic agents are able to profitably 
exchange property rights for mutual benefit. Insofar as neo-classical theory ignores 
transaction costs, it ignores a fundamental feature of reality (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 11) . 
The presence of transaction costs also explains the existence of externalities . Externalities 
arise when there is a disparity in the incidence of costs and benefits arising from an 
individual's actions (Bromley and Cochrane, 1994). According to Demsetz (1967) the 
conversion of a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality occurs when the cost of 
bringing the effect to bear on the decision of one or more interacting individuals is too high to 
make it worthwhile . The existence of externalities has a profound effect on economic 
incentives, because in making econOffilC decisions, economic agents tend only to take 
cognisance of those effects that have a direct bearing on their own welfare. Since transaction 
costs prohibit all effects being brought to bear on the decision maker, efficient allocation of 
resources T nlY occur to the extent to which externalities are 'internalised' (Baber, 
1991: 12). 
1.4.2.2 Economic incentives 
Institutions define the set of behavioural rules that govern patterns of action and resource use 
in a society (Ruttan, 1978). By establishing the 'rules of the game' within which individual 
economic agents must make decisions, the property institution of a society detennines who 
has what claims with regard to income flows generated by the use of a resource such as land, 
and the magnitude of these flows . The particular structure of property rights in an economy 




defining economic incentives , the property rights structure and tenure institution cannot be 
regarded as exogenous to the economic process. 
1.4 .2.3 Ethical considerations 
Neo-c1assical econOlTIlC theory relies on the (supposedly value-free) criterion of Pareto 
optimality to evaluate differ~nt social states . However , in the presence of positive transaction 
costs , the separability of efficiency from equity breaks down since the efficiency of resource 
allocation depends critically upon ownership structures and property relations (Bardhan, 
1989: 5). Pareto optimality is thus not free of ethical value judgements, since it is based on 
the premise that the existing distribution and structure of property rights is morally 
acceptable . But, since no unique Pareto optimal state exists , and there are an infinite number 
of Pareto optima which reflect alternative initial distributions of property rights , any Pareto 
optimum cannot be ethically value-free since the Pareto criterion tacitly sanctions the status 
quo . 
Since property institutions define the property rights structure prevailing in a society and 
determine the initial distribution of resources , they determine who has what rights with 
respect to the income flows generated by the use of resources. The property institutions thus 
determine the demand for , and supply of, any particular resource and consequently the 
resource 's price . A different set of property rights would therefore lead to a different set of 
prices . Markets in themselves can therefore neither justify the property rights which structure 
them, nor the consequences of their operations, and the existing structure of property rights is 
thus not necessarily morally acceptable. 
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1.5 Institutional economic theory 
Granted that the conventional neo-classical efficiency standards are unsatisfactory , the need 
arises to move towards a concept that takes fuller account of the real-life constraints that 
limit individual choices . It is necessary to move beyond the non-ethical or positive approach 
of neo-classical economics , to include an ethical evaluation of the prevailing property 
institution and level of transaction costs , and to include property institutions as endogenous 
variables in the economic system. 
Economists have thus given increasing attention to the role institutions play in the operation 
of economic systems. This approach seeks to extend the range of applicability of neo-
classical theory by considering how institutions and transaction costs affect individual 
incentives and economic behaviour (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 1). Modern institutional 
economics focuses on the institution of property and the rules governing property rights , 
and as such is a useful tool for analysing economic incentives and resource allocation in 
agriculture . 
1.5. 1 Economic efficiency in institutional economics. 
Assuming different economic agents have different perceptions of the transaction costs and 
benefits attached to any market exchange of rights , and the only source of valuation of assets 
or resource claims is the revealed choice behaviour of parties to potential exchanges , there is 
consequently no means whereby an external observer can determine whether or not observed 
levels of exchange stop short of an 'efficient' norm (Buchanan, 1986: 94-95) (compared to the 
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neo-classical assertion that the 'optimal' allocation of resources is determinate, conceptually, 
to any external observer). Efficiency in resource use within a given institutional setting is thus 
assured, provided market participants remain free to make or refuse exchange. 
Implicit in this conclusion is the recognition that the legal assignment of rights within an 
institution may affect the allocation of resources within a society. Provided rights are clear, 
agreement on a change of rules within which exchanges take place would result in a new 
pattern of resource ownership. Agreement on such a change of rules indicates that the new 
rules are deemed to be more efficient than the old rules, and is in response to changes in the 
economic, social and political environment of a society. This exchange between sets of 
constraints is what Buchanan (1991: 5) calls constitutional economics (or institutional 
economics), with its emphasis centred on the selection of rules, or institutions, that will in 
turn limit the behaviour of the persons who operate within them, rather than on the given 
efficiency in a particular institutional setting. As such, institutional economics extends the 
neo-classical approach to include the reciprocal exchange of liberties (Buchanan, 1991: 6). 
Free exchange between institutional settings will occur through the forces generated by utility 
maximising considerations that move the rules towards that which is 'efficient'. That which is 
efficient is that which all affected parties agree upon. Efficiency in this sense is concerned 
with the extent to which the institutions of a society are responsive to the values and choices 
of individual citizens, rather than with resource allocation within a given institution. If 
voluntary exchange between institutions is constrained via a political agency, trade between 
institutions is not possible and the allocative patterns can be labelled as 'presumably 
inefficient' (Buchanan, 1986: 98). Such property institutions, imposed from above and 
17 
regarded as fundamentally unfair by the communities affected, will be inherently unstable due 
to the political demand for change. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AGRICUL TURAL LAND TENURE INSTITUTIONS 
It was suggested in Chapter One that efficiency in resource allocation is neither objectively 
nor independently measurable. As a consequence, attention must be focused on the 
exchange process itself, and on the incentive structures within the different institutional 
settings that facilitate individual interaction. Before the process by which individuals chose 
between property institutions is described, the incentive structures of four idealised 
property institutions applicable to agricultural land - open access, common property, private 
property and state property - will be discussed. The remainder of the chapter then critically 
analyses the prevailing theories of institutional innovation. 
2.1 The land tenure institution 
The institution whereby individuals gain property rights to land is called the land tenure 
system. The land tenure system sets out the ' rules of the game', and is fundamental in 
defining and upholding property rights to land. Important components of any property rights 
to land include the following: (a) the right to use the asset (U5U§.), (b) the right to appropriate 
returns from the asset (usus jru.ctus) , and (c) the right to change the asset's form, substance 
and location (abusus) , which allows the owner of the right to transfer all rights (through a 
sale) or some rights (via a rental agreement) in the asset to others at a mutually agreed-upon 
price (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 6). Two characteristic property rights are the right to be 
included in, and to exclude others from, particular benefit streams. Different property 
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institutions are characterised by different combinations of these basic property rights, and 
result in different penalty-reward structures (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972) . 
Additionally, different tenure institutions provide different levels of tenure security . Tenure 
security is defined by Place et al (1994: 20) as an individual's perception of his/her 
undisturbed rights to a piece of land on a continuos basis, as well as the ability to reap the 
benefits of labour and capital invested in the land, either in use or upon,alienation. The level 
,..-
of tenure security afforded by a particular tenure institution is thus a function of three 
components, viz. The breadth, duration and assurance of an individual's property rights, with 
legal and economic dimensions . The breadt~ , or robustness , of rights defines the legal 
quantity or bundle of rights held over the land (use, transfer and exclusion rights). Duration 
refers to the length of time during which the bundle of rights is legally valid. Assurance 
defines the certainty with which legal definitions of breadth and duration are held. If legal 
procedures are unclear, or their outcomes uncertain, tenure is insecure. Thus, while the legal 
dimension defines the de jure composition and duration of an individual's property rights to 
land, de facto tenure security is largely dependant on the assurance with which property rights 
are held. From an economic perspective, if anyone of these conditions is lacking, tenure is 
not secure (Lyne and Roth, 1994; Runge , 1981) . 
2.2 Incentive implications of different land tenure institutions 
Institutions establish expectations about the rights to resource use in economic activity and 
about the partitioning of the income stream resulting from economic activity by defining and 
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upholding property rights. As a result, different property institutions can be expected to 
provide different economic incentives to individuals within the society. 
The incentive implications of four idealised property institutions regarding land, namely open 
access, common property, private property and state property are examined. Considered in 
this analysis is the extent to which the consequences of decisions will be brought to bear on 
the interacting parties (externalities) and the extent to which agents will co-ordinate their 
activities and interact for their mutual benefit (economic co-ordination). The level of 
economic co-ordination is an important development consideration since it influences factor 
mobility, and hence resource allocation (i.e . the extent to which individuals are able to enter 
into mutually beneficial exchange resulting in land being held by those who value it most 
highly) . 
2.2. I Open access 
Open access is best described by the maxim 'everybody's property is nobody' s property '. 
Under open access, institutional rules do not assign exclusive property rights to groups or 
individuals. This implies that no individual is excluded from the use of, and hence the benefit 
streams emanating from, the particular resource (land) and all property rights are inclusive . 
2.2 .1.1 Economic co-ordination 
In the absence of exclusive property rights , it is impossible to enter into mutually beneficial 
exchanges regarding land as transaction costs are infinite since the owner of the land cannot 
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be identified (Lyne and Nieuwoudt , 1990) . Land is lost to the market under open access , and 
cannot move to its most valued use via market transactions . In the absence of a land market , 
land is viewed as a costless resource as it has zero opportunity cost, removing the incentive to 
invest in land saving teclmology (Nieuwoudt, 1990) . Further, since property rights to land are 
not transferable, land cannot be used for collateral to attract credit. 
2.2.1.2 Externalities 
Owing to the infinite costs of bringing to bear on an individual decision maker the 
consequences of his/her actions under open access, the likelihood of free-riding will be 
I 
pervasive . By means of an example, grazing resources in common rangelands are open to all 
~ 
and are thus regarded as a free good to individual agents. In contrast, society regards grazing 
as a scarce good (unless it is abundant relative to the demands placed upon it) and private 
costs and benefits thus differ from social costs and benefits . The equilibrium rate of 
exploitation under open access occurs where private costs of using the land equal average 
product, and the resource earns zero rent. If the private cost of keeping cattle on the common 
grazing land is very low, the equilibrium stocking rate may exceed the ~aximum sustainable 
stocking rate. 
Under these conditions negative externalities - associated with the over-utilisation and 
degradation of the land - are not internalised, leading to overgrazing (at least in the economic 
sense). Perhaps a more serious consequence is that positive externalities - associated with 
fixed improvements in the land - are not internalised because of the actions of free-riders and . , 
herein lies the 'tragedy of the commons '. Such a divergence between social and private cost 
) 
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cannot be remedied endogenously as suggested by Coase (1960), owing to the presence of 
infinitely large transaction costs, and results in non-optimal land allocation and weak 
economic incentives (Runge, 1981). 
While free-riding and resource degradation under open access is well documented (Hardin, 
1968; Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1990), Runge (1981) contends that open access is not 
synonymous with strict individual dominance, and that open access is characterised by non-
separable externalities. Mathematically , j(XI,X2) *- /l(XI) + fi(X2). Using two cattle owners 
r -
grazing cattle on a common range with unrestricted acc<1ss (qJ and q2 being the number of, 
cattle grazed by farmer 1 and 2, respectively), Runge (1981) showed that marginal cost is 
r 
affected not only by the variable under the control of the individual, but also by the other 
individual's choice variable (the number of cattle grazed) . Thus, CJ(qJ, q2) = Alq/ + BlqJql" 
and C2(ql, q2) = A2q{ + B2q2q/ and individuals are conditioned by their expectations of the 
likely behaviour of others. Decision making thus involves interdependent choices made under 
unceqainty regarding the other agent's actions . 
It is argued that the incentive exists for communities to formulate co-ordinate strategies 
enabling individuals to form more certain expectations as to the strategies perused by others 
(Buchanan, 1993: 4). However, incentives to free-ride and capture benefits for free may 
undermine incentives to organise the collective solution (Runge, 1981), as each individual has 
the incentive to cheat. Furthermore, endogenous shifts away from open access involve high 
transaction costs owing to the potentially infinite number of users and are thus made less 
likely. 
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2 .2 .2 Common property 
A common property institution is characterised by restricted acc~ss . Common property is thus 
not 'everybody's property ' but rather a finite and distinct group of individuals' property 
(Ciriancy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975), governed by a set of restrictive (institutional) rules 
which are agreed upon by the individuals using the resourr:,e, and rents accrue to the group as 
a whole. The individual's right to inclusion in the benefit streams emanating from the land 
depends upon membership of a particular group or community, and the community in tum 
must have the right to exclude outsiders. Two basic common property institutions can be 
identified: 
i) . Here members of the group exercise their own 
-~...---t''-.. 
management decisions within the constraints established by the group as a whole. 
ii) The second relates to An n-user group . Here members of a defmed group surrender 
their use-rights to an elected body, who manages the resource on behalf of the group. 
Examples of non-user group management institutions include private companies and 
similar business organisations. 
2.2.2. 1 Economic co-ordination 
Individuals under common property institutions managed by a user group are unable to freely 
exchange their inclusive use rights, either amongst themselves or with agents outside the 
group/community, as each individual has an indivisible share of the communally owned 
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resource. As a result, land markets are constrained since potential buyers/renters wishing to 
seCllreE~ghts must first find and then negotiate with all the group members . The 
larger the group , the greater the transaction costs and the more constrained the land market 
will be . 
By contrast, successful non-user groups facilitate the development of a land (rental) market -
provided free-rider incentives are limited - since the potential tenant need only negotiate with 
the management committee, regardless of group size. If the benefits from renting the property 
to an outside agent exceed profits earned by own management, the management body may be 
urged by its members (the land owners) to enter into a (ren~L l ontract with an outside agent. 
" 




To successfully internalise negative externalities, user groups must be small. Firstly, 
transaction costs associated with large groups - the costs of negotiating and enforcing the rules 
- tend to cancel the benefits of collective action (typically 1 groups of less than six participants 
can be successful (Olson, 1971: 54». Secondly, since strict individual dominance no longer 
applies (Runge" 1981), ecision making involves interdependent choice . Each individual has ') 
"'--- -, 
to decide, based on his/her expectations regarding others' actions, whether or not to enter the 
initial coalition. As group size increases , accountability decreases as the assurance regarding 
others' actions decreases. Accordingly , the likelihood of collective action decreases on 
account of uncertainty and higher transaction costs. Even with complete assurance regarding 
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others I actions, t e economic incentive to defect still exists in large groups since marginal 
private returns to the common resource (communal grazing) exceed the marginal private cost 
of, for example, keeping an additional livestock unit. 
User groups also experience difficulties in internalising positive externalities associated with 
individual investments. This is because transaction costs associated with the establishment of 
rules governing a common resource are likely to vary with the complexity of the rules . Thus, 
while rules regulating group access may evolve endogenously, even small groups will find it 
difficult to devise rules that partition benefits of collective investments in the same proportion 
as members share costs. Individual investments in fixed improvements are thus less likely in 
user groups because of the actions of free-riders . . 
These problems can be overcome by successful non-user group management organisations. 
On Maori land in New Zealand, the introduction of a management organisation concentrating 
managerial power in the hands of an elected management body converted an open access 
resource into an asset that could be farmed exclusively by the management committee, or 
leased to a tenant, with the proceeds divided amongst the owners (Lyne, 1994). The operation 
of an efficient land market compels the management organisation to consider the long-term 
effects of management decisions, as both positive and negative externalities are internalised by 
the non-user group. Ideally, the business organisation should allow individuals to be rewarded 
in proportion to their investment or share in the resource. This ensures that returns to 
individual investments in the group owned resource accrue to the individual, further 
increasing investment incentives . 
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Even though all members of the group may not adhere to agreed upon rules, it is argued that 
a minimum coalition prepared to observe the rules is sufficient for an endogenous move to a 
stable structure of well-defined property rights (R~ge, 1985). Those adhering to the rules 
will be better off than if no rules existed, which implies that a certain number of free-riders 
will be tolerated. Moreover, the incentive to benefit from free-riding in the short run must be 
measured against the incentive to uphold the co-operative agreement which promotes the 
welfare of the group as a whole. Rawls (1971, cited by Wade, 1987) has shown analytically 
that compliance of one individual to the rules can reinforce other players to do likewise. 
2.2.3 Private property 
A private property right is the right to the exclusive benefit of the income stream flowing 
from a particular resource . This right includes the right to enter into contracts with other 
economic agents concerning the benefit stream and is absolute in the sense that it is limited 
only by those restrictions explicitly stated in the laws of a society . 
2.2.3 .1 Economic co-ordination 
With private property rights, transactions costs are minimised and an economic agent can 
transfer a resource's entire rent (income) stream through its sale or temporarily transfer a 
portion of the right through renting. Land is thus highly mobile under absolute private 
property rights, and competition for rights expressed in market transactions transmits 
comprehensive information in the form of prices. 
27 
Market prices co-ordinate and transmit widely dispersed information which is of mutual 
benefit to both buyers and sellers. As such, the main role of the market is to reduce the cost 
of carrying out exchange transactions . Within the market, the price system co-ordinates 
knowledge dispersed amongst many people. The system works with an economy of 
knowledge. Only the most essential information is passed on and only to those concerned. 
Through the price system, the whole acts as one market, since limited individual fields of 
vision overlap sufficiently so that, through many intermediaries, the relevant information is 
communicated to all interested parties (Hayek, 1945). 
The transferability of land rights under private property institutions assigns an opportunity 
cost to land which represents the cost of non-transferral , and ensures that the resource moves 
to its most valued use . At this point, resources are subjectively val.ued most highly causing 
private and social costs and benefits to converge. 
2.2.3.2 Externalities 
In the presence of a well functioning asset market, private property rights confer the benefit 
stream flowing from the land entirely on the owner of the resource and management decisions 
influencing future rent streams are internalised either in use or upon ali~nation (Pasour, 1990: 
200). In this way , private property rights compel land owners to consider long-term effects of 
management decisions and provide economic incentives to invest on that land since the 
benefits of such investment are to a large degree internalised. The transferability of land 
rights also allows the individual to use the land as collateral, increasing the individual's ability 
to invest in the land (Pasour, 1990: 202). In the same way, negative externalities relating to 
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the consumption effect of possible resource degradation on future generations, are 
internalised. Decisions which result in reduced incomes in the future are reflected in lower 
current market values, encouraging the conservation of resources for future generations 
(Pasour, 1990: 201). 
2.2.4 State property 
State property exists when the state asserts its right of sovereignty over land, and economic 
rents from the land accrue to the state . The productivity of agriculture and the level of 
economic co-ordination under state property will depend on whether state-owned resources 
are allocated through the market mechanism or by central direction. 
2.2.4.1 Economic co-ordination 
If allocative decisions are made by central direction, information problems characteristic of 
public choice planning will prevent resources moving to their most valued use. In the absence 
of market prices to co-ordinate and communicate the information necessary to allocate 
resources, central planners must assimilate this dispersed information themselves. Information 
pertaining to time and place, known only to the individual "on the spot" is lost to the central 
planner and resource allocation is unlikely to be efficient (Hayek, 1945). These problems 
would clearly be overcome by allocating state-owned resources through the market. 
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2.2.4 .2 Externali ties 
Public choice planning (state planning) suffers incentive problems due to the presence of 
externalities, since democratic participation in public choice planning entails enormous 
information costs. Individual bureaucrats are given the power to make decisions in a 
- , 
collective choice environment, and face less direct responsibility for their decisions than do 
entrepreneurs operating under a decentralised market environment. They are thus open to 
rent seeking which influences resource allocation. Further, positive externalities 
surrounding individual investments in fixed improvements are not internalised on state 
owned land. Consequently , unless the individual investor is assured that he/she will ea a 
sufficiently high proportion of the resultant benefits by means of a long term, inheritableJ 
'7' 
lease, such investment will remain unlikely. 
~ - -
2.3 Institutional innovation: The evolutionary theory of land rights 
A growing volume of economic literature on institutional innovation subscribes to the doctrine 
of institutional change labelled by Platteau (1995: 2) as the evolutionary theory of land rights 
(ETLR). The core of this doctrine is that new institutions evolve whenever changes in factor 
endowments, technical change, or preferences that get reflected in price variations give rise to 
new cost -benefit possibilities to which the old institutions are no longer attuned. Institutional 
innovation thus arises out of dis-equilibrium in the structure of predictable expectations 
established according to the existing property institutions, and institutions evolve over time to 
mediate conflicting interests among individuals (Bromley and Cochrane, 1994). As such, 
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tenure institutions are regarded as dynamic and are capable of significant autonomous 
evolution in the right (efficiency enhancing) direction. 
This observation fits the Coasian ' transaction cost ' (and similar ' imperfect information ') 
theory , which postulates that new institutions and property rights evolve in response to the 
"desires of the interacting persons for adjustments to new cost-benefit possibilities" (Demsetz, 
1967 : 350), arising from new technologies that invoke new harmful and beneficial effects to 
which society has not yet been accustomed. 
A common point of departure for the ETLR is the stylised ' tragedy of the commons ' . Here, a 
potential value generating resource is used in common by all participants in the group, 
extending individualised usage of the resource beyond that level that would be optimally 
agreed upon as that participant's share in an idealised setting for collectively d~termined 
utilisation. As long as land is abundant, the absence of individual property rights does not 
necessarily have damaging consequences . In terms of externalities , they are of such small 
significance that it does not pay anyone to take them into account. However, when the gains 
from internalisation become larger than the cost, due to increases in the value of land as a 
productive asset and/or an increase in the value of information reducing risk and transaction 
costs following increasing returns attributable to agricultural land, efficiency considerations 
engender an endogenous shift from communal to more exclusive ownership rights (Ault and 
Rutman, 1979; Platteau, 1995 : 3). 
By assigning exclusive rights to a resource (land), individuals are able to freely enter into the 
exchange economy since they are no longer dependant on the actions of others (as under open 
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access , and to a lessor extent, common property). The individual has the incentive to use the 
resource 'optimally ' since any departure from efficiency results in opportunity costs that are 
incurred by the resource owner. Furthermore, the individual maintains private control over 
the productive resources and is 'at liberty ' to use the resources as he/she deems fit, thereby 
increasing the individual's choice set (Buchanan, 1993: 16) . Thus the evolution of secure and 
marketable rights theoretically represents the optimal institutional setting . 
2.3.1 A critique of the evolutionary theory of land rights 
The metaphor of the tragic commons suggests that productive tenure reform lies in the 
demand for increased individual independence, and draws attention to the assignment of 
separated rights of exclusion to individuals . However, while the ETLR and the 'transaction 
cost' theory help to identify members who share a common interest in a collective good (for 
example , more exclusive property rights) , both theories fail to take account of the significant 
costs incurred in achieving the desired assignment of property rights. Such costs arise from 
collective action - resulting in high transactions costs incurred by large groups with egalitarian 
shares of the benefits of collective action (Olson, 1971: 34) - and from free-riders who limit 
the ability of potential gainers to get together and bring about an institutional change. 
Implicit in the ETLR is a re-assignment of property rights , which influences the initial 
distribution of income and wealth. There will thus be resistance to change from those 
benefiting from the existing property rights structure. The political cost of altering the 
existing structure of property rights will depend critically upon the relative strengths of the 
different interest groups affected by the proposed change. The larger the group, the greater 
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the organisational cost (Olson, 1971: 48) . A small group with an interest in maintaining the 
status quo may be able to prohibit institutional change desired by a large number of people. 
Reliance on lobby groups to determine the optimal level of institutional innovation may result 
in unpredictable and undesirable consequences. Since much opposition to endogenous change 
is likely to come from households whose social security is threatened by enclosure, the 
transition may not occur until sub-division and degradation of land reduces its social security 
value to a level comparable with lesser forms of insurance (Lyne and Roth, 1994). Thomson 
and Lyne (1993) noted that chiefs in rural KwaZulu-Natal resisted the evolution of a rental 
market in certain areas as they perceived this to reduce their control over land. In the same 
region, Lyne and Nieuwoudt (1990) noted that stock owners resisted attempts by farmers to 
rent idle land because their supply of communal grazing diminished when fallow land was 
cultivated. This economic theory is further corroborated by empirical evidence from Kenya 
indicating that customary tenure in certain areas of the country only underwent endogenous 
individualisation (prior to land reforms initiated in the 1950's) in the face of increasing 
population pressure, over-use of grazing resources and soil erosion (Barrows and Rpth, 1990: 
270). 
On the other hand, the successful lobby for more exclusive rights by a small group may have 
negative equity implications for households relying on secondary rights to land, as enclosure 
occurs at the expense of the egalitarian land ethic characteristic of communal tenures. This 
may result in distress sales, land grabbing and the emergence of a ' landless class '. 
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Finally , although free-riding is not necessarily a dominant strategy (see Section 2.2 .1.2) and 
enforcement of agreed upon rules is not a logical necessity (Runge, 1981), where strategies 
are imperfectly co-ordinated, outside enforcement of institutional rules may help achieve 
Pareto-improvements. This requirement increases transaction costs , further constraining the 
endogenous institutional innovation. 
2.4 The supply of institutional innovation 
Constraints on the successful endogenous evolution of property rights often encourages policy 
makers to carry out administrative reforms, notably the introduction of registered title deeds. 
The adoption of such 'replacement policies ' may have undesirable consequences if they are 
not well suited to the needs and resource constraints facing the particular community . 
Empirical evidence from several African case studies has shown that the exogenous supply of 
land titling may create rather than reduce tenure insecurity and conflict over land rights. If the 
formal land code is ambiguous in its definition of rights, and if legal procedures to settle 
disputes are vague, land holders may not perceive increased tenure security following 
registration of title. Studies by Roth et al (1994: 224) in Somalia and Carter et al (1994: 166) 
in Kenya indicate that title contributed little to investments or land improvements in 
agriculture . Kille and Lyne (1993) demonstrated empirically that exclusive and assured tenure 
is a significant determinant of on-farm investments in KwaZulu-Natal, but that these 
conditions have little to do with land titling. Failure to update title deeds upon transfer further 
exacerbates disputes and tenure insecurity . A recent sample survey of freehold farmers in 
KwaZulu-Natal showed that 41 per cent of respondents had insecure property rights because 
34 
the farm was registered to a deceased person, and 32 per cent lacked exclusive rights as the 
same parcel of land was registered to more than one person (Kille and Lyne, 1993). 
In addition, an active land market has often not resulted in those regions where land titles 
were registered. In Kenya, the absence of legal support for registered title deeds following a 
land registration programme initiated in the 1950's served only to create confusion over 
property rights and reduced security of tenure (Barrows and Roth, 1990). On the contrary, 
some titling programmes prohibited all market transfers . In Somalia where land transfers 
were banned, the rental market virtually collapsed due to increased risk (Lyne and . Roth, 
1994). 
The dangers of instituting land (title) registration in a situation where the property rights 
market indicates that this would not be the optimal tenure system are essentially threefold. 
Firstly, by replacing traditional arrangements land registration is likely to extinguish some 
secondary land rights. Thus, while neo-classical theory implicitly assumes an inverse 
relationship between exclusivity of property rights and transaction costs, it can be argued that 
costs associated with increased landlessness and the loss of secondary rights associated with 
the enclosure of common property may indeed lead to a positive relationship between the 
exclusivity of property rights to land and transaction costs incurred in negotiations to maintain 
secondary rights and an egalitarian distribution of land for some individuals (Atwood, 1990; 
Lyne and Roth , 1994). 
Secondly, land registration may have negative equity implications for poorer smallholders. 
Transaction costs associated with formal private tenure (including fees for lawyers, surveyors 
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and government officials) vary little according to the size of the farm, placing large land-
owners in a position where they are more able to afford land transactions . In addition, 
wealthier land-owners usually have better access to information and have a greater 
appreciation of the implications of land registration (Atwood, 1990). Consequently , larger 
land owners may be in a strong position to exploit poorer, less informed smallholders, 
resulting in increased landlessness and decreased individual liberty for those without land in 
communal areas (Feder and Noronha, 1987). 
Finally , the state may be unable, or unwilling, to supply the level of public support needed for 
the impartial implementation and administration of these rights, and land rights may remain 
unenforceable (Feder and Noronha, 1987). The introduction of non-sanctioned title deeds 
could introduce or heighten uncertainty , as local institutions are disrupted leading to conflict 
between existing and new rights. Under these circumstances the costs of entering into land 
transfers are further compounded by the necessity to discover the legitimate holder of 
property rights, or to settle disputes in this regard. 
2.5 The optimal level of institutional change 
The process of institutional change has important implications for proposed land reforms in 
Southern Africa. It is essential that land reform policies recognise the status quo, to avoid 
conceptualising a complete restructuring of the agricultural sector from within a vacuum. 
The existing distribution of rights and endowments among individual economic agents , 
along with the historically determined structure of property rights, are an existential 
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reality . This reality will consequently define the constraints to , and consequences of, any 
future land policy. 
Clearly , changes in population density , technology and political power are all important in 
ensuring efficient institutional innovation (Feder and Feeny, 1993: '249). The existence of 
different interest groups must be recognised to ensure that the evolution of land tenure 
changes from an unpredictable process to a more pragmatic one. This is essential, as 
efficient institutional innovation requires a tenure system well adapted to the needs and 
resource constraints facing the community as a whole. Innovations to the contrary may 
increase transaction costs and uncertainty , decreasing tenure security and economic 
incentives, 
This implies that , given the heterogeneity and number of agents within society, the 
efficiency of institutional innovation will depend to a large degree on the efficiency of the 
democratic process, i.e. the extent to which it is representative of, and accountable to, all 
members of society . In situations where social and political costs and benefits differ (for 
example , where politicians gain and hold power by eliciting the support of particular 
interest groups (Pasour, 1985: 528) , or act purely for ideological reasons - as has occurred 
in South Africa prior to 1992) , the state may impose artificial constraints on · property 
institution, inhibiting agricultural development (Baber, 1991: 40). 
It must be noted that the democratic process alone will not optimise institutional 
arrangements , as voters do not have perfect information and democratic choices may not 
reflect the wishes of future generations . 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL: THE LINK BETWEEN LAND TENURE SECURITY 
AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
From an institutional perspective it is postulated that the evolution of exclusive and 
enforceable land rights is closely related to increases in population density, advances in 
farming technology and the emergence of agricultural markets (Feder and Noronha, 1987). 
According to van den Brink et al (1994), tenure institutions in African countries have arisen 
quite reasonably as a result of productive responses to the felt needs of the communities. 
However , theory presented in the previous chapter suggests that the evolution of tenure 
institutions in many African countries may be constrained by the actions of vested interest 
groups and prohibitive transaction costs. 
Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa 's rapid population growth and increasing levels of 
poverty, this has led to growing debate about whether indigenous land tenure systems in 
Africa are in fact a constraint on agricultural productivity. If this is not the case, the need for 
widespread and costly tenure reforms and land registration programs in Africa is called into 
question (Place and Hazell, 1993). In order to test this postulate, numerous recent studies 
have adopted broad theoretical models describing the relationship between land tenure 
security and agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa (Kille and ~yne, 1993; Place and 
Hazell, 1993; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; and others). Specifically , the studies have 
investigated the relationship between land tenure security and credit use, on-farm investments 
in agriculture, complementary short-term input use and yields. 
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This study adds to the debate, investigating the interaction between land tenure security and 
agricultural productivity in the small farm sector characteristic of many regions of sub-
Saharan Africa, and the likely impact of a group ownership resettlement model on economic 
incentives . The study differs from previous World Bank and Land Tenure Center studies in 
that it adopts a broader deflnition of tenure security, attempting to measure tenure security as 
a function of the breadth, duration and assurance of an individuals' property rights to land. 
The analysis is likely to have important implications for land reform in South Africa, 
especially regarding the effect of incentive distortions under communal land ownership, and 
the likely impact of a proposed group ownership resettlement model on economic incentives. 
3.1 The interaction between tenure security and agricultural productivity 
According to economic theory, the efflcient and sustainable use of agricultural land requires, 
firstly, economic incentives to invest in agriculture, and to conserve and improve land. 
Secondly, it requires the ability to fmance such investments in land, improvements and farm 
inputs. Finally, efflcient land use requires an active market to allocate land and other 
productive resources to their most effective use (Nieuwoudt, 1990). It is hypothesised that the 
extent to which these conditions are satisfled depends on the level of tenure security afforded 
by the institutional environment within which farmers operate (Feder and Noronha, 1987) . 
The conceptual model investigating this hypothesis is outlined in the following sections, and is 
summarised in Figure 3. 1. 
Increased demand 
for complementary 
short-term in uts 
Increased incentive and 
ability to invest in 
a riculture 
Increased supply of 
credit (short/medium 
term 
L-------4a1 Increased short-term input 
a lication/hectare ~""'------I 
Figure 3.1: Secure property rights and agricultural productivity: A conceptual 
framework 
Source: Adapted from Feder et at, 1988 
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3.1.1 Tenure security and the land market 
Economic theory suggests that exclusive and assured land rights reduce tc:.alilsaction costs , 
including risk , surrounding land transfers . Expected returns to potential buyers and renters 
of land thus increase, leading to an aggregate outward shift in the demand curve for land, 
and the emergence of an active sale and/or rental market. At the same time, . land acquires 
an opportunity cost, penalising the non-use or under-use of land and facilitating the 
movement of land to more productive farmers, and rents are maximised. This leads to an 
increase in allocative efficiency. Land will only be left idle or under-utilised if transaction 
costs are high relative to the rent (because of distortions in the land market) or if farmers 
have distorted incentives or are not profit maximisers. 
Increased allocative efficiency is achieved through either a land sale market or a land rental 
market. For both sale and rental transactions, an efficien~ land market requires security of 
tenure and low transaction costs . Without clearly defined and enforceable property rights , 
transaction costs incurred in discovering the valid owner and in making and enforcing sale or 
rental transactions increase . If transactions costs are high relative to the perceived benefits of 
the transaction, market transfers may be prohibited and allocative efficiency impeded. Sale 
markets require greater tenure security than land rental markets as they demand a greater 
bundle of property rights. This is because the seller must transfer all rights to the land, not 
just use rights as in a rental transaction. 
Where farm size is small and households value land for the social security it provides, land 
saleability may have little bearing on allocative efficiency as there is no guarantee that the 
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offer price of a productive farmer will exceed the reservation price of land owners with few 
alternative forms of insurance (Lyne and Roth, 1994) . However , an active rental market 
would still transfer use rights to more productive farmers as there would still be an 
opportunity cost to penalise under-utilisation. Potential lessors need only rent out land that 
they do not require in the short-term, and do not suffer a loss in social security. Thus, apart 
from increasing allocative efficiency , voluntary rental transactions can have positive equity 
implications for many households . Poorer households unable to use all their land gain rental 
income and households renting in the land gain opportunities to extend their farming 
operations. The efficiency and equity advantages of a land rental market have been 
demonstrated by Thomson (1996) in study of rental market activity in rural areas of 
K waZulu -Natal. 
3.1.2 Tenure security and on-farm investments 
Exclusive and assured tenure is expected to encourage greater on-farm investment and 
conservation as the benefits of such investments can to a large degree be internalised, either in 
use , or if the land right is marketable , upon alienation (Feder and Onchan, 1987). If the rights 
are transferable, this ensure that a high rate of time preference by resource (land) owners need 
not imply that the resource will be used too quickly . A land market forces an owner, 
regardless of his age or time preference, to consider the preferences of future generations 
when making investment and conservation decisions because current market values reflect 
future expected income streams (Pasour , 1990: 200-202). Transferable property rights also 
assign an opportunity cost to land which provides farmers with the incentive to invest in land 
replacing technologies , such as improved grazing, improved soil fertility and hybrid seeds . It 
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is expected that tenure security is likely to be less of an issue for short-term input use, 
provided short-term use rights are secure for the duration of the growing season. 
Nonetheless, an increased derived demand for complementary short-term inputs is expected 
in areas characterised by more exclusive and assured property rights, while a weaker 
relationship might be expected for substitutes . 
Increased tenure security ensures that investment incentives are retained even when land 
rights are transferred via a rental agreement. The longer the lease period, the greater the 
incentive for the tenant to conserve and invest in the land (Pasour, 1990). When the lease 
period is short, the tenant has less incentive to invest in fixed improvements, but the owner of 
the property still has the incentive to invest in improvements and conservation, as this will 
impact on his future rent stream from the resource. However, the level of investment is 
expected to be less than that of an owner/operator due to uncertainty and moral hazard. 
Conversely, the less certain property rights are, the higher the discount rate for future returns, 
the lower the value of all returns to investments on the land and the smaller the volume of 
investments undertaken. Without clearly defined rights, transaction costs increase and the 
actions of free-riders discourage individual investments in land as benefits of such investments 
are not fully internalised. 
Analysis of survey data from numerous World Bank and Land Tenure Center studies testing 
the relationship between tenure security and on-farm investments have provided generally 
inconclusive results (Bruce et al, 1994: 255) . Results from a study in Kenya, Rwanda and 
Ghana show little relationship between secure land rights and the adoption of land improving 
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investments (Place and Hazell, 1993). However , these studies either failed to measure tenure 
security in terms of the breadth, duration and assurance of the property rights held (often 
measuring tenure security as the presence or otherwise of a land title in situations where this 
was not a relevant indicator of tenure security) , or failed to recognise that secure tenure 
provides economic incentives to both tenant and landlord to invest on rented land (e.g. Place 
and Hazell, 1993) . Where a broader definition of property rights is adopted, research 
demonstrates a stronger relationship between tenure security and investments. In Rwanda, 
Blare!' s (1994: 87) study showed a positive and significant relationship between tenure 
security and on-farm investment. Similarly, results presented by Kille and Lyne (1993) show 
that exclusive and assured tenure is a significant determinant of on-farm investment in rural 
areas of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. 
However, secure tenure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for agricultural investment 
and development. Farmers investment demand may be weak for reasons other than 
insufficient tenure security. Missing factor markets, inappropriate technology transfers and 
poorly developed input and output distribution mechanisms may aU constrain investment even 
if tenure is secure. 
3.1.3 Tenure security and access to credit markets 
Besides increasing the incentive to invest on agricultural land, it is hypothesised that secure 
tenure and a well functioning land market increases the demand for and supply of resources 
to finance such investments (Pasour, 1990: 202) . The supply of credit, especially formal 
credit (from formal lending institutions) frequently depends on the borrowers ownership 
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security, as the provision of land as collateral is a common prerequisite for commercial 
bank loans . Collateral reduces the lender 's cost of information regarding the borrowers 
r---
credit worthiness and risk of default. By lowering the risk and information costs faced by 
, I ' 
lenders , follateral can increase the number of profitable lending oQPOI:nmitie,§ and therefore 
....... - -
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the volume of agricultural credit, Even where land is not offered as collateral , exclusive 
land owners have , ceteris paribus, better access to credit because they are regarded as 
having higher credit worthiness by virt.ue of their secure land rights which are implicitly 
regarded as collateral (Feder et ai , 1988: 49). 
To act as suitable collateral, the bundle of use rights to land must include the right to 
transfer ownership . Further, lenders require assurance that the occupier of the land is 
indeed the legal owner. Roth et ai (1989) describe two other conditions necessary to 
enhance the collateral value of title deeds . Firstly, there must be a well developed land 
market that enables lenders to convert mortgaged land into financial assets at reasonable 
transaction costs upon foreclosure. The greater and more effective the restrictions on land 
sales, the lower the value of the land as collateral to the lender. Secondly, foreclosure must 
be politically feasible to reduce the lenders risk of loan losses. 
The absence of a land sale market does not necessarily preclude the use of land rights as 
collateral if land can be rented. By law , the lessee, with the consent of the lessor, is entitled 
to assign the rights and obligations of a lease to a third party , in this case the lending 
institution (Kerr, 1984) . In the event of foreclosure, the lease is sold at its present value. 
While long-term lease agreements are likely to be suited for this use, this still represents a 
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'second best' solution as the collateral value of a transferable lease deminishes over its 
contractual term. 
The supply side effect of secure tenure on formal credit use observed elsewhere (for 
example, by Feder and Onchan (1987) in Thailand) is not apparent in areas studied in sub-
Saharan Africa (Bruce et ai, 1994: 254) . Moreover, it is evident that land titles alone are 
unlikely to induce the development of active credit markets in sub-Saharan Africa (Migot-
Adholla et ai, 1991). This is likely to be a reflection of the absence of a well functioning 
land market and other institutional rigidities in capital markets, resulting in low overall use 
of formal credit in the areas studied. Furthermore, in areas where informal credit use 
predominates (as found in many areas of Africa (Atwood, 1990)), collateral may be of 
limited value . This is because informal lenders may not require land as collateral as they 
are often more able to enforce repayment, hence reducing the risk of default associated with 
the loan (Feder et ai, 1988: 45). 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLING AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
To test the conceptual model , household data were collected by means of an interview 
survey of small-scale farmers in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe. This chapter describes 
the choice of sampling technique adopted, and then gives a brief history of land policy 
shaping property rights in the different agricultural sectors of Zimbabwe. This section 
draw~ heavily on research conducted by the author in collaboration with the University of 
Zimbabwe during April 1993 (Moor, 1994) . Finally , the empirical techniques employed to 
estimate the hypothesised relationships will be discussed. 
4.1 Sampling techniques 
imple random sampling is a statistical technique whereby the target population's 
characteristics are measured by randomly selecting sample units from the study population 
with equal probability. Theoretically , the study and target populations should coincide , but 
often this is practically not possible. This is because the sample frame is not always 
representative, and t~ sampling variance is large (Barnett, 1991: '1.05) . Associated with 
non-representation is the possible problem of insufficient variation in the characteristics to 
be measured, limiting the sample 's usefulness in further statistical analysis. These problems 
can be overcome using stratified random sampling or multi-stage sampling. 
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Stratified random sampling requires that the target population to be estimated be divided 
into various strata, often chosen along geographical lines or for other administrative 
reasons. Within each stratum, a simple random sample of the sampling units are chosen and 
their characteristics measured. Provided the within stratum variance is less than the 
between strata variance, the technique will yield a representative sample with less variance 
than with simple random sampling (Barnett, 1991: 107). Multi-stage sampling stratifies the 
sample more than once, using different criterion at the different levels of stratification. 
4.2 The survey 
Data for the study were gathered by means of an int~v:iew survey of small scale farmers in 
~--
Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe, during April 1995. Respondents were revisited in August 
investi f the interaction between land tenure security and economic incentives under a ..... 
wide range of geographically adjacent tenure institutions, including small scale privately 
owned farms , communal areas and a government resettlement programme. Moreover, past 
government policies in Zimbabwe have purposefully favoured large scale commercial 
agriculture, invalidating comparisons between the large scale commercial sector (LSCS) and 
the small farm sector (Ashworth, 1993). By contrast, le~els of state support within the small 
farm sector have not varied much between regions. The Zimbabwean small farm sector was 
considered appropriate for the study given similarities between the South African and 
Zimbabwean small farm sectors, and Zimbabwe's experience with land reforms in the small 
farm sector initiated at independence in 1980. 
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The study area was stratified so as to maximise the variation on the measured tenure 
variables between strata. Three strata were identified, namely the Small Scale Commercial 
Sector (SSCS), the Communal Area (CA) and the Model A Resettlement Area (RA). A 
t:andom sample of households was drawn from each stratum and the household head 
interviewed: 40 from the SSCS, 39 from the RA and 40 from the CA. 
Each respondent was personally interviewed by the author with the aid of an interpreter, 
thus excluding the possible bias caused by the use of several interpreters. Discussions were 
../" 
also held with officials from goverrunent agricultural extension services (A GRIT EX) and 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). Amongst the variables measured in the 
questionnaire (Appendix A. I) were household characteristics, household head 
characteristics, farm characteristics (including measures of tenure security) and production 
characteristics. For each respondent, data were gathered on both grazing and arable 
allotments . 
4.3 Description of the survey areas 
Three geographically adjacent strata were identified in the Zimbabwean small farm sector. 
Differences in tenure institutions between the strata are largely the result of past 
Zimbabwean goverrunent policies . Before describing the location and tenure characteristics 
of the different strata, it is instructive to briefly review the history of land policy III 
Zimbabwe which shaped the current delimitation of property rights in the country. 
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4.3.1 The history of land policy in Zimbabwe 
Since white settlers first arrived in Zimbabwe in 1896, agriculture in Zimbabwe has been 
divided along racial lines resulting in a dualistic structure of property rights and land use 
patterns, with the different sectors characterised by different property institutions. By 1896 
just over six million hectares of farming land had been expropriated by the white settlers 
recruited in South Africa by Cecil John Rhodes, and the first African Reserve, comprising 
about 23 per cent of all arable land (Deininger and Binswanger, 1992), was established. 
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 institutionalised the racial division of land, classifying 
the country into European Areas (49,0 per cent), Native Reserves (21,7 per cent) and Native 
Purchase Areas (7,5 per cent). Approximately 17 per cent of the land was not allocated. In 
1969 the Land Apportionment Act was replaced by the Land Tenure Act (LTA). This Act 
decreased the European area and redistributed some of the previously unassigned areas. The 
Native Reserves were renamed Tribal Trust Lands, and are now called Communal Areas. At 
independence 6000 white large scale commercial farmers owned 15,6 million hectares (46,5 
%) of farm land, 700000 Communal Area farmers owned 16,3 million hectares (49,3 %) and 
1,4 million hectares (4,2 %) was owned by approximately 8500 small scale commercial 
farmers (originally the Native Purchase Areas) (Vink and Louw, 1990). 
4.3.2 Land policy since independence (1980) 
Following independence in 1980, the new government of Zimbabwe launched a two pronged 
development strategy with the stated aim of achieving 'Growth with Equity' (Zimbabwe, 
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1986). On the one hand, there was an obvious need for direct development within the 
overcrowded Communal Areas. Given that at independence: (1) the majority of the rural 
population lived in the Communal Areas, (2) Communal Areas were characterised by 
increasing population pressure and resource degradation and (3) the basic agricultural support 
institutions were primarily serving commercial agriculture, the new majority government 
committed resources to Communal Area sub-sector reforms. Such reforms included 
infrastructural improvements and the establishment of new rural marketing depo (Davies, 
7 
1990), and an increase in the Government guaranteed Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) credit extension into Communal Areas via the Small Farm Credit Scheme first initiated 
in 1978 (Mufuka, 1991). 
On the other hand, the demand for a more equitable distribution of land required additional 
land to be acquired to resettle communal farmers to extend their subsistence base (Davies, 
1990) . The government initiated a resettlement programme in September 1980, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Lancaster House agreement. In terms of this agreement, the British 
Government would underwrite half the cost of settlement, provided that land only changed 
hands on a 'willing seller - willing buyer' basis . Only 'under-utilised' land could be 
compulsorily acquired, but would have to be paid for immediately and at the market price 
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Comparison of land distribution by sector and natural region in 
Zimbabwe, 1980-1989. 
LSCS (%) SSCS (%) Communal (%) Resettled (%) , 
'80 '89 '80 '89 '80 '89 '80 '89 
2,8 1,8 0,5 0,7 0,8 0,8 - 0,9 
27,6 32,7 17,8 17,4 7,7 7,7 - 17,9 
20,7 21,5 37,9 38,4 17,3 17.7 - 37,7 
25,7 21,6 36,9 36,2 44,9 44,6 - 24,6 
23,3 22,2 6,9 7,2 29,3 29,1 - 18,8 
15680 11220 1416 1380 16279 16450 - 3290 
Source: Vink and Louw, 1990. 
Initially, the plan ,envisaged settling 18000 families on an area of 1,1 million hectares over 
five years . However, the first three-year Transitional Plan (1982/83 - 1984/85) redefined the 
target figure to be settled upwards to 162 000 families on 9 million hectares by as early as 
1984 (Vink and Louw, 1990). By the end of 1983, over 2 million hectares of commercial 
farm land had been purchased by the state for redistribution. However, after 1983 land 
acquisition showed a marked loss of momentum as the budget fell from Z$ 25 million in 1980 
to Z$2 million in 1985. By the end of June 1989 the policy had fallen well short of its target; 
3,2 million hectares (10.2 per cent) of Zimbabwe's agricultural and were redistributed to 
53968 settler families, including 0,5 million hectares of state land and 2,7 million hectares of 
land acquired from the predominantly white large scale commercial sector (LSCS) at a cost of 
Z$68,9 million. Over 83 per cent of the land had been acquired by 1983/84 (Roth, 1993). 
After more than a decade of land reforms, land distribution in Zimbabwe still remains highly 
skewed. In 1989, 4660 families still held 11,2 million hectares of land in the LSCS, while 
over one million families live on 16,4 million hectares in the Communal Areas. 
} 
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To clearly understand the impact of past policies and land ownership patterns on production, 
it is helpful to look at land ownership in terms of Zimbabwe I s land use potential. Zimbabwe 
can be divided into five agro-ecological zones or Natural Regions (NR), which provide a 
broad framework for evaluating potential land use , as follows (Weiner et ai, 1985): 
I. Specialised and diversified farming region . This area is well suited to tea, coffee and 
forest crops, as well as intensive livestock. 
II. Intensive farming region. Maize, tobacco , cotton, wheat, other grains and intensive 
livestock are well suited to this region. 
III. Semi-intensive farming region. Best suited to semi-intensive livestock production. 
Cropping is risky in this region. 
IV . Semi-extensive farming region. Livestock is the only sound farming system in this 
region. 
V. Extensive livestock region. Extensive livestock farming is the only possible farming 
system without irrigation. 
From Table 4.1 it is evident that only 8,5 per cent of land in Communal Areas and 18,8 per 
cent of land in the Resettled Areas is considered to be of high arable potential (NR I and NR 
II) , compared to 34.5 per cent in the LSCS (Vink and Louw, 1990) . 
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4.3.3 The Tanda Small Scale Commercial Sector 
The Tanda Small Scale Commercial farming area is situated 155 kilometres east of Harare in 
Manicaland Province, 32° 15' east and 17° 45 ' south (Figure 4.1). This area, formerly known 
as the Tanda Native Purchase Area, was first occupied by small scale commercial farmers in 
the 1930's. 
The area was selected for the study as it is adjacent to bota a Resettlement Area and a 
Communal Area. The nearest town is Headlands which is 45 kilometres away, although most 
supplies come from Rusape which is 80 kilometres away. These towns provide little 
employment for the area, with most off-farm workers employed in Harare (this is also the 
case in the CA and RA) . Access to the area is via a poorly maintained dirt road from 
Headlands, while vehicular access to individual farms is often impossible (most farmers use 
ox-drawn carts). There is a daily bus service to Rusape, and a twice weekly service to Harare. 
The Tanda village has a school and two Spaza shops. There is one AGRITEX extension 
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Figure 4.1 : Map of Zimbabwe showing the location of the study area 
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4.3.3 .1 Tenure institution 
Land in the SSCS is initially held under long-term lease from the government with an option 
to purchase . Once purchased, farmers are issued freehold title to the land and are free to enter 
into land transactions. However, it has been noted that private tenure in the SSCS may be 
somewhat conditional compared to that on other freehold land held under the statu law 
(Ashworth, 1993). Certain usufructuary and secondary rights to freehold land belonging to 
others are recognised by the state. This is as a result of social customs and traditional family 
rights becoming intertwined with the often misunderstood concepts and practices of owning 
land in a freehold sense . Nonetheless , property rights are transferable , which according to 
Ashworth (1993) , has afforded SSCS farmers improved access to credit facilities. The average 
farm size in the SCSS was estimated by Gustafsson (1987) to be approximately 128 hectares. 
4.3.4 The Tanda Communal Area 
The Tanda Communal Area is situated just east of the Tanda SSCS, and extends to the 
mountainous Nyanga Communal Area on Zimbabwe 's eastern border with Mozambique. 
Access to the area is via the same dirt roads as in the SSCS, while vehicular access to 
individual households is very poor. The area is divided into villages , each controlled by a 
local headman. EaSh village has its own communal grazing area. The villages delineate rural 
communities and have very little infrastructure. There are a number of Spaza shops , a school 
and an AGRITEX extension office at Nyahowe village. It was estimated that each extension 
official was responsible for approximately 800 farmers in the Tanda Communal Area. 
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4.3.4.1 Tenure institution 
Land in the Corrununal Areas is held under a corrunon property tenure institution, with title 
deeds to the land vested in the State. Corrununal ownership confers individual rights to plots .... 
for houses and arable land, and provides unlimited access to corrununal grazing land held by 
the particular corrununity. Exclusive rights to arable land are held for the growing season 
only, as arable land reverts to corrununal grazing in the winter months. According to 
customary law, allocated arable land not utilised reverts to the headman for re-allocation, and 
the household faces the threat of eviction. However, eviction is a rare occurrence (Muir and 
Blackie, 1994: 4). As land is socially understood in African tenure, once allocated, the holder 
has sovereign standing, self determination and an accepted place in the corrununity. While 
land allocations are not alienable, the continued right to use allotted land is relatively secure 
for male landholders provided that they meet the moral requirements of corrununity 
membership. 
Prior to 1982, land in Corrununal Areas was legally held in trust by traditional leaders for the 
benefit of the corrununity. In 1982, with the passing the Corrununal Lands Act, legal authority 
over land allocation was formerly transferred from traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) to 
elected district councils. However, according to Rukuni (1990), the de facto administration of 
land in the corrununal areas has reverted back to traditional leaders. This is confirmed by data 
collected for this study which indicates that 90 per cent of CA households' sampled believe 
the land is owned by the chief. 
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On average, Communal Area's are characterised by increasing population density and 
declining farm size (1.3 hectares per household in 1983-1984) (Mehretu, 1994: 59). It is 
estimated by Davies (1990) that the population in the Communal Areas is growing at almost 
three per cent per annum. The increasing population pressure has contributed to severe land 
degradation. According to Zimbabwe's Five Year Development Plan (Zimbabwe, 1986), 40 
per cent of Communal Areas are regarded as overpopulated, and soil erosion and 
deforestation have reached critical proportions. 
4.3.5 The Mayo Resettlement Area 
The resettlement of agricultural land in Zimbabwe was carried out according to five different 
models . In each case, the legal ownership of the land is vested in the state and settlers are 
granted occupancy permits , which fall well short of a title or even a lease. Land cannot be 
sold, sub-divided or inherited (without government approval). The five resettlement models 
are: 
Model A (Intensive) Resettlement model. The land is not owned by the settlers, who are only 
issued an annual (and conditional) permit to cultivate land. Individual households are allocated 
five to six hectares of arable land plus access to common grazing (Palmer, 1990). As in the 
Communal Areas, arable land reverts to communal grazing in the winter months . 
Resettlement areas are organised into villages, and basic infrastructure is provided. A similar 
model, Model A (Accelerated), was devised to deal with spontaneous settlements on 
unoccupied land (Gustafsson, 1987) . 
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The third model, Model B Resettlement, is based on community living and co-operative 
fanning. Apart from ideological considerations , the collective structure is intended to permit 
the preservation of the high technology production structure of the original commercial fanns. 
Members of the co-operatives run the fanns through sets of committees and the proceeds are 
shared amongst the fanners according to a predetermined fonnula. Individual rights to land 
are inclusive, since the land is resettled to a group, with individuals having equal access to the 
common resource. 
The remaining two resettlement schemes are still regarded as experimental, and together 
account for less than ten per cent of total resettlement. Model C Resettlement provides core 
commercial estates, surrounded by Model A type small scale resettlement. The Model D 
scheme utilises commercial ranges as 'holding grazing ' areas while neighbouring Communal 
Areas are reorganised to demarcate arable, grazing and residential areas . This is reminiscent 
of Bettennent Planning experienced in South Africa (see Baber, 1991 : 68) 
Within the programme, the settlers have overwhelmingly opted for the Model A scheme, with 
81,4 per cent of the area and 78,8 per cent of the families settled choosing Model A (Roth, 
1990). Twelve per cent of the settlers are settled to Model B, 0,9 per cent on two fanns 
according to Model C and 8,3 per cent on one experimental area under Model D. 
The Mayo Resettlement Area was selected for the study as it is typical of a Model A 
Resettlement Scheme. The Mayo Resettlement Area is located on the western border of the 
Tanda SSCS and Tanda CA (Figure 4.1) . The area was originally made up of large 
commercial fanns bought by the government after 1980 for resettlement. Since 1983, 1355 
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households have been resettled in the area, divided into 80 villages. Individuals are allocated 
approximately five hectares of arable land, and each village has its own communal grazing. 
Access to the area is via the dirt road from Headlands . Access to individual households is 
better than in the SSCS and CA, but the roads are deteriorating rapidly. Villages have little 
infrastructure and no formal shops. However, the AGRITEX regional office, the AFC district 
branch, a grain and fertiliser depot together with a number of shops , schools and a clinic have 
developed at Mayo village. There are four AGRITEX officials serving the approximately 
1355 resettled households. 
4.3 .5.1 Tenure institution 
An individual's rights to arable land under Model A resettlement are defmed by the 'permit of 
occupancy ', which offers only temporary use rights and can be revoked at any time by the 
State. The permit specifies the type of fixed structures (buildings) and land use practices that 
are allowed on the land and is not transferable . In terms of the permit, disputes are settled by 
either the village chairperson or the regional Resettlement Officer, who are both appointed by 
the government. This increases uncertainty as these officials are answerable to the 
government and not to the people in the community (Mufuka, 1991). Grazing land is 
characterised by a common property tenure institution. In terms of the law, access to grazing 
is limited to members of a specific village, and stocking rates are prescribed by the 
government. 
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4.4 SampliIlg Methodology 
Having identified the three strata to be sampled, a random sample of individual households to 
be interviewed was required from each area. 
Given the small size of the Tanda SSCS, a simple random sample of households was selected 
from a complete list of households in the area compiled by the local AGRITEX official. The 
situation was more complex in the CA and RA. Because of the CA's vast size and poor road 
infrastructure, only the area accessible by road and immediately adjacent to the SSCS was 
surveyed. A multi-stage sampling procedure was used to draw the desired sample. Firstly, a 
sample of villages was randomly selected from a list of villages in the north-western quadrant 
of the Tanda Communal Area. Next, individuals were randomly selected from household lists 
for each village. A Similar multi-stage sampling procedure was used in the RA. A sample of 
villages was drawn from a list of those villages ' adjacent to the main access route . From this , 
a simple random sample of households to be interviewed was drawn. 
Although villages were not sampled with probability proportionate to their size, the extent of 
any bias is likely to be small since all villages sampled were of a similar size. As a result of 
the sampling methodology employed, all households sampled in all the strata were accessible 
from the main access roads . 
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4.5 Estimation techniques 
/ From the conceptual model, it is evident that credit use, long-term land investments, short-
term complementary input use and yield are interrelated. For this reason, the effect of tenure 
security on agricultural investments and productivity was estimated as a simultaneous 
equation model using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis. Dummy dependant 
variables within the simultaneous system were estimated by probit analysis. The presence of 
multicollinearity was checked for throughout the analysis using matrix decomposition (Judge 
et ai, 1988: 870). Severe multicollinearity was encountered during the 2SLS estimation. As a 
result, a separate 2SLS regression, using principal component regression analysis to rid the 
data of the multicollinearity, was estimated (Kendall, 1957; Nieuwoudt, 1972). These 
techniques will be discussed in the following sections. 
4.5.1 Regression analysis 
4.5 .1.1 Multiple regression 
The objective of multiple regression analysis is to estimate the mean or expected value of the 
dependant variable Yon the basis of given values of the explanatory variables-X,j. Estimated 
by ordinary least squares (OLS) , multiple regression allows powerful interpretation of data 
provided the underlying assumptions of both model and technique hold true. 
The linear regression model is based on the following assumptions (Gujarati, 1988: 166): 
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1. The dependant variable (Y) is a linear (or intrinsically linear) function of the explanatory X 
variables. 
2. The X's are non-stochastic and there is no linear relationship between two or more of 
the independent variables. 
3. The error term (Ui) has zero expected mean and constant variance for all observations. 
4 . There is no serial correlation of error terms corresponding to different observations. 
5. There is zero covariance between Ui and each X variable. 
6. The error term is normally distributed. 
When these assumptions are violated parameters cannot be estimated, or at best are biased, 
inefficient or inconsistent. Simultaneous equation models violate the regression assumption 
that the X variables are either non-stochastic , or if stochastic are distributed randomly of 
their stochastic error term. In simultaneous models , mutually dependant variables are 
correlated with the disturbance (error) terms and are not independently distributed of them. 
OLS regression under these conditions can result in ' simultaneous equation bias'. This 
leads to estimators that are not only biased, but are also inconsistent (that is, they do not , 
converge on their true value as the population size increases indefinitely). Consequently, 
the simultaneous equation model must be estimated using either indirect, two-stage or three-
stage least squares. 
There is one situation where this is not the case - with recursive , or triangular, models. In 
such models there is only a one-way , as opposed to a two-way, cause and effect 
relationship . Assuming the error terms are not contemporaneously correlated, each equation 
can be estimated separately using OLS, giving unbiased estimators (that is, if cov(uJt, U2() = 
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COV(U21, U31) = cov(Ult , U31) = 0). In other words , for OLS to give unbiased estimators, the 
same period disturbances in the different equations must not be correlated. 
4.5.1.2 Simultaneous equation models 
Simultaneous equation models are appropriate when there is joint dependence of economic 
variables within the model. They are also appropriate in recursive models where there is 
contemporaneous correlation between error terms in the different equations (Hsiao. 1986: 
113). Unlike single equation models , simultaneous equation models must account for all 
information from each equation when estimating parameters otherwise they will be biased 
and inconsistent (Gujarati , 1988: 556) . 
The theoretical model to be investigated in this thesis requires four equations . The system is 
recursive and the assumption of zero contemporaneous correlation amongst error terms is 
not appropriate . This is because it is likely that unobserved household or farm variables in 
the different equations are correlated, resulting in contemporaneously correlated error 
terms. According to Hsiao (1986: 113), a triangular model (recursive model) showing 
contemporaneous correlations of the error terms can be efficiently estimated using 2SLS, 
provided the model is identified. 
In simultaneous systems , the problem of identification refers to the ability to numerically 
estimate the parameters of the structural equations from the estimated reduced-form 
coefficients. The structural equations are the full equations to be estimated by the model. 
The reduced-form equations and associated reduced-form coefficients express each 
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endogenous variable (the Y's) in the system in terms of exogenous variables (the X's) and 
the stochastic disturbance only. An equation is exactly identified if unique numerical values 
of the structural parameters can be obtained, and over identified if more than one numerical 
value is possible for some parameters in the structural equation. Only when equations are 
exactly or over identified can parameters be estimated because there are enough 
independent equations to allow estimation of the unknown structural parameters. 
Identification can be simply tested using the Order condition as follows (Gujarati, 1988: 
584): 
If K - k = m - 1, the equation is exactly identified and if 
K - k > m - 1, the equation is over identified. 
Where: K = number of predetermined (exogenous) variables in the model. 
k = number of predetermined variables in the given equation. 
m = number of endogenous variables in the given equation. 
The order condition is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of identification. A more 
stringent test of identification is the Rank condition, which is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for identifying an equation. By the Rank condition an equation is identified if, in a 
system of g equations, at least one non-zero determinant of the order (g-1) can be constructed 
from the coefficients of the variables (both endogenous and exogenous) excluded from the 
particular equation, but included in the other equations in the model. 
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Each equation in a simultaneous system must be tested for identification to ensure the correct 
estimation technique is used. The statistical model was found to be identified in each equation, 
so two-stage least squares regression was appropriate. 
4.5.1.3 Two-stage least squares regression analysis 
Two-stage least squares regression analysis purifies the stochastic explanatory variable of the 
influence of the stochastic disturbance term by creating a proxy or instrumental variable for 
the endogenous variable. The technique involves two successive applications of OLS 
(Gujarati, 1988: 604). Consider the following model: 
YII = fJlO + fJll Y21 + fJl2)(11 + ... + UII 
Y21 = fJ20 + fJ21 Ylt + /322)(21 + ... + U21 
Stage 1: 
To rid the second equation of the likely correlation between the endogenous explanatory 
variable YI and the error term U2, first regress YI on all the predetermined or truly 
exogenous variables in the whole system. This affords an estimate of YI that is conditional 
upon the non-stochastic X' s and a random error component. YI can thus be expressed as YI 
= y* I + e I. This no longer violates the assumption that the explanatory variable (y* I) and 
the error term (el) are uncorrelated. The instrument, Y*I, can now be used as a true 
explanatory variable in the other equations . 
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Stage 2: 
The second stage involves replacing the endogenous explanatory variable with the 
instruments estimated in Stage 1, and re-estimating the equation by OLS. Equation Y21 is re-
estimated as: 
Y21 = /320 + /32/( Y* I + el) + /322X21 + ... + U21 
Y21 = /320 + /321 Y*I + /322X21 + ... + (U21 + $2Iel) 
Y21 = /320 + /321 Y*I + /32iX21 + .. . + U*I 
The final equation is very similar to the original equation for Y21, the only difference being 
that YII is replaced by Y*I. Since Y*I is independently distributed of U*I, OLS estimation 
provides unbiased and consistent estimators of the parameters. It is thus seen that the two-
stage least squares procedure 'purifies ' the stochastic explanatory variables of the influence 
of the stochastic error terms. 
Importantly, two-stage least squares estimates may not satisfy small sample properties such 
as unbiasedness and minimum variance. Thus results from small samples should be 
interpreted with due caution. 
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4.5 .2 Probit analysis 
In the empirical model, long-term investments and complementary short-term input use are 
captured as dummy variables. Estimation of such models by OLS, assuming the 
dichotomous}'; to be a linear function of the explanatory variables (X's), violates three of 
the OLS assumptions . The violated assumptions are : 
i) Non-normality of the disturbances (Ui) 
Although OLS does not require the disturbances to be normally distributed, it is assumed 
for the purpose of statistical inference (Gujarati, 1988: 469) . However, for models with a 
dummy dependant variable (linear probability models - LPM), the disturbance term follows 
a binomial distribution. 
}'; = 1 Ui = 1 - PI - fJMi 
}';=o Ui = - fJI - fJMi 
The non-fulfilment of the normality assumption is not critical as OLS estimates remain 
unbiased. Furthermore, as sample size increases indefinitely, the OLS estimators tend to be 
normally distributed generally . 
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ii) Heteroscedastic variances of the disturbances 
Even if E(Ui) = 0 and E(UiUj) = 0, for i = j it can no longer be maintained that the 
disturbances (Ui)are homoscedastic (of equal variance) . This is because the variance of Ui is 
dependant on the conditional expectation of Y, which depends on the value taken by X 
(Gujarati, 1988: 471). 
Although unbiased, the estimated parameters are no longer of minimum variance. This can 
be overcome by means of the Goldberger transformation (Gujarati, 1988: 471) or the use of 
Aitken's generalised least squares (Hill and Kau, 1973). 
iii) Non-fulfilment of [0 ~ E(f; IX) ~ 1] 
Since E(f; IX) in the linear probability model measure the conditional probability of the 
event f; occurring given X, it must necessarily lie between 1 and O. However, estimation 
of the LPM by OLS does not ensure 0 ~ E(f; IX) ~ 1. Thus , despite a number of suggested 
solutions to this problem, LPM remains a logically unattractive model since it assumes that 
Pi = E(Y = 11 X) increases linearly with X. 
It is thus suggested that the techniques of logit or probit analysis are used. The choice 
between the probit and logit model is largely one of convenience and the differences 
between the two models are slight. The main difference is that the pro bit model assumes a 
normal distribution of the error term, while the logit model assumes a logistic distribution 
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of error terms (Judge et aI, 1988: 788). Both models take a sigmoid functional form, 
although the logistic density has slightly heavier (flatter) tails. 
To replace OLS estimation of the dummy dependant variables in the two-stage least squares 
model, the probit model is selected as it rests on the assumption that the disturbances are 
distributed normally, as in OLS estimation. The standard normal cumulative distribution 
function associated with the probit model implies that the probability that the i1h decision 
maker selects the first alternative is given by (Judge et ai, 1988: 787): 
-oo<Z<oo 
The final equation derived from the probit model is : 
Since F is the normal cumulative distribution function, no matter what value Ai takes, F will 
necessarily be transformed into the interval of zero and unity (Hill and Kau, 1973). 
Moreover , the derived functional form is sigmoid in shape which allows any linear or non-
linear relationship between X and Y through A to be accommodated (Hill and Kau, 1973). 
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Probit is estimated by maximum likelihood. Such estimates are consistent, asymptotically 
efficient and asymptotically normally distributed (Judge et ai, 1988: 792). 
Goodness of fit was measured by the chi-squared statistic and its associated probability. 
This tests whether residuals are distributed homogeneously around the regression line, and 
if significant can indicate that a different response model or predictor transformation is 
required (SPSS-X User Manual, 1975: 614). The associated probability should be near to 
0.5 indicating a good fit. 
4.5.3 Principal component analysis 
Principal component analysis is a data transformation technique whereby the data is 
transformed to describe the same amount of variance as the original data, with the same 
number of dimensions (or axes), but in such a way that the first axis accounts for as much 
of the variation as possible. The second and following axes account for as much of the 
remaining variation as possible without been correlated to any of the preceding axes. The 
axes' orthogonal properties are useful in countering problems associated with 
multicollinearity (N ieuwoudt, 1972) . 





where: Xl ... Xm are independent variables 
i = I. .. m 
ail . .. aim are the component loadings. 
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THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
The conceptual model detailed in Chapter Three can be formalised into a four equation 





C = f(Xhj, X~, X)) 
Lij = f( Xhj, Xfij, X\j ,C) 
Iij = f( Xhj, Xfij, X\j, C, Lij) 
Yij = f( Xhj, Xfij, Xlij, Lj, Iij) 
... Credit use 
... Demand for land improvements 
... Demand for complementary inputs 
... Yield 
where C (credit use), L (long-term land improvements) and I (short-term input application) 
are endogenous variables. The vector Xh is a vector of household characteristics, Xf a vector 
of farm characteristics and Xl is measure of tenure security. 
Equation (1) describes the joint effect of supply- and demand-side factors on the household',s 
use of credit, including household characteristics, farm characteristics and the level of land 
tenure security. Equation (2) represents the extent of land improvements made on plot i by 
household head} since the time of acquisition and is a function of Xhj, Xfij, X\j, together with 
the supply and demand for credit (C). Complementary short-term input use on plot i by 
household head} in equation (3) is dependant on the same variables as equation (2), plus the 
current level of long-term land improvements (L). Finally, yield in equation (4) is determined 
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by Xhj, X fij, Xlij together with the extent of land improvements (L) and the level of short-term 
input use (I) . 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Before discussing the empirical model in detail it is necessary to describe the way in which 
the variables were measured and how they are expected to influence the agricultural 
productivity model. Households are stratified and group means are presented, together with 
their associated F-value. A significant F-value requires that one reject the hypothesis that the 
\ 
group means are equal (SPSS Reference Guide, 1990: 62). However, caution i~ required 
when drawing inferences based on mean comparisons, as other variables not considered may 
affect the means in a systematic way. 
5.1.1 Household characteristics 
Statistics describing household characteristics are presented in Table 5.1 . The data show a 
number of significant differences between household heads in the different strata. Firstly, 
household heads sampled in the SSCS are on average older than RA and CA household 
heads. Secondly , RA respondents have been the primary decision makers on ~he farm for a 
significantly shorter period of time. This is because the area was only resettled after 1983. 
Thirdly, one of the most striking features is that 90 per cent of SSCS farmers sampled are 
males , compared to 66 per cent of RA farmers and 52 per cent of CA farmers. A similar 
result was reported in communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (Baber, 1991: 77). 
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A possible reason for this is that, in the absence of an active land market in the RA and 
CA, land has a low opportunity. Households, in attempting to maximise their joint utility, 
consequently assign family members with relatively low opportunity cost of time, such as 
children, women and old men, to agricultural production. This also provides some evidence 
of cultivation, thereby ensuring continued retention of rural land rights. This argument is 
supported by the fact that a significantly greater percentage of CA and RA farmers are part-
time farmers . 
Table 5.1: Household characteristics by strata in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe 
(1995) 
Household head characteristics: 
Age (Yrs) 
Sex (% male) 
Full-time farmers (%) 
Education l ) (Yrs) 
Farming experience2) (Yrs) 
Agricultural Training3) (%) 
Household composition (#): 
Adults 
Children 
On-Farm familY workers 





































2) Number of years the household head has been principal decision maker on the farm 
3) 'Master Farmer' or similar agricultural training qualification 
4) * P < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
5.1.2 Land tenure security on arable land 
Statistics describing tenure characteristics on arable land from all three strata are presented in 
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Table 5.2 
5.1.2.1 Land tenure security - Tanda Small Scale Commercial Sector 
In the Tanda SSCS, land is initially held under a long-term lease from the government with an 
option to purchase. Once this option has been exercised, individuals can register freehold title 
to the land and can enter into land transactions. 
Table 5.2: Tenure characteristics on arable land by strata in Manicaland Province, 
Zimbabwe (1995) 
SSCS (40) RA (39) CA (40) F-Valuel} 
0 ~~~_~_~_~~E_~f_£~~~~_ !~~!~_~~~~_~!L ___ .. _______ .. _ .. ____________ 42.5_. ____ 0 ____ . __ _ 
Perceived breadth of property rights (%) : 
ru~~~ ~ 0 3 127.44" 
Right to bequeath 95 74 100 9.03" 
Right to exclude livestock during winter 98 3 2 475.00" 
Assurance of property rights (%): 
Incidence of stray livestock at planting 47 79 85 8.85" 
Incidence of crop damage by stray livestock 58 82 60 3.32" 
0 
0 
Settled out of court (with compensati.on) 13 8 
Stock owner fined in court ;.-- 9 6 
Fine not paid 0 3 0 
Took no action against stock owner 9 21 97 
1) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Although freehold tenure grants an individual exclusive land rights, de facto individual rights 
vary considerably . Firstly, of the 40 SSCS farmers interviewed, 28 (70 per cent) had title 
deeds to their land. However, in only 17 cases was the title deed registered in the name of the 
current household head. In the remaining 11 titled cases, the deeds remain registered to 
deceased persons as heirs failed to register the change of ownership. Many respondents 
indicated that this was a result of prohibitive transaction costs surrounding title registration. 
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Registration costs were reported to be as high as Z$3 0001 , and legal procedures required 
households to register title at a central registry in Harare. Secondly, while approximately 95 
percent of all SSCS farmers indicated that they could specify the heir to their land, only 47.5 
per cent believed that they could sell their land without permission from the government or 
other family members. 
Although 57,5 per cent of all SSCS households reported crop losses following cattle 
intrusions, 22 per cent of affected households received compensation for their losses. All of 
the court imposed fines were enforced, increasing the certainty of law and tenure assurance in 
the SSCS. However, exclusive rights were not assured for all SSCS farmers . Farmers 
neighbouring the CA who reported cattle intrusions and crop damage by CA livestock were 
unable to take action against these farmers, because they were unable to identify the guilty CA 
stock owners. The remaining 69 per cent settled out of court, and did not demand 
compensation. 
5.1.2.2 Land tenure security - Mayo Model A Resettlement Area 
Land in the Mayo Resettlement Area is owned by the government, and settlers are issued an 
annual (and conditional) permit to cultivate five hectares of arable land, plus access to 
common grazing. 
The breadth of rights over arable land in the RA is limited. Households are not allowed to sell 
their allotted land, and only 74,4 per cent of respondents indicated that they could specify the 
1 At the time of the study, Z$l = RO.4 
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heir to their land without permission from the government. Over 97 per cent of households 
indicated that they did not have the right to exclude stock owners from their arable lands 
during winter. Moreover, limited exclusive arable rights are difficult to enforce (lack 
assurance). Seventy-nine per cent of households reported stray livestock in their fields at the 
time of planting, while eighty-two per cent of households reported crop losses due to stray 
livestock. Less than 11 per cent of affected respondents received compensation for crop 
losses. Eight per cent received out of court compensation, while only two household reported 
the stock owner to government authorities (resettlement officer). In both cases the stock 
owner was fined, but one of the fmes was not enforced. Twenty-one per cent of affected 
households took no action against stock owners . A possible reason for this is that allotted 
arable lands are far from the house (average distance is 1,03 km), making it difficult to trace 
the guilty stock owner. All remaining households settled out of court and did not demand 
compensation. 
5.1.2.3 Land tenure security - Tanda Communal Area 
Title to land in Tanda Communal Area is vested in the State. As long as the family resides in 
the area, communal ownership confers individual rights to plots for houses and arable land, 
and provides unlimited access to communal grazing land held by the community. 
Individuals do not have the right to buy or sell land in the CA, but they do have the right to 
bequeath their land to an heir. On allotted arable land, 98 per cent of respondents indicated 
that they did not have the right to exclude stock owners from their land during winter. As in 
the RA , exclusive rights to arable land for the growing season are difficult to enforce, with 85 
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per cent of households interviewed reporting cattle intrusions at the time of planting. 
Discussions with extension officials and farmers revealed that late planting is a major 
constraint on production in the Communal Areas (Mathambo, 1995). Sixty per cent of 
respondents reported crop losses due to stray cattle. None were compensated and no 
transgressors were reported to the tribal authorities. Only one farmer demanded out of court 
compensation for crop damage, but the stock owner refused to pay. All of the remaining 
farmers who experienced cattle intrusions took no action against the stock owners. 
5.1.3 Land tenure security on grazing land 
----
The situation on grazing land is even more extreme than that found on arable land in the small 
scale sector in Zimbabwe. In the SSCS, individual rights to grazing land are exclusive and 
enforceable. Although 62,5 per cent of households reported having problems with stray cattle 
entering their grazing lands, 80 per cent of these chased the cattle away, while one farmer 
reported the stock owner to the courts and was compensated. Moreover, 95 per cent of 
households adhered to the suggested stocking rates for their farms. By contrast, only ten per 
cent of RA farmers , and no CA farmers , were aware of recommended stocking rates or rules. 
to limit livestock numbers . Over 90 per cent of RA and CA farmers reported stray livestock 
from other villages on their allotted communal grazing, but less than 15 per cent did anything 
to remove the livestock. Thus, although government rules do exist to control livestock 
numbers on communal grazing in the RA and CA, communal grazing is de facto an open 
access resource. 
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5.1.4 Empirical measurement of tenure security in the model 
The registration of free-hold title was not considered a suitable indicator of tenure security in 
the study. Evidence from titling programmes in Africa suggest that title registration is not 
necessarily synonymous with tenure security (see Section 2.4). Notwithstanding the 
significant relationship between registered title deeds and on-farm investments in studies by 
Feder and Onchan (1987), high levels of tenure insecurity can exist even with the possession 
of title in sub-Saharan Africa. If the formal land code is ambiguous in its definition of rights, 
and if legal procedures to settle disputes are vague, land holders may not perceive increased 
tenure security following registration of title . Conversely, it has been argued that investment 
on agricultural land under customary tenure is SUb-optimal because property rights are not 
clearly defined (Johnson, 1972). This too is an oversimplification. Property rights to land may 
be well defined under customary law, but the extent of use and transfer rights may be limited. 
Furthermore, some of these rights may be difficult to enforce. 
Besides theoretical considerations, titling was not considered a suitable indicator of tenure 
security for econometric reasons . The decision to register land title in the SSCS, or to update 
existing titles , requires purposeful choice by the farmers themselves. Title registration is thus 
endogenous to the economic - and econometric - system. Estimation of such a system will 
lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates because of heterogeneity between titled 
and untitled farmers in the sample (Roth et ai, 1989). 
Consequently, tenure security in the empirical model was captured as an index (TENURE) 
measuring an individual's perceived breadth, duration and assurance of property rights over 
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specific land parcels (on both arable and grazing land). The index was constructed out of the 
following variables: 
1) A dummy variable (D1) scoring one if the respondent perceived that he/she had the 
right to sell the land without the permission of others, and zero if otherwise. 
2) A dummy variable (D2) scoring one if the respondent was able to specify an heir to 
the land, and zero if otherwise. This was identified as an important determinant of 
investment incentives in sub-Saharan Africa by Bruce et al (1994: 255). 
3) A dummy variable (D3) scoring one if the respondent had exclusive use rights to land 
for the full duration of each year, and zero if otherwise. Respondents who had 
continuous use rights, but shared the land with other farmers, scored zero for this 
variable. 
4) A dummy variable (D4) scoring one if the respondent's recorded property rights were 
enforced (assured), and zero if otherwise. Households who took no action against 
stock owners whose livestock strayed onto their arable or grazing lands, or did not 
receive compensation when it was demanded, scored zero for this variable. It was 
assumed that households who reported no cattle intrusions on their lands had assured 
property rights, and scored one for the variable. 
The duration of an individual's property rights was not explicitly included in the index. 
Because land rights in the SSCS and CA are held for at least as long as the person resides on 
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the land, and no RA fanners were aware of anyone having been evicted from the resettled 
land since its occupation, the only perceived variation in the duration of land rights is 
captured in D3. 
Based on the assumption that each variable in the index carries an equal weight, the index 
measures tenure security on a scale of zero (least secure) to four (most secure). Each fanner 
received a score for tenure security on both arable and grazing land (a different set of weights 
would produce different scores for tenure security). On average, fanners in the SSCS score 
highest on the TENURE index (3.15), compared to 0.91 in the RA and 1. 06 in the CA. 
Perceived tenure security was expected to impact positively on investment in on-fann 
improvements and agricultural productivity. 
Critical to the empirical model is the assumption that tenure security (TENURE) is an 
exogenous variable. Failing this, the tenure variable may be correlated to the error tenn in the 
equation leading to biased and inconsistent estimators of the dependent variable. In order to 
treat land rights as predetermined, it must be shown that farmers cannot alter specific land 
rights at will (Place et ai, 1994: 30) . For example, households in traditional communal areas 
may be able to alter their rights to a specific parcel of land by investing in long-tenn land 
improvements, questioning the causality between land rights and long-tenn investments. 
Examination of the relationship between tenure security and the time elapsed since land 
acquisition showed little correlation, suggesting that individual fanners were unable to alter 
their land rights from those held at acquisition (p=0,095 in the SSCS, p=-0,092 in the RA 
and p=-0,016 in the CA). This implies that land improvements accomplished over the time 
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periods observed in the study are unlikely to have a significant effect on perceived tenure 
security. Furthermore - with the exception of SSCS farmers eligible for title deeds - farmers 
in the sample are unable to alter land rights at the time of acquisition. In both the RA and the 
CA, title to land is vested in the state, and households are subject to exogenously imposed 
tenure institutions (by the government in the RA, and by tribal customs (and the government) 
in the CA). The assumption that tenure is an exogenous variable was therefore accepted for 
the empirical analysis, and is consistent with studies by Feder and Onchan (1987) and Place 
and Hazell (1993). 
This assumption does not disregard the endogenous evolution of tenure institutions. Rather, 
given the limited time period observed in the sample, it is not expected that significant 
endogenous tenure innovations would have occurred (the average length of time since the land 
was acquired by the current household head was 17 years in the sample). Furthermore, 
problems associated with collective action in large groups (Olson, 1971: 48) and resistance 
from those who stand to lose from an institutional change may constrain endogenous shifts 
towards exclusive land rights. Studies in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa report forcible 
resistance by stock owners at attempts to enclose arable lands in communal areas(Thomson 
and Lyne, 1995). Traditional chiefs, with powers enhanced by previous colonial 
governments, also resist changes to the status quo. 
In addition, competition from the successful large scale commercial agricultural sector 
dominant in Zimbabwean and Southern African agriculture has resulted in the increasing 
marginalisation of agriculture as a source of income in the small scale farm sector, reducing 
the demand for exclusive rights to agricultural land. In 1980, it was estimated that commercial 
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farmers in Zimbabwe produced 80 per cent of total agricultural output, and 96 per cent of 
agricultural sales (Bratton, 1990: 269) . 
5.1.5 Land market activity 
The majority of land parcels in all the strata were acquired through non-market channels 
(Table 5.3). In the SSCS, 55 per cent of households inherited their land. In the RA and CA, 
government allocation (82 per cent) and tribal allocation (70 per cent) respectively accounted 
for most land acquisition. 
Despite the existence of freehold title in the SSCS, only 2 households purchased their land 
from other farmers . This observation is not surprising, given that farms are small and 
households value land for the social security it provides. The social security value of land is 
high in rural areas of Zimbabwe, given the absence of a rural government pension 
programme. With few alternative forms of insurance, there is no guarantee that the offer price 
of a more productive farmer will exceed the reservation price of the household, and the land 
market is likely to remain inactive (Lyne and Roth, 1994). 
Where farm land is held for reasons other than agriculture, it would still transfer to more 
productive farmers via an efficient rental market, as the foregone rental would penalise under-
utilisers . However the rental market appears constrained in all the strata, despite the presence 
of potential lessees and lessors. Over one-third of all households interviewed indicated that 
they would like to rent in additional land, yet none did so. 
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Table 5.3: Land market activity by strata in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe 
(1995) 
SSCS RA (39) CA (40) F-Value3) 
(40) .-
Mode of acquisition (%) : 
Purchase 5 0 0 2.03 
~ Long-term lease 40 0 0 25.67** 
Inheritance 55 18 25 6.83** 
Government allocation 0 82 5 126.28** 
Tribal allocation 0 0 70 89.84** 
Rental market activity (%): 
Potential lessee 33 33 43 0.483 
Potential lessor 25 15 3 4.55* 
• 
Perceived constraints for lessee!) (%) : 
Noland available to rent in 54 62 71 0.43 
Government / tribal prohibition 0 23 0 4.19* 
Risk of meeting rental payments 38 23 6 2.50 
Perceived constraint for lessor!) (%): 
No lessees 30 66 100 1.64 
Government/tribal prohibition 0 34 0 2.27 
!3-is~_qf da~~g~J_~!~'possessio~ ______ 80 0 0 0.72 
Uncultivated land area2) (%) 42 27 16 13.92" 
1) Column may sum to greater that 100 per cent because some farmers indicated more 
than one constraint. 
2) Including land left fallow for crop rotations 
3) * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01 
In the SSCS, 33 per cent of households wished to ren~ in additional land, while 25 per cent 
indicated that they would like tQ rent out excess land. Forty-Jwo per cent of arable land was 
, } . 
left idle, of which only 12 per cent was withheld from production for crop rotations. 
However, only one rental transaction was reported despite the apparent availability of land 
(rented out land) . Rather, the data suggest that the rental market was constrained by a lack of 
tenure assurance. Eighty per cent of potential lessors perceived that renting out land was too 
risky. Thus, the reservation rent of these farmers is likely to be high on account of the high 
risk (Atwood, 1990). In this situation, the reservation rent of the lessor may exceed the 
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maximum rent a potential lessee is prepared to pay, and the rental market remains inactive. 
This is supported by the fact that 38 per cent of potential SSCS lessees indicated that risk 
associated with not meeting the required rental payment prevented them from renting in land. 
In the RA, 33 per cent of households expressed a desire to rent in additional land, yet only 15 
per cent would consider renting out land. This was despite the fact that 28 per cent of arable 
land was left idle, of which only seven per cent was for crop rotations . No rental transactions 
were recorded. Rather than a shortage of land, a more telling constraint is likely to be the 
uncertainty amongst lessees and lessors as to the legality of rental transactions in the RA. This 
was reported by 34 per cent of potential lessors and 23 per cent of potential lessees. Although 
the 'permit to occupy ' land in the RA prohibits land sales, discussions with the government 
Resettlement Officer suggested that rental transactions were not officially prohibited. 
However, the fact that the majority of potential lessees (lessors) were unable to fmd 
households willing to rent out (in) land supports the contention that the tenure institution in 
the RA does not provide sufficient information regarding property rights to stimulate an active 
land rental market. 
In the CA, 43 per cent of households expressed a desire to rent in land, while only one 
household was interested in renting out land. Moreover, only 16 per cent of the arable land 
was left idle, of which 15 per cent was for crop rotations . At first glance, this suggests that 
the rental market is constrained by a shortage of land in the Communal Area. However, the 
fact that very few households are willing to consider renting out surplus land may be the 
result of extreme tenure insecurity. A lack of tenure assurance for both lessee and lessor has 
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been identified by Thomson and Lyne (1993) as a serious constraint on the evolution of an 
efficient rental market under similar conditions in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Unfortunately , further statistical analysis on constraints to rental transactions m the 
Zimbabwean small farm sector was not possible as a result of data limitations. Although 
beyond the scope of this study , the identification of land market constraints is essential as it 
impacts directly on economic incentives, and requires further research. 
5. 1.6 Credit use 
Two broad sources of credit were identified in the study are~, namely formal lenders and 
informal lenders. Formal lenders included commercial banks, the government fmanced 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and co-operatives (the Cotton Marketing Board). 
Informal lenders included friends and relatives , and informal money lenders. Statistics 
describing credit use in the small farm sector of Zimbabwe are presented in Table 5.4. 
No significant relationship was discernible between tenure security and the use of formal 
credit for the 1993/1994 and the 1994/1995 seasons . Firstly , even where tenure was most 
secure (SSCS) there was no evidence of credit being extended from commercial lending 
institutions. This finding is consistent with other studies in Africa (Bruce et ai, 1994: 254), 
and is common where an inefficient land market limits the banks' ability to easily convert land 
\ 
assets into financial assets (Roth et al , 1989) . 
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Table 5.4: Credit use by strata in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe (1993 - 1995) 
SSCS (40) RA (39) CA (40) F-Value4) 
Source of credit (%) : 
No credit used 80 75 85 0.69 
Formal lenders: 
Commercial banks 0 0 0 
AFC 10 25 12 2.09 
Informal lenders 10 0 3 2.73 
Duration of loan: 
1 year 75 80 67 0.41 
2 - 5 ~ears 25 20 33 0.16 
Collateral required 1) (%): 
No collateral required 25 20 20 1.78 
~ 75 0 0 4.20· Land as collateral 
Collateral substitute2) 0 80 80 10.98·· 
Credit market constraints (%): 
Households wishing to borrow 65 46 47 1.77 
Reason for not borrowing3): 
Credit is not available 16 17 11 0.17 
Repayment risk 85 94 79 0.45 
Land not accepted as collateral 11 6 0 2.00 
1) Collateral required for formal credit (no collateral was required for informal loans) 
2) Group loans and moveable assets 
3) Column may sum to greater than 100 per cent because some households indicated 
more than one reason. 
4) * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01 
The usefulness of land as collateral depends on the banks' ability to enforce foreclosure on 
defaulting borrowers. In the SSCS, less than half the respondents had title deeds registered in 
the current household head's name. The remaining households' had yet to apply for title 
deeds , or had title deeds registered in the previous heads name, reducing the collateral value 
of the land. Land in the RA and CA cannot be pledged as collateral since title to the land is 
vested in the state. In the absence of suitable collateral, the supply of credit from commercial 
institutions is likely to be constrained. This is because banks have to abide by strict usury 
laws which dictate a lower rate of interest that would otherwise prevail , given the risks and 
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transaction costs in extending loans to small farmers without secure collateral (Feder et ai, 
1988: 48). 
Secondly, all formal credit used was in the form of government guaranteed AFC short and 
medium-term loans. Use of AFC credit was reported by 10 per cent of SSCS farmers , 25 per 
cent of RA farmers and 13 per cent of CA farmers. The data suggest that tenure security is 
not a significant determinant of AFC credit supply. Although land was pledged as collateral 
for 75 per cent of SSCS loans, it was not required in the RA and CA. In the RA and CA, 80 
per cent of loans were secured with collateral substitutes (group guarantees and moveable 
assets). Fifty per cent of RA and 20 per cent of CA loans are extended to groups of farmers. 
This is intended to decrease the lender's transaction costs and risk of default as the incentive 
lies with the group to thoroughly screen applicants as all group members share joint liability. 
Rather than insecure tenure, decreased government commitment to the expansion of credit 
facilities into the small farm sector since the mid 1980's has decreased AFC credit supply to 
all small scale farmers (Jayne et ai, 1994). It is estimated by Chimadza (1994, cited by Eicher 
and Rukuni, 1996) that Zimbabwe's government credit program is currently reaching less 
than three per cent of communal households . Discussions with AFC officials revealed that 
this lack of commitment was the result of the high transaction costs (despite the AFC's 
preference for group lending) associated with extending credit to the small farm sector, and a 
default rate of over 40 per cent for RA and CA farmers. 
Two constraints on the demand for credit are identified in the sample. Firstly, group cohesion 
- required for successful group lending - is unlikely to be strong in the small farm sector since 
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groups were constituted solely for the purpose of accessing credit (Adams and RomeJo, 
1981). This was highlighted as an important constraint on credit demand during interviews 
with progressive RA farmers , many of whom did not access group loans because of the risk 
of other group members defaulting. Another pervasive constraint on the demand for formal 
and informal credit in the small farm sector was the recent severe drought experienced in the 
region (1992/1993 season). Of those households not using credit, 53 per cent indicated that 
they would like to do so. However, 86 per cent of these respondents indicated that they did 
not access credit facilities because of heightened repayment risk following the severe drought. 
5.1.6.1 Credit use in the empirical model 
Credit use (from formal and informal sources) was too infrequent to warrant further 
statistical analysis in the empirical model. 
5.1. 7 Long-term investments 
Information on the incidence of six types of land improvements made by the current 
household head since acquisition was collected from each household interviewed. Tlpese data 
were combined into investments on arable land (soil liming, fencing arable lands and 
conservation measures) and investments on non-arable land (fencing grazing lands, 
establishing tree crops and establishing pastures) (Table 5.5). Obsolete investments were 
excluded from the sample (for example, pastures that were no longer in production, or 
fencing that was in poor condition) . 
Table 5.5: 
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Stock of land improvements by strata in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe 
(1995) 
__ ._~_SCS (40) RA (39) CA (40) F-Value2) .... _. ____ .. H._ ..... _------_ .... _--_ .. _---_._ . 
Arable investments (%): 
Fencing 90 41 28 23.84" 
Liming 15 5 5 1.7 
Conservation 93 53 58 9.45" 
N on-arable investments (%): 
Pastures 59 3 0 52.09" 
Tree crops 90 8 50 47.40" 
.-.. ---------!:~~~~!!g------- 90 0 0 346.54" ••••••••••••••• ·H ••••• ·_···_···_· _______________ ••• ___ •••••• __ •• ____ •• __ • ______ 
Moveable assets I) (#): 7.72 3.95 3.17 42.50" 
1) Average number of moveable assets owned (ploughs, carts etc.) 
2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
5.1.7 .1 Long-term investments in the empirical model 
Households in the SSCS invested significantly more in all arable improvements than CA and 
RA farmers (fencing, liming and conservation measures). Furthermore, reported household 
investments in conservation measures in the RA and CA are likely to be biased upwards, 
since conservation measures were provided by the state in these areas (surveying and 
construction of in-field erosion contours) . 
Investments in livestock production were also greatest in the SSCS. Firstly, fifty-nine per cent 
of SSCS farmers had established pastures or hay crops. By contrast, less than 3 per cent of 
RA farmers and no CA farmers had planted pastures . Even on arable land, RA and CA 
households do not have the incentive to establish pastures for livestock, as arable land reverts 
to communal grazing in winter. One RA farmer that did establish winter pastures on his 
allotted arable land was unable to exclude other farmer 's livestock from his pastures in 
winter. It is striking that 44 per cent of the cattle herd in the CA and 30 per cent of the herd 
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in the RA died as a result of fodder shortages in the 1992 drought, compared to only 22 per 
cent in the SSCS. Secondly, SSCS farmers established significantly more tree crops, 
compared to RA and CA farmers (mostly for fuelwood). Finally, over 90 per cent of SSCS 
farmers erected cattle fences in their grazing lands. However, fencing of grazing lands is 
prohibited by law in the CA and RA. 
For each household, a measure of investment (INVES1) was estimated on both arable and 
non-arable land. Investments in fencing and long-term soil fertility (liming) were 
considered on arable land, while investments in pastures and tree crops were considered on 
non-arable lands. Since conservation measures are provided by the state in the RA and CA, 
and fencing of communal grazing land is prohibited in the RA and CA, they were excluded 
from the investment adoption model as they do not reflect individual choices. Moveable 
assets are easily liquidated and their acquisition is thus expected to be less dependent on 
secure property rights. For this reason, the number of moveable assets owned by a 
household was not considered in the investment adoption model (although the number of 
moveable assets could influence the use of short-term inputs and yield). 
The variable INVEST is a dummy variable scoring one if the household had invested in one 
or more of the investments considered, and zero if otherwise. The variable only measures 
the household's decision to invest in the stock of fixed improvements to land, and does not 
necessarily reflect the effectiveness or extensiveness of their implementation. 
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5.1. 8 Input use and agricultural productivity 
Agricultural production varied widely across the strata in the study region. Maize was the , 
predominant crop grown, accounting for 65 per cent of all land cultivated in the sample for 
the 1993-1994 season. Other crops commonly grown included groundnuts, millet and 
sorghum. Tobacco was grown on two SSCS farms. Statistics describing farm production 
characteristics for the 1993-1994 season are presented in Table 5.6. 
Land in the RA was of significantly higher agricultural potential than that in the SSCS and 
CA. Eighty-seven per cent of RA farmers were in NRl and NR3, suited to intensive or 
semi-intensive farming . By contrast, 95 per cent of SSCS farms and 100 per cent of CA 
farms were in NR4, a semi-extensive farming region suited mainly to extensive livestock 
production. A significantly larger percentage of arable land was cultivated in the CA and 
RA, compared to the SSCS. Similar results were presented by Weiner et al (1985), who 
conclude that land in the SSCS is under-utilised. However, it is more likely that a greater 
percentage of land was cultivated in the RA and CA as this is perceived to secure individual 
rights to allotted arable lands under customary law (see Section 4.3.4 and 4.3.5). 
Table 5.6: 
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Agricultural production by strata in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe 
(1993-1994) 
SSCS (40) RA (39) CA (40) F-Value9l 
Natural region l ) (NR) 3.95 2.95 4.00 113.61" 
Soil Type2) 1.85 3.74 2.12 48 .71" 
Area planted (ha) 8.99 3.55 3.00 61.97'-
Percentage of total area planted (%) 58 .30 72.66 83.92 13.29--
Percentage of total area planted to maize (%) 60.29 77 .18 59 .00 
Agricultural production - arable land: 
Agricultural inputs: 
Input expenditure per hectare3) (Z$4» 235.93 253.90 199.37 0.73 
Hired labour per hectare (Z$) 158.78 17.69 18.83 6.61'-
Hired machinery/animals per 4.73 5.79 15.24 1.77 
hectare(Z$) 
Agricultural output: 
Maize yield per hectare (kg) 2158.00 2603.14 978.69 15.86" 
Crop income per hectareS) (Z$) 1480.55 1621.19 423.39 12.62" 
/( Agricultural production - grazing land: 
% of ~ouseholds owning cattle 100 95 88 2.92 
) 
% herd died in the 1992 drought 22 31 44 
Number of cattle owned 16.12 13.63 4.85 16.79·' 
Veterinary cost per, LU6) (Z$) 14.34 3.03 8.07 2.36' 
Income from Cattle sales (Z$) 2501.62 1465.84 641.80 7.62'· 
............................... -..... ----... -.~ ......... ....... · ....... · .. · .. · ................... H .•.. _ .. H·._ .. ___ .. ___ ..................... _ ·.·.H·· •• ·····H.·· .. __ ....... __ .• ___ • _____ • __ ._ .... _____ .................. _______ ••••.••• _ ............... _ .. ___ .... 
Gross farm income7) (Z$) 18016.22 7805.45 1934.72 6.63" 
Off-farm incomeS) (Z$) 3648.80 2381.89 2831.50 0.33 
-----------------------------------------------------------






NR2 Intensive farming , NR3 Semi-intensive 
farming, NR4 Semi-extensive farming 
Soil composition: 1 = sandy soil ... 5 = clay soil 
Purchased non-labour cash inputs for all crops 
Zimbabwean Dollar: Z$1 = RO.4 
Income from all crops sold 
6) Livestock Unit (cow, ox or bull) 
7) Crop income + Livestock income 
8) Re Remitted wages , income from own-business 
9) * P < 0.05 
** P < 0.01 
The value of purc~ased non-labour short-term input application was highest in the RA. It is 
important to note that the recorded value of purchased inputs used in the RA and CA may 
have been biased upwards, since all RA and CA farmers in the sample were given one 50 
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kilogram bag of fertiliser and one ten kilogram bag of maize seed as part of a government 
drought relief programme (Mathambo, 1995). Not surprisingly , yields are highest in the 
RA, given the region's higher agricultural potential and greater levels of input application. 
High RA yields contrast with average yields of 1.3 tons per hectare over all RA lands in 
Zimbabwe in 1989/1990 reported by Ashworth (1993) . 
A striking difference is evident between arable production in the SSCS and the CA. 
Although both strata have similar agricultural potential, SSCS farmers achieve more than 
twice the maize yield than that reported in the CA. Yields in the SSCS and CA are similar 
to those reported by Ashworth (1993) . A contributing factor to this production differential 
could be the apparent shortage of draught power and equipment in the CA (Feder et ai, 
1982: 33) . Communal Area farmers had significantly smaller herd sizes than SSCS and RA 
farmers , and used three times the value of livestock and machinery contractors per hectare. 
The value of inputs used per livestock unit for livestock production is significantly higher in 
the SSCS . Investment in veterinary supplies per livestock unit averaged Z$14:34 in the 
SSCS, compared to only Z$3 .03 in the RA and Z$8.07 in the CA. This is expected since 
grazing is an open access resource in the CA and RA, and there is little incentive to for 
users to keep cattle for purposes other than a store of wealth. The higher percentage of 
livestock deaths in the RA and CA can be attributed to the lack of incentives to invest in 
livestock production in these areas. 
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Finally, although there is no significant difference in the amount of off-farm income 
received by the households in the different strata, off-farm income as a proportion of total 
income is much greater in the CA and RA. 
5.1.8.1 Input use and yield in the empirical model 
For each household, a variable (INPUT) was estimated for both crop and livestock 
production. The variable measured the total cost of all purchased non-labour inputs used 
per hectare for crop production (seed, fertiliser and pesticides), and the value of all 
veterinary expenditure per livestock unit for livestock production (including dipping costs). 
To allow crop and livestock data to be pooled, input use was measured as a dummy 
variable, scoring one if the respondent reported above average input use per hectare or per 
livestock unit and zero if otherwise. Binary analysis based on the incidence of input use was 
not possible because most farmers indicated some use of the measured inputs. 
Agricultural output (YIELD) was measured as the total value of all crops sold per hectare. 
Although this measure does not account for on-farm consumption of crops produced, it is 
assumed that there is no significant difference in on-farm consumption between different 
farms. The dependant variable was only measured on arable lands. Livestock yield (the 
value of livestock sold) was not regarded as a reliable indicator of livestock production in 
the sample. This is because a number of SSCS farmers indicated that they had not sold 
cattle because they were rebuilding their herds following the severe 1992 drought. As a 
consequence, livestock off-take was less than ten per cent in all the strata. While low off-
take percentages are often associated with communal grazing institutions (Lyne and 
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Nieuwoudt, 1991), higher off-take rates are more common in the SSCS (Mathambo, 1995). 
Unfortunately, information on other livestock production measures (for example, calvin~ 
percentages) was not gathered. -
5.1.9 Control variables in the empirical model 
A number of control variables were included in the model to capture both observed and 
unobserved household and farm variations. Firstly, characteristics of the household head 
are captured. Most important in this regard is the household head's age (AGE) a~d his level 
of investment in human capital. Older farmers tend to be more experienced (p = 0.71 **). 
More experienced managers are likely to make informed decisions regarding input use and 
farm management practices, resulting in increased yields. However, older farmers may face 
physical constraints in working and managing the farm. 
Investments in human capital are captured by the household head's level of formal 
education (EDU - number of years schooling) and investment in post-school agricultural 
training (MF). Better educated/trained farmers are better able to assimilate information and 
show increased allocative ability, allowing them to adjust faster to changes affecting 
agricultural production (Feder et at, 1982: 32). Consequently, farmers with a greater 
investment in human capital are expected to invest more in long-term land improvements 
and complementary short-term inputs, and are likely to attain higher yields. Regular contact 
with extension officials is also expected to decrease subjective risk and uncertainty 
surrounding new technologies , facilitating on-farm investments and input use (Feder et at, 
1982: 30) . Contact with AGRITEX extension officials was estimated directly as a dummy 
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variable (EX1) , scoring one if the household had contact with an extension official in the 
past six months, and zero if otherwise. The variable MF may also capture a household's 
exposure to government extension agencies , as extension officials reported concentrated 
extension effort on farmers who had attended Master Farmer training courses. 
The number of years the respondent had been the principal household decision maker 
(TIME) was included in the long-term investment equation. Long-term investments usually 
have significant capital requirements, placing more established farmers in a stronger 
financial position to invest. Moreover, as improvements are accomplished over time, the 
longer the time spent on the land the greater the probability of investment occurring. 
The sex of the household head (SEX) was captured as a dummy variable scoring one if the 
household head was a male, and zero if otherwise. In most instances where the household 
head was a female, the male head was either deceased or was a migrant worker, usually 
engaged in full-time wage employment in Harare. Input use may be lower in cases where 
the household head is deceased owing to more stringent capital, management and labour 
constraints . In the case of wage employed migrant workers, remitted income may alleviate 
capital constraints leading to increased investment and agricultural productivity. The impact 
of wage remittances on short-term input use is captured in the variable measuring off-farm 
income (LQD) . 
Variables controlling for farm characteristics were also included in the model. The farm's 
agricultural potential was measured in terms of the five agro-climatic or Natural Regions 
identified in Zimbabwe, providing a broad framework for evaluating land use potential 
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according to rainfall and geographic locality (see Section 4.3.2). No respondents were 
recorded in Natural Region One (highest potential arable land) or in Natural Region Five 
(only suited to extensive livestock production) . Agricultural potential was captured in the 
model by two dummy variables; Nl = 1 if Natural Region = 4, and zero if otherwise, and 
N2 = 1 if Natural Region = 3, and zero if otherwise. Respondents in Natural Region Two 
scored zero for both N 1 and N2. The effect of agricultural potential on the agricultural 
productivity is thus compared against Natural Region Two (the base category - highest 
potential arable land recorded in the sample). Data on arable plot-specific soil type (SOIL) 
was included in the equation estimating crop yields from arable lands. 
Farm size - measured in hectares - was not included in the model for two reasons. Firstly, 
the study was confined to the small farm sector of Zimbabwe and the limited range of 
physical farm sizes observed in the sample was unlikely to have a significant effect on 
agricultural investments and productivity. Moreover, grazing land in the CA and RA is 
communally owned so the size of an individual's grazing allotment is indeterminate. 
Secondly, the physical area of farm land operated may not be a good indicator of farm size 
if the farming enterprises are not homogenous in the sample. In any event, the expected 
effect of farm size on agricultural productivity is not clear. Some argue that large fixed 
costs associated with long-term investments cause a reduced tendency to adopt and a slower 
rate of adoption on smaller farms (Feder et ai, 1982: 25). However, the lumpiness of 
technology may be somewhat mitigated against by the emergence of markets for hired 
services (for example, tractor hire services were available in the CA). Others (Binswanger 
et ai , 1992) support the notion of small farmer efficiency and argue that smaller farms use 
labour and land more intensively than large farms. 
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Rather, farm size was measured in terms of gross farm income (GFI = Total income from 
crop sales + Total income from livestock sales). Gross farm income is a better measure of 
farm size as it provides a comparable measure of size regardless of farming enterprise. 
Gross farm income also serves as a proxy variable measuring a household's liquidity. For 
the equation estimating past investments in long-term on-farm improvements, it was 
assumed that past investments were based on future expected incomes (Kendrick and Jones, 
1953; Tweeten, 1962: 237). Following this assumption, farmers with larger current 
incomes are more likely to have invested in fixed improvements in the past. Furthermore, 
farmers with larger gross incomes enjoy a higher level of liquidity and are more able to 
finance long-term investments (Tweeten. 1962: 241) and complementary short-term inputs. 
Nieuwoudt (1970) showed that farm income was a significant determinant of the demand 
for fertiliser in South Africa over the period 1943 - 1967. 
Non-farm income (LQD) was also included as a proxy for a households liquidity. Farmers 
with greater non-farm income are expected to invest in more short-term inputs by virtue of 
their increased liquidity - resulting in increased yields - ceteris paribus. Non-farm income 
includes wage remittances , pension payments , income from self-employment and any other 
income transfers to the household. 
Finally, the number of large livestock units (HSL) owned by a household was included as a 
proxy for draught power availability . It was reported by extension officials that a shortage 
of draught power was responsible for untimely land preparation, and consequent poor 
yields , in the CA and RA . 
5.2 
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Results of the simultaneous equation model estimating agricultural 
productivity 
The theoretical model suggests a simultaneous relationship between credit use, long-term 
land improvements, short-term input use and yield. Although the model was recursive, it 
was estimated simultaneously using two-stage least squares regression. This was done 
because it was assumed that error terms in the different equations were contemporaneously 
correlated (see Section 4.5.1.2 and Hsiao, 1986: 113). The following section defines the 
structural equations to be estimated. Results from the two-stage least squares regression 
analysis are then presented. 
5.2.1 Structural equations of the simultaneous model 
The theoretical model can be formalised into a four equation simultaneous equation model. 
The equation estimating credit use was dropped from the final set of simultaneous equations 
as recorded credit use was too infrequent to warrant statistical estimation. The full 
empirical model is specified as: 
INVEST = f(TENURE; Xhij, Xfij, Uij) 
INPUT = f(INVEST, TENlJRE; X\, Xfij , Uij) 
YIELD = f(INVEST, INPUT, TENURE; Xhij, Xfij, Uij) 
The variables INVEST and INPUT are endogenous to the system, measuring the incidence 
of investments in long-term land improvements and short-term input use respectively. The 
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variable TENURE captures an individuals breadth, duration and assurance of property 
rights as described in Section 5.1.2.5. The vector Xhij and Xfij capture household and fann 
characteristics included in the estimation. 
5.2.2 Results of the simultaneous model 
In the first stage of the two-stage least squares estimation, the endogenous variables were 
regressed against all exogenous or predetermined variables in the system. Both endogenous 
variables (INVEST and INPUT) were estimated by probit analysis , as they capture long-term 
land improvements and complementary short-term input use as binary variables. The proxy 
variables showed reasonable goodness-of-fit statistics. The Chi-squared statistics were not 
significant and their associated probability was 0.63 for the equation estimating long-term 
investments (P JNVEST) and 0.44 for the equation estimating complementary input use 
(PJNPUT). An insignificant Chi-Squared statistic implies that the residuals are distributed 
homogeneously around the regression line and that a different response model is not required 
(SPSS-X User Manual , 1975 : 614). 
Results from the second stage regressions support the hypothesis that tenure security has a 
positive and significant influence on agricultural productivity . Results presented in Table 5.7 
show that farmers with more secure rights are more likely to invest in agriculture, and attain 
higher yields , than those with less secure rights , ceteris paribus. 
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Table 5.7: Results of the simultaneous model of agricultural productivity in the small 
farm sector of Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe (1994) 
Equation 5.1: Investments in long-term land improvements 
INVEST = 3.9721 + 0.3076 TENURE + 0.0170 TIME + 5.2775 GFI -
(12.5) (3 .9) (1.9) (3.4) 
0.8080 N2 + 0.0276 EDU 
(-3.5) (0.8) 
df = 230 
Equation 5.2: Complementary short-term input use 
INPUT = 4.7754 + 1.1065 P INVEST - 0.0189 AGE + 2.4290 GFI -
(12.2) (2.2) (-3.2) (1.7) 
0.3905 N2 + 0.0189 EXT - 0.3676 SEX 
(-1.5) (0.7) (-1.7) 
x2 = 229.03ns df = 229 
Equation 5.3.1: Yield from arable lands 
YIELD = -2.6304 + 4.5391 P_INPUT + 0.0322 AGE + 0.4946 MF - 0.5575 Nl + 
(-4.5) (6.3) (5.3) (2.8) (-2.5) 
0.2112 SOIL + 0.0343 HSL 
(2.4) (3.5) 
Adj. R2 = 61.6% F-value 31.53** df = 108 
Equation 5.3.2: Yield from arable lands 
YIELD = -0.6933 + 1.6834 P _INVEST + 0.6271 MF - 0.4438 Nl + 0.1480 SOIL + 
(-1.4) (2.9) (3.1) (-1.7) (1.4) 
0.0553 HSL 
(5.3) 
Adj. R2 = 51.0% F-value = 24.78** df = 109 
Notes : a) 
b) 
c) 
Figures in parentheses are t -Values 
for df> 120: for df = 120: 
Pr (t ~ 1.96) = 0.05 Pr (t ~ 1.98) = 0.05 
Pr (t ~ 2.57) = 0.01 Pr (t ~ 2.62) = 0.01 
** denotes statistical significance at the one per cent level 
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5.2.3 Tenure security and long-term land improvements 
Equation 5.1 (Table 5.7) estimates household investments in long-term on-fann 
improvements. Data from arable and grazing lands were pooled. The Chi-square statistic was 
not significant and the associated probability was 0.73 . All the variables considered in the 
equation, with the exception of the variable capturing the lowest potential agricultural region 
(Nl) , were included in the model for theoretical reasons . Nl was excluded from the model as 
it had positive (and insignificant) coefficient which is inconsistent with economic theory. A 
possible reason for this anomalous result is that 95 per cent of SSCS farmers, who have more 
secure property rights and hence increased investment incentives, are in the lowest potential 
agricultural region (NR4). 
The model was stable and signs of all remaining coefficients were consistent with a priori 
expectations . Most importantly, results show that the probability of investing in on-farm 
improvements is increased significantly as tenure security (TENURE) increases (t = 3.9 which 
is significant at the 99 per cent confidence level). Farmers with exclusive and assured tenure 
have greater investment incentives as benefits of such investments can be internalised, either 
in use or upon alienation. This contrasts with results presented by Place and Hazell (1993), 
who conclude from a survey of farmers in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda that land rights were 
not a significant determinant of land-improving investments in the areas studied. The 
significant result obtained in this study can be attributed to the broader definition of tenure 
security adopted, and to data stratification designed to maximise variation in the tenure 
characteristics observed. 
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The households ' gross farm income (OF/) is positively related to on-farm investments, and is 
significant at the 99 per cent level (t = 3.4). This is consistent with the assumption that past 
investment decisions were based on future expected incomes . Farmers with larger farming 
operations (higher gross farm incomes) also have a greater ability and incentive to invest in 
costly long-term improvements , as costs and benefits of fixed improvements are spread over a 
larger volume of output. The positive coefficient for the number of years the household has 
been on the farm (TIME - significant at the 90 per cent level), and the negative and significant 
coefficient capturing agricultural potential (N2) , are both consistent with economic theory. 
Past investment in human capital (EDU) has the expected sign, but the hypothesis that its 
coefficient equals zero cannot be rejected with any degree of certainty . The insignificant effect 
of investments in human capital on long-term land investments in the sample is not surprising 
given that reported levels of education and training did not differ significantly between strata 
(Table 5.1) . 
5.2.4 Tenure security and short-term input use 
Equation 5.2 estimates investment in short-term inputs in the sample . Once again, data from 
crop and livestock enterprises were pooled. The Chi-squared statistic was not significant and 
the associated probability was 0.49. Once again, NI was dropped from the equation as it had 
a positive (and insignificant) coefficient. 
r--"1.-
'Although matrix decomposition indicated that multicollinearity was not severe in the equation, ,-
significant zero-order correlations between P JNVEST and TENURE meant that the separate 
105 
effects of tenure security and that of long-term investments on short-term input use could not 
'\ 
be isolated (p = 0.84**). This is not surprising since tenure security had a positive and 
significant effect on the adoption of long -term investments estimated in Equation 5.1. 
Consequently, tenure security was omitted from the second equation as its influence on short-
term input use is captured in P JNVEST. 
Results of the regression indicate that investments in long-term land improvements have a 
positive and significant effect on the application of complementary short-term inputs (t = 2.2 
which is significant at the 95 per cent confidence level) . In a separate reduced form regression 
estimating short-term input use, TENURE was retained in the model and P INVEST was 
excluded. Tenure security had a positive and significant coefficient in this equation, 
confirming its influence on short-term input use. This implies that farmers with more 
exclusive and assured property rights to land are more likely to invest in yield enhancing 
complementary short-term inputs, ceteris paribus. 
The household heads' age was negatively and significantly related to the application of 
purchased short-term inputs (t = -3 .2). Two explanations are forwarded for this. Apart from 
physical constraints in working and managing the farm, older farmers may use more 
traditional agricultural practices . In this regard, cattle manure is used as a natural substitute 
for purchased fertilisers. (Tweeten, 1962: 157). In addition, older farmers are generally more 
risk averse and may be more inclined to substitute manure and own seed for purchased short-
term inputs following the recent severe droughts in Zimbabwe (Mathambo, 1995). 
Unfortunately , reliable information on the use of non-purchased inputs was not gathered in 





likely to appreciate the benefits afforded by new technologies (high yielding seed varieties and 
modern fertilisers) (Feder et ai, 1982: 32; Hill and Kau, 1973). 
The signs of remaining coefficients all conform to a priori expectations, but are not 
significant at the 95 per cent level. Significant zero-order correlations between GFI and 
P JNVEST reduced the significance of GFI in the regression. To ~apture the effect of 
investments in human capital on input use , separate regressions estimating the effect of 
agricultural training (MF) and extension (EX1) were estimated. Coefficients estimated in both 
regressions had a positive but insignificant effect on the application of short-term inputs in the 
sample, possibly the result of insufficient variation in the data collected (for simplicity, only 
the equation estimating the effect of extension is presented here). The insignificant effect of 
extension and training on input use was also reported in a study by Jayne et ai (1994) for 
Communal Area farmers in Zimbabwe. They conclude that returns to extension and training 
(for example, increased adoption of high yielding seeds and fertilisers) may not be fully 
realised without Government attention to investments in complementary input and output 
markets, and improved access to rural credit facilities. Another likely explanation for low 
returns to extension in the Communal Area 's reported by Jayne et al (1994) could be a lack of 
investment incentives under communal ownership, corroberated by empirical results in 
Equation 5.1 and Equation 5.2. 
Data on arable and grazing lands were pooled in the first two equations. However, a dummy 
variable identifying the two regressions was not included in the analysis (see Chow, 1960 
cited by Gujarati, 1988: 443) . Since all observations pertaining to the household and 
household head are the same for an individual in the two regressions , the dummy variable 
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would only capture individual differences in tenure security on arable and grazing land for 
each household. In this study, these differences in tenure security have already been estimated 
in the index measuring tenure security (TENURE). 
5.2.5 Tenure security and yield 
The final equations (5.3.1 and 5.3.2) estimate agricultural output from arable lands. Tenure 
security was not entered directly into the equations as its influence on yield is captured in 
P JNVEST and P JNPUT. Unfortunately, the individual influence of P JNVEST and 
P JNPUT on output could not be determined in a single equation because of collinearity 
between the two variables. The collinearity between the two variables is evident in their 
significant zero-order correlation (p = 0.57**), which is expected since short-term inputs 
measured were presumed to be complementary to investments in long-term farm 
improvements. 
To overcome this, it was necessary to enter PJNVEST and PJNPUT separately into two 
different equations. The signs of all coefficients in both equations were consistent with .a 
priori expectations. The variable N2 was omitted from equation (5.3.1), while N2 and AGE 
were omitted from equation (5.3.2), as they had t-values less than unity. This is done so as to 
maximise R2. The adjusted R2 was 62 per cent for the equation including PJNVEST, and 51 
per cent for the equation including P JNPUT. 
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Farmers who invested more in long-term land improvements and who applied larger 
applications of complementary short-term inputs , achieved significantly higher yields, ceteris 
paribus (t = 6.3 and 2.9 respectively). The positive and significant effect of tenure security 
on yield was confirmed in a separate reduced-form regression, where TENURE was entered 
into the regression in the absence of P JNVEST and P JNPUT. 
As expected, farmers in areas of better agricultural potential (reflected by the negative 
coefficient estimated for Nl) and on better soils (SOIL) reported significantly higher yields. 
Older farmers reported significantly higher yields in Equation (5.3 .1). Older farmers are 
more experienced in the sample and are thus more likely to make yield enhancing 
management decisions (for example, time of planting and field preparation). The significant 
effect of good farm management practices on yield is not surprising, given that late planting 
was identified by extension officials as a major constraint on agricultural production in 
communal areas (Mathambo, 1995). The result is supported by the positive and significant 
coefficient estimated for MF, measuring a household's investment in agricultural training . 
Households' with larger cattle herds (HSL) achieved significantly (at the 99 per cent level) 
higher yields than those with smaller herd sizes , ceteris paribus. This implies that a lack of 
draught power (and possibly manure, used as a natural substitute for purchased fertilisers) is a 
significant constraint on yield in the Zimbabwean small farm sector. This result emphasises 
the importance of tenure security on agricultural productivity in the small farm sector. 
Farmers without exclusive and assured property rights to grazing lands have little incentive to 
invest in livestock production. As a consequence, livestock mortality reduced RA and CA 
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herds which directly impacts on yields from arable lands in these areas. The significance of 
HSL may also be evidence of an imperfect market for contractor services in the small fann 
sector. 
5.3 Principal Component regression analysis 
It was demonstrated in Section 5.2 that increased tenure security, increased application of 
short-term inputs , and long-term land improving investments each have a positive and 
significant influence on yields recorded on arable lands in the small scale agricultural sector 
in Zimbabwe. Unfortunately , severe multicollinearity precluded the estimation of the 
individual effects of these variables on yield in a single equation. Estimation in the presence 
of severe multicollinearity can result in unstable OLS regression coefficients that can lead 
to erroneous inferences . To overcome this , the effect of input use and long-term 
investments on yield are estimated separately in equation (5.3 .1) and equation (5 .3.2) 
(Table 5.7). 
An alternative estimation procedure - ridge regression - is suggested by Chatterjee and 
Price (1977 : 175). Although ridge regression estimates are biased, they tend to be more 
precise than OLS estimates in terms of mean square error. The ridge estimates are also 
more stable in the sense that they are not affected by slight variations in the estimation data. 
However , the estimation procedure does not reproduce the estimation data as well as the 
OLS regression, reflected by a reduction in R2. Nonetheless , where multicollinearity is 
suspected, a ridge regression is recommended as the resulting estimated regression 
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coefficients may suggest an alternative interpretation of the data (Chatterjee and Price, 
1977: 187). 
Ridge regression uses principal component analysis to purge the data of multicollinearity. 
Regressions on estimated principal components - excluding one, two or three minor 
principal axes - are calculated and transformed back to the original variables on eithe~ the 
original or standardised scale (GENSTAT, 1995: 268). Unfortunately, ridge regression 
estimates generated by GENST A T do not calculate the coefficient standard errors of the 
regressions on principal components when the minor axes are excluded. For this reason, 
principal component analysis using the method suggested by Kendall (1957) and Nieuwoudt 
(1972) is proposed to rid the explanatory variables of multicollinearity, and to re-estimate 
the regression coefficients for the original variables. This technique yields the same 
estimates as the ridge regression, but allows an estimation of the t-values of coefficients 
presented in the final equation (having accounted for multicollinearity). 
A correlation matrix of the variables included in the yield equation is presented in Table 5.8 
(for arable land only) . All coefficient signs agree with a priori expectations. Significant 
zero-order correlations between the explanatory variables P _INVEST, P JNPUT and 
TENURE suggests that multicollinearity is likely to be a problem. Severe multicollinearity 
is confirmed by the large condition number generated using matrix decomposition (CI = 
28). 
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Table 5.8: Correlation matrix for variables in yield model (Arable land only: n = 119) 
YIELD P INVEST P INPUT TENURE AGE Nl N2 MF 











0.391 ** 0.567** . 
0. 190* 0.759.** 0.493** 
0.167* 0.332** -0.428** 0.233* 1 
-0.119 0.462** 0.228* 0.433** 0.135 
0.073 -0.417** -0.198* -0.386** -0.133 
0.361 ** 0.313** 0.213* 0.045 0.144 
** denotes significance at the one per cent level 
* denotes significance at the five per cent level. 
-0.862** 1 
-0.057 -0.023 
Table 5.9 presents results from the second-stage OLS regression estimated for the yield 
equation described in Section 5.2.1, with the effect of long-term investments, short-term 
input use and tenure estimated in a single equation. Regression estimates in equation (5.4) 
are affected by multicollinearity in the sample. The negative coefficient estimated for 
TENURE has the incorrect sign - inconsistent with theoretical expectations and opposite to 
that in the correlation matrix. Furthermore, the insignificant coefficient estimated for 
P JNVEST contrasts with the positive and significant coefficient estimated for the variable 
in Equation 5.3 .2 (Table 5.7) . 
Table 5.9: Estimated coefficients for yield equation (OLS) 
YIELD = -2.193 + 6\.98 P_INPUT + 0.28 P_INVEST - 0.37 TENURE + 0.045AGE + 
(3 .66)** (5 .15)** (0.28) (-1.95) (4.35)** 
0.32 MF - 0.89 Nl 
(1.22) (-3.38)** 
Adj . R2 = 40.2% df = 112 
Notes: a) Figures in parenthesis are t-values ; 
** denotes significance at the one per cent level 
* denotes significance at the five per cent level. 
(5.4) 
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Principal Components extracted from the data are shown in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: variables in yield 
PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
- - -- --- -- ---- -- --- --- --- - --- -- -- - --- ---------- ------ ------------------------------ - --
P INVEST 0.41722 -0.58039 -0.10414 -0.10294 -0.35499 0.58448 -
P INPUT 0.58220 0.09741 -0.09614 -0.13873 -0.46124 -0.64056 
TENURE 0.53742 0.05196 0.17387 -0.42120 0.70568 0.05337 
AGE 0.13732 0.79888 -0.08325 -0.15442 -0.27196 0.48806 
NI 0.38106 0.10241 0.45994 0.78927 0.05372 0.08326 
MF 0.18460 0.04761 -0.85511 0.38205 0.29395 0.00896 ••••.•• ___ ...... _ •• __ • ____ .H·H. _. ___ .... _____ .. _ ..__ ._ .... _._ .... __ .. _. __ ~_._ ... __ . ______ ._._. __ .... __ .. H ..... H····_· ____ . __ .H. ___ ._ .... _ .. __ .. _ .. __ .. _~ .... _._ 
Eigen-value 2.5875 1.3928 1.0964 0.6042 0.2174 0.1017 
% variation 43 .12 23.21 18.27 10.07 3.62 1.69 
The two smallest Principal Components were dropped from the model. The number of 
components to omit from the principal component regression was determined from the 
ridge regression. Two components were omitted as this corresponded to the point 
(estimated by ridge regression) where the improper sign estimated for TENURE in the OLS 
regression took on a positive sign. At this point, the bias parameter (k) equals 0.6, 
indicating the extent of bias introduced into the estimation (0 ~ k ~ 1) (Chatterjee and Price, 
1977: 182). 
Thus, the standardised yield model in terms of Principal Components is: 
(5.5) 
This model was estimated using OLS, yielding the following regression: 
Z YIELD = 0.206 PC! - 0.0296 PC2 - 0.385 PC3 - 0.257 PC4 
(se) (0.0480) (0.0655) (0.0738) (0.0994) 
Adj. RZ = 29.6% 
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(5.6) 
Chatterjee and Price (1977: 176) show the link between the U coefficients of the principal 
component regression and the p coefficients of the standardised regression model of YIELD 
(Z YIELD). Importantly, the relationship between the U and p coefficients is unique since 
the principal components are orthogonal. 
The relationship is illustrated in equation (5.7) and (5.8). 
ZYIELD = fJl ZP_INPUT + fJ2 ZPJNVEST + fJ3 ZTENURE + fJ4 ZAGE + fJ5 ZNI 
+ j36 ZMF (5.7) 
and 
fJl = 0.41722 Ul - 0.58039 U2 - 0.10414 U3 - 0.10294 U4 
fJ2 = 0.58220 Ul + 0.09741 Uz - 0.09614 U3 - 0.13873 U4 
fJ3 = 0.53742 Ul + 0.05196 U2 + 0.17387 U3 - 0.42120 U4 
fJ4 = 0.13732 Ul + 0.79888 U2 - 0.08325 U3 - 0.15442 U4 
fJ5 = 0.38106 Ul + 0.10241 Uz + 0.45994 U3 + 0.78927 U4 
j36 = 0.18460 Ul + 0.04761 Uz - 0.85511 U3 + 0.38205 U4 (5.8) 
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Substituting the U coefficients from (5 .6) into equation (5.8) gives values for the /3 
coefficients : 
/3, = 0.1697, /32 = 0.1897 , /33 = 0 .1505 , /34 = 0.0764, /35 = -0.3045, {J6 = 0.2677 
and 
ZYIELD = 0.1697ZPJNPUT + 0.1897 ZPJNVEST + 0.1505 ZTENURE + 
0.0764 ZAGE - 0.3045 ZNl + 0.2677 ZMF (5.9) 
The standard errors of the /3 coefficients , se(/3i) , are obtained from the square root of the 
variance of the f3 coefficients, var(/3i), in equation (5.10) (Gujarati, 1988:60). 
k 
var(f3i) = L (PC loading)1 • var(Ui) (5.10) 
1= 1 
where k = the number of principal components retained and 
Ui = the coefficients of Equation (5.6). 
The calculated t-values for the standardised variables are equivalent to those in original 
scale since scaling does not affect the correlation of the variables. By mUltiplying the 
standardised regression coefficients in equation (5.9) by Syl Sxi - the standard deviation of the 
dependant variable (y) divided by the standard deviation of the relevant explanatory 
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variable (Xi) - the variables are expressed in original scale (Nieuwoudt, 1972; Chatterjee 
and Price, 1977). 
Table 5.11: Estimated coefficients for yield equation in original scale (principal 
component regression) 
YIELD = -0.3698 + 1.5623 PjNPUT + 1.1650 PjNVEST + 0.2439 TENURE + 
(5.59)** (5.82)** (2.96)** 
0.0063 AGE - 0.0965 NI + 0 .8483 MF 
(1.38) (-0.35) (2.91)** 
Adj . R2 = 29.6% df = 111 
Notes : a) Figures in parenthesis are t-values; 
** denotes significance at the one per cent level 
* denotes significance at the five per cent level. 
(5.11) 
Comparing equation (5.11) to equation (5.4), the t-values have increased substantially, with 
the exception of AGE and NI. Recorded yields are significantly greater for households with 
more exclusive and assured property rights (t = 2.96 which is significant at the 99 per cent 
level). This result is reinforced by the positive and significant influence of P jNPUT and 
P jNVEST on yields. Households with more secure property rights invest more in long-
term land improvements and apply greater levels of complementary short-term inputs, 
resulting in increased yields from arable lands , ceteris paribus. Households who invested 
more in human capital also achieved significantly higher yields, ceteris paribus (t = 2.91). 
The adjusted R2 has fallen from 40.2 per cent to 29 .6 per cent. This loss in R2 is expected, 
given the large bias parameter estimated in the ridge regression (k equals 0.6). There is thus 
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a trade-off between the models ability to reproduce the estimation data, and improved 
interpretability of the estimated coefficients . 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INNOVATION OF AGRICULTURAL TENURE INSTITUTIONS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
The objective of this study was to empirically investigate the relationship between land 
tenure security and agricultural productivity in small scale agriculture, deriving 
implications for proposed land reform in South Africa. Empirical results presented in 
Chapter Five indicate that tenure security has a positive and significant effect on investment 
incentives and agricultural productivity in the Zimbabwean small farm sector. In order to 
understand the implication of this result on a land reform policy in South Africa, it is first 
necessary to trace the history of land policy that shaped the innovation of land tenure 
institutions in the country. 
Following a brief and selective synopsis of legislation shaping land tenure in South Africa 
at present, this chapter analyses the dualistic structure of agriculture in the commercial and 
small scale South African agricultural sectors . While land was, perhaps inevitably, the focal 
point of conflict between the white and black population following white expansion from 
the Cape of Good Hope in the late 17th century , the chapter will focus on legislation 
influencing land tenure in South Africa implemented since 1913. The chapter concludes by 
introducing land reforms proposed for South Africa in the Government's Green Paper on 
South African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). The economic implications 
of alternative land reforms will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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6.1 Land policy following the Land Act of 1913 
6.1 .1 The Land Act of 1913 
The Land Act, Act 27 of 1913, passed by the white dominated parliament of the Union of 
South Africa, represented the first comprehensive piece of legislation on land tenure in the 
country as a whole ensuring that access to a legal interest in land depended critically upon 
race classification (Davis and Corder, 1991 : 139). 
In accordance with this Act, the greater share of land in the entire country was appropriated 
for exclusive use by whites . Areas designated for blacks were termed 'scheduled' areas, and 
included all the then existing 'reserves ,2, as well as land privately owned by blacks for tribal 
purposes. In terms of Section 1 (1) of Act 27 of 1913, the Act contains two key provisions . 
Firstly, no person other than a black may, without the approval of the Minister of Education 
and Development Aid (then the Governor-General), acquire land in a 'scheduled black area' 
from a black person. Secondly, the Act effectively prohibits land transactions by black 
persons everywhere outside the scheduled area, unless the approval of the Minister is obtained 
(Budlender and Latsky, 1991: 116) . These scheduled areas, outside which blacks, and within 
which whites, were precluded from all property rights, totalled approximately 10,5 million 
hectares , or 8,6 per cent of the total land area of South Africa (South African Institute of Race 
Relations , 1975 : 115). 
2 In the latter half of the 19th century , land was allocated to blacks in areas termed 
' reserves ' for exclusive black occupation, but not in ownership. 
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Two exceptions to the Land Act are noted (Budlender and Latsky, 1991: 116). Firstly, the 
Act made provision for additional land to be 'released' to blacks in addition to that made 
available under the Land Act. No land was made available under this exception until the 
passing of the Development Trust and Land Act, Act 18 of 1936. The second exception was 
existing land belonging to blacks outside the scheduled areas. Blacks were allowed to acquire 
property rights to such land with the permission of the Governor-General , but permission was 
only granted if hardship and a historic claim to the land could be proved. 
6.1.2 The Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 
With the passing of Act 18 of 1936, the Development Trust and Land Act, the areas to be 
released in terms of the 1913 Land Act were finalised . The extent of the released areas was 
approximately 6,21 million hectares, bringing the total land area set aside for blacks in 1936, 
excluding that land owned by blacks outside the scheduled areas, to 16,71 million hectares, or 
13,7 per cent of the total land area of the country (South African Institute of Race Relations, 
1975: 115) . 
The 1936 Development Trust and Land Act further established a statutory trust, now known 
as the South African Development Trust (SADT) , which in accordance with Section 6(1) of 
the Act became the owner of all state-owned land within the scheduled and released areas 
(Budlender and Latsky, 1991: 121). This includes all Trust land (land under tribal occupation 
outside the scheduled areas prior to 1936 and now within the released areas , as well as all 
land later purchased by the SADT in the released areas) and all tribal land occupied by a tribe 
in the scheduled areas. A trust fund was formed to purchase all outstanding land in the 
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released areas, and by 1990, almost all land demarcated as released in terms of the 1936 Act 
had been purchased (Baber, 1991: 49). 
Following the election of the Nationalist government into power in 1948 came further 
distortions to the rural land economy, and the intention to use the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts 
as a basis for permanent racial partitioning emerged. While the development of the policy of 
racial segregation, especially in terms of territory, culminates in the Group Areas Act, Act 77 
of 1957, first passed in 1950 (Van Reenen, 1962), this act has little relevance for state land 
occupied by blacks, since all land falling outside the areas identified by the Group Areas Act, 
acquired under the Development Trust and Land Act, Act 18 of 1936, is expressly excluded 
from the provisions of the Group Areas Act. 
However, under this exclusion, and in line with the policy of separate development, 
approximately 157 000 hectares of freehold land held by blacks, acquired outside the 
scheduled areas (and in white areas before the 1913 Land Act) became subject to 
expropriation under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. Between 1960 and 
1982, it is estimated by the Association for Rural Development (AFRA) that 103 "black 
spots" had been expropriated and that 1 05 000 people living in these areas had been forcibly 
relocated to black areas (Craib, 1990 cited by Baber, 1991: 53). 
6.2 The current structure of agriculture in South Africa 
Although all racially based legislation pertaining to land in South Africa has been repealed 
with the passing of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1992, agriculture 
121 
m South Africa is still characterised by an extreme dualism. The rural economy in 
previously black areas (the small farm sector) is characterised by stagnating agricultural 
production, widespread resource degradation and poverty, increasing population pressure 
and landlessness, and extreme skewedness of distribution of assets and income amongst 
households (Baber and Nieuwoudt, 1992). Lenta (1981: 65) estimates that cereal production 
per capita in rural KwaZulu-Natal decreased at an average rate of 1.16 per cent per annum 
between the periods 1867-1872 and 1972-1977. Furthermore, estimates of relative yields 
indicate that output in the small farm sector is far below that attained on comparable land in 
historically white commercial areas (Lyne, 1989). By contrast, the large scale commercial 
farming sector is characterised by moderate increasing efficiency and levels of land 
conservation. Notwithstanding the drought experienced in the early 1980's, field crop, 
horticultural and animal production increased by 6.86, 3.80 and 0.89 per cent per annum 
respectively in the sector during the period 1980-1989 (Van Zyl and Van Rooyen, 1990 cited 
by Baber, 1991 : 86). 
This dualism is also apparent in the relative level of importance agriculture enjoys in the 
different sectors. It is estimated that over 80 per cent of household income in the small farm 
sector is derived from wage remittances and welfare benefits, with a high proportion of 
income being spent on food and household needs (Bembridge, 1987). Agricultural 
production is estimated to meet only 16 per cent of the de facto populations food 
requirements in these areas (Huntly et aI, 1989 cited by Baber and Nieuwoudt, 1992). By 
contrast, South Africa currently enjoys an overall self-sufficiency in agricultural products 
after consumption and growth is taken into account (Baber, 1991: 86), reflecting the 
significant contribution of the commercial agricultural sector. 
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6.3 Public support and land distribution differentials 
One reason for the relative poor performance of the small scale agricultural sector is that 
access to land, physical infrastructure (in the form of dams , roads and communication 
links) and institutional infrastructure (extension services, credit institutions and organised 
agricultural lobbies) differ in terms of quality and availability (Fenyes et aI, 1988). 
According to Huntley et al (1989 cited by Baber and Nieuwoudt, 1992), the ratio of total 
financial aid and advisory services to commercial versus small farm sector was 197: 1 for 
the period 1910-1936. Although this ratio improved to 2:1 in the 1980's, per capita state 
support remains extremely inequitable. 
The distribution of land in South Africa is set out in Table 6.1. Following the 1936 Land Act 
and subsequent consolidations, the delimitation of land prior to the passing of the Abolition of 
Racially Based Land Measures Act assigned 16,3 per cent of South Africa's agricultural land 
for black use, and 83,7 per cent for white use. As a consequence, farm land area per capita of 
rural population is much more favourable in commercial sector than it is in the small farm 
sector. This extreme skewedness of the distribution of land is reflected by the fact that the 
amount of farm land per capita is on average approximately fifteen times as great in the 
commercial sector as it is in the small farm sector. Output per worker in commercial 
agriculture is more than twenty times that obtained in subsistence agriculture (Kassier and 
Groenewald, 1992). 
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Table 6.1: Farm land per capita of rural population - South Africa (1990) 
Region Farm LandI) Rural Population Farm land/capita 
(1 000 ha) (1000) (ha) 
-
South Africa2) 82246 4527 18,13 
Transkei 4185 2638 1,59 
Bophuthatswana 3979 1464 2,72 
Venda 639 446 0,70 
Ciskie 756 477 1,58 
KwaZulu 3277 2645 1,24 
Lebowa 2057 1 718 1,20 
Gazankulu 544 447 1,14 
KaNgwane 354 338 1,05 
KwaNdebele 214 282 0,76 
QwaQwa 60 160 0,38 
Total 98311 15 182 6,483) 
1) Crop land, natural grazing, wood and forests 
2) Excluding the former "homelands" 
3) Average farm land per capita 
Source: 1990 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, cited by Kassier and 
Groenewald (1992) . 
Massive population growth in rural areas has further decreased land/population ratios to the 
point where individual land holding has become totally uneconomic in parts of the small farm 
sector. This extreme population pressure has inevitably led to massive overcrowding and 
landlessness in the small farm sector (Letsoalo, 1991: 101), and has reduced the potential of 
agricultural production to provide for household needs. 
Access to land and infrastructure is explicitly addressed in the government's Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (ANC, 1994) and the Green Paper on South African Land 
Policy (Department of Land Affairs , 1996: 4). These , together with the likely change in 
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focus of state and research and extension into the small farm sector, should go some way to 
satisfy the demand for land and related services in the sector. 
6.4 Property institution differentials 
From the empirical results presented in Chapter Five, it is evident that a second reason for the 
poor performance of the South African small farm sector is likely to be the fact that the 
structure of property rights in previously black areas differs markedly from those in the white 
areas3. This divergent structure of property rights resulted because successive South African 
governments have, in accordance with the principal that whites possessed sovereignty over all 
land in the country, attempted to control and regulate the property rights allocated to blacks. 
Following the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, land in the small farm sector could be divided into 
four broad categories , namely Trust land, tribal (communal) land, private land and land held 
in quitrent from the state (Cross, 1991: 70). Trust land refers to land under tribal occupation 
outside the scheduled areas prior to 1936 (and now within the released areas). Trust land is 
registered in the name of the SADT. Tribal land refers to land occupied by a tribe in the 
scheduled areas and is registered in the name of the State President, acting as trustee for the 
tribe. Both tribal and Trust land are under the control of the SADT. Private land constitutes 
land purchased by individuals , tribes or other black associations in scheduled areas prior to 
1913, in released areas and from the SADT after 1936. Quitrent tenure refers to a form of 
Despite the passing of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1992, 
the tenure institutions in the different sectors remain largely unchanged from those that 
evolved under prior legislation. 
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conditional individual tenure on land leased from the state for a nominal amount, subject to a 
number of state restrictions, with the threat of forfeiture (Cross , 1991 : 82). 
6.4.1 Property rights in the commercial farming sector 
In the commercial sector, individuals possess private property rights to land, which is held 
mostly with individual freehold title. With exclusive private property rights, tenure is secure 
with the result that an active land market (both sale and rental) is prevalent in these areas. In 
the presence of an active land market, inefficient land use attracts an opportunity cost, 
ensuring efficient resource allocation (Nieuwoudt, 1990). Private property rights in white 
areas are attenuated by the Sub-division of Agricultural Land Act (Act 70 of 1970), which 
prohibits the subdivision of land into areas deemed to represent uneconomic farming units. In 
accordance with the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts , and the 1957 Group Areas Act, blacks were 
excluded from holding property rights in white areas. 
6.4.2 Property rights in the small farm sector 
Whites were by law precluded from all property rights in black areas. The de facto property 
institutions under which blacks possessed property rights in small farm sector was a product 
of the interplay between state attempts to control the access to and use of land, and attempts 
by indigenous land tenure forms to resist unwanted and exogenously imposed institutions. As 
a result , the majority of de facto property rights to land, other than the state tenures , are 
informal , differing substantially from what is written into law governing black areas following 
the Black Areas Land Regulations Proclamation R188 of 1969. 
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For the purpose of studying the land tenure implications of past legislation, the four main 
fonns of land holdings in the small fann sector can be grouped into three categories, under 
varying degrees of state and popular control. Together, these three forms of land holding 
account for approximately 16.3 per cent of South Africa's agricultural land (CSS, 1992, cited 
by Kassier and Groenewald, 1992). First is traditional communal (or communitarian) tenure, 
which despite attempts of state intervention, is based on predominantly traditional indigenous 
tenure institutions . Second are state controlled leasehold tenures, including Trust tenure and 
tenure arrangements in the state initiated development areas (Project farms (Letsoalo, 
1991: 106)) and last is a group of individualised forms of tenure relatively free from state 
intervention, including freehold and quitrent (Cross , 1991: 68) . 
6.4.2 .1 Communal tenure 
In principle, communal tenure is based on traditional institutions as filtered through 
Proclamation R188 of 1969, and refers to versions of tribal tenure administered by tribal 
authorities and their sub-ordinates , as found in KwaZulu-Natal and the fonner Transkei 
(Cross, 1991: 70) . Land is legally held in trust by the chief for the benefit of that community, 
while the underlying title is vested in the state. Individuals , acting on behalf of the family or 
agnate group, are granted rights of exclusion to allocated land, including the right to occupy 
the land and the exclusive right to cultivate allotted arable land. As in communal area of 
Zimbabwe, land not allocated to a household reverts to communal grazing, as does allotted 
arable land that is not cultivated during winter months (Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1991). 
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Access to and property rights in the land follow acceptance as a bona fide member of the 
community. In communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal, men born into a community usually obtain 
land by agreement from their fathers, or by negotiation with other relatives and neighbours. 
Outsiders wishing to gain access to land in a community have to fmd a local sponsor who will 
give them land or find land for them, or may in some cases apply directly to the chief who 
usually controls a small amount of abandoned or forfeited land. However, such land is 
becoming increasingly scarce as communities grow and individual holdings become smaller 
over time. The legitimate role of chiefs is thus to give legal sanction to locally arranged 
transactions and to publicly install new families (Cross, 1991: 73). 
Individual rights in the communal area's differ from those under common law in two ways. 
Firstly, individual rights are informally recognised and sanctioned, often with no legal status. 
Secondly, property rights are 'communal' implying: (a) each married man has the right to be 
awarded a residential site and access to arable land (one man, one plot), and grazing rights 
follow a commonage system open to all households; (b) individual agents do not have the 
right to permanently alienate their land; and (c), the community is able to revoke land 
allocations following non-use over a designated period of time (Cross, 1991: 72). 
Consequently, individual 'ownership' rights within a community are conditioned by group or 
secondary rights of other individuals in the community (Atwood, 1990). Insofar as communal 
tenure ensures the individual the ability to use land for a certain period and for a defmed 
purpose, property rights are secure. However, these limited property rights do not guarantee 
that individuals can co-ordinate economic activity and reap the benefits of individual effort. 
Predictability, and hence tenure security, is further reduced since formally recognised land 
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law in South Africa (Roman-Dutch law) does not recognise the diverse system of land rights 
reflecting the diversity of land use patterns and values in indigenous tenure institutions (van 
der Walt, 1991: 34). 
a) Tenure security in communal areas - arable land 
Research in South Africa indicates that de facto land use in communal areas is paradoxical. In 
communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal, there is excess demand for additional land arising from 
intense population pressure, yet large tracts of land are left fallow . Results from empirical 
analysis in communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal show extremely low per hectare yields, 
indicating that cropland is under-utilised in these areas (Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1991). 
Although farmers have exclusive user-rights to arable land, individuals do not have the 
incentive to co-ordinate economic activity and exchange user-rights, and rental markets in 
rural South Africa are constrained despite the presence of potential tenants and lessors (Lyne 
and Roth, 1994). In a recent survey (1991) conducted in rural KwaZulu-Natal, it was found 
that half the households sampled wanted to rent in arable land left idle by neighbours, but that 
only five per cent did so. Of those who indicated that they would like to participate in a land 
rental market, almost 70 per cent indicated that transactions were too risky. This is because 
customary tenure in communal areas is perceived to be insecure and transactions are costly, 
because (a) there is a perception that transferring arable land may jeopardise existing property 
rights if interpreted by the tribal authority as openly demonstrating an indifferent attitude 
towards land use, and informal rental transactions are not legally enforceable (rights are not 
assured) and (b) the fact that the exclusivity of primary rights is in some instances undermined 
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by the secondary rights assigned to other users, resulting in increased transaction costs in 
locating the legitimate property right holder (the breadth of rights is inadequate) (Lyne and 
Roth, 1994). In the absence of an active land market, the opportunity cost of land is low or 
even zero in communal areas. 
Tenure security is further reduced on arable land as individuals appear unable to enforce their 
legitimate rights of exclusion over their allotted arable lands. Research in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Thomson and Lyne, 1995) indicates that crop farmers are unable to enforce their property 
rights as they find it difficult to keep livestock belonging to other people out of their fields, 
and are often unsuccessful in extracting compensation from stock owners for crop damages 
caused by stray cattle. There is thus little demand for land as a productive asset because 
individuals are not assured of the benefits arising from individual effort. 
b) Tenure security in communal areas - grazing land 
Community members theoretically possess rights of inclusion to common grazing areas under 
communal tenure institutions. However, this individual right loses its meaning if the right to 
inclusion is not restricted to a distinct or finite group or community of individuals (Ciriancy-
Wantrup and Bishop, 1975), or if the right to exclude others is not enforced. On grazing land, 
available evidence indicates that such binding restrictions on individual use and access to the 
commons, a necessary condition for efficient common property resource management, are not 
in effect (Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1990). Consequently, the tenure institution on common 
grazing land can most accurately be described as open access. 
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Comparisons between communal and private grazing lands (Table 6.2) indicate that average 
stocking rates in communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal are almost double those in neighbouring 
commercial farms. High stocking rates have resulted in poor calving percentages and higher 
herd mortality rates . Grazing land in these subsistence areas is overutilized, leading to 
continued degradation of the natural resource base and comparatively low yields from animal 
production (Baber and Nieuwoudt, 1992). 
Table 6.2: Comparison of cattle statistics in communal and commercial areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal (1987) 
Communal ownership Private ownership 
Grazing land (ha) 2,2 million 3,4 million 
Herd size (1987) 1,5 million 1,2 million 
Herd mortality 7,4 % 3,9 % 
Calving rate 32,0 % 80,0 % 
Slaughter and export rate (1987) 5,0 % 25,0 % 
Source: Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1990. 
6.4.2.2 State controlled tenure 
Most land in the small farm sector in South Africa falls under the control of the SADT. Title 
to this land rests with the state and property rights are controlled by government officials, in 
conjunction with chiefs and headmen (who became paid employees of the government with 
the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951). In general, Trust land (that land under the 
control of the SADT) is more conditional and subject to more outside control than communal 
land (Cross, 1991: 78). Property rights are allocated on a 'one-man one-plot' basis, with the 
bundle of rights to these plots subject to a number of restrictions. Firstly, landholders are 
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legally permitted one field, and subdivision, leasing out and share-cropping is officially 
forbidden (Cross, 1991: 79) and secondly, property rights can be withdrawn if arable land is 
not utilised for a period of one or two years (Baber, 1991: 67). 
Communities living on Trust land are thus effectively tenants of the state on highly 
conditional leases. Owing to government intervention and the disruption of the indigenous 
tenure institutions and egalitarian land ethic, tenure is perceived to be less secure than under 
traditional communal tenure (Cross, 1991 : 80). The application of the 'one-man one-plot' 
principal, with its accompanying restrictions, effectively precludes the operation of a land 
market. Consequently, the opportunity cost of the land is viewed as zero, and efficient 
resource allocation via market transfers has been prevented. 
Owing to increasing concerns at the environmental degradation that was taking place in black 
areas, the implementation of Betterment or rehabilitation was enabled in the form of 
Proclamation 31 of 1939, which centred on the need to 'combat the evil of over-stocking'. To 
prevent practices categorised as land abuse, the 'Betterment plan' provided that control over 
rural black land use should be taken away from the occupants and placed with the state 
agricultural apparatus (Cross, 1991: 70). All SADT land was subject to Betterment planning. 
Under Betterment legislation, land was delimited into separate areas for grazing, cultivation 
and residential use. In principle, all families are entitled to land, but by delimiting and 
freezing the number of sites available, Betterment has created a landless surplus of people 
(Cross, 1991: 70). According to Bembridge (1986), up to 70 per cent of land in the small 
farm sector was officially placed under betterment planning. 
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6.4.2.3 Individualised tenure 
Legally, property rights on freehold land in the small farm sector mirror private property 
rights in commercial areas. Individuals have the right to the exclusive income stream flowing 
from a particular resource. This right includes the right to enter into contracts with other 
economic agents concerning these benefit streams, and the rental value of land represents the 
opportunity cost to the individual for not utilising the land. However, freehold land appears to 
be no more productive than trust or communal tenure (Cross, 1991: 91). 
Freehold land in the small farm sector has moved to its highest economic use (Baber, 1991: 
82) . As a result of increasing population pressure and an increasing amount of landlessness, 
economic returns from 'farming with people ' exceed returns from agricultural production, 
and in the absence of zoning regulations and the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, 
freehold land in the small farm sector is becoming increasingly residential. Food production 
thus remains a low-priority activity. 
6.5 Land reform in South Africa - 1996 
Over the better part of a century and through layers of statutory interventions into the 
common law of property, South Africa has been divided into a number of race zones. 
Within these race zones, people of different race have been assigned mutually exclusive and 
markedl y different tenure institutions (Budlender and Latsky, 1991: 115). 
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As a consequence, land reform is identified in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme as the central and driving force in a programme of rural development in South 
Africa (ANC, 1994: 19-20). The primary need for land reform is to redress the injustices of 
the past and to re-establish the legitimacy of the entire property rights structure in South 
Africa. Such legitimacy is required for any reform programme to be successful, since the 
effectiveness of an institution at defining property rights depends critically on those rights 
being upheld by the law (Bromley and Cochrane, 1994). This section briefly outlines land 
reform proposals and mechanisms described in the Governments Green Paper on South 
African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs , 1996). The effect of proposed land reforms 
on economic incentives and agricultural productivity are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
The Government's land reform proposal focuses on three main policies (Department of Land 
Affairs, 1996: 3) : 
1) The restitution of land rights lost in the past as a result of racially based policies. This 
is explicitly addressed by a Land Claims Court and Commission - established under 
the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 '7 and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2) The redistribution of land to provide the disadvantaged and poor with land for 
residential and productive purposes. 
3) Land tenure reform to improve tenure security on all agricultural land (including 
land held in the traditional communal areas). 
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6.5 .1 Land redistributon 
Although the extent of the proposed land redistribution in South Africa is not yet 
quantifiable, it is envisaged that significant portions of commercial and state farm land will 
be transferred to the poor and emerging farmers over the next ten years (Department of 
Land Affairs , 1996: 26) . Land from private individuals will be redistributed mainly through 
willing seller - willing buyer transactions, with expropriation been used as a mechanism of 
last resort. The state will thus not be a buyer or owner of land for redistribution, but will 
make available land acquisition grants to facilitate the policy of market driven land 
redistribution. Grants may also be used for the acquisition of state land. In this case, the 
value of the state land would be debited against the Grant for which the beneficiary had 
qualified. 
The primary source of direct financial assistance to potential beneficiaries will be the 
Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant. This grant, set at a maximum of R15000 per 
household, is to be used for land acquisition an infrustructural investments. The grants are 
not intended to fulfil all beneficiary needs . Rather, it is intended that grants should be used 
to encourage complementary contributions from government and private lending 
institutions . Households may apply for the grant individually or in a group. Given the 
limited size of the grant, there is clearly an incentive for households to organise into groups 
to finance larger, group owned, land purchases. Criteria for the selection of beneficiaries of 
the land redistribution policy proposed in the Green Paper on South African Land policy 
(Department of Land Affairs, 1996: 52) aim at alleviating poverty and assisting the poorest 
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of the poor. Households earning more than Rl 500 per month are likely to be ineligible for 
state assistance in terms of the various land acquisition grants. 
6.5.2 Land tenure reform 
The goal of the government's land tenure reform programme is to extend registerable 
tenure rights to all South Africans , and to eliminate landholding systems based on permits 
(Trust tenure). Within the programme, it is intended that diverse tenure systems should 
enjoy equal levels of protection and recognition by the law, and will be recorded in a single 
registry. To achieve this , it is proposed that pre-existing formal and informal land rights be 
used as a basis to clarify and formalise property rights . The policy places emphasis on the 
requirements and land needs of the poorest South Africans. Group ownership and 
communal tenure are encouraged, as it is proposed that they can make an important 
contribution to land needs and poverty alleviation by 'providing low cost and secure access 
to land' (Department of Land Affairs , 1996: 45). 
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CHAPTER 7 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND REFORlVl IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Baber (1991: 91) identifies two distinct levels of rural land reform in South Africa. On a 
national level, land reform is concerned with the political demand from historically 
disadvantaged South Africans for a more equitable dispensation with respect to their access 
to rural land and infrastructure. A primary cause of the inequitable access is the existing 
distribution of rights to land in accordance with the Land Act of 1913, and the 
Development Trust and Land Act of 1936. In essence, these acts resulted in almost all land 
in the small farm sector being nationalised, becoming the property of the State or the SADT 
(van der Walt, 1991: 29). As a result, farmers in the small farm sector have been deprived 
of the opportunity to acquire ownership of land, giving rise to the inequitable distribution 
of productive assets between race groups and between sectors in agriculture (see Table 
6.1). As a consequence, land reform at a national level is regarded as a sine qua non for a 
wider political settlement and is explicitly addressed in the RDP and the Green Paper on 
South African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). 
At an equally important level, however, rural land reform concerns individual demands for 
tenure institutions at a local level. Certainty and stability of expectations determines 
institutional success (Runge, 1985). Consequently, for an institution to be efficient it must 
be well adapted to the specific needs and resource constraints facing a particular 
community. By defining and upholding property rights, different property institutions can be 
expected to provide different economic incentives to individuals within society. Due 
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consideration of this secondary market for land reform is essential if future land policies 
aimed at responding to the national political market for land reform are to avoid unexpected 
and counterproductive consequences, and was the focus of this study. 
Evidence from Zimbabwean data indicates that tenure institutions characterised by 
exclusive and assured property rights significantly increase the probability of conservation 
and investments on agricultural land, and increased yields. At the same time, returns (yield) 
to investments in agricultural training and extension are likely to be greater in areas 
characterised by exclusive and assured property rights, as households have a greater 
incentive to invest time and capital in agriculture. It can thus be expected that any national 
land redistribution programme that takes land out of commercial production under formal 
private tenure and redistributes it under a land tenure system which does not facilitate 
economic interaction, or adequately internalise externalities, will reduce the level of 
agricultural production and resource conservation on that land. 
Empirical results from Zimbabwe also suggest that communal land tenure systems III 
Southern Africa are a constraint on agricultural productivity. It is likely that the endogenous 
evolution of tenure institutions has been constrained by prohibitive transaction costs incurred 
in reaching collective agreement in large groups, and by resistance to change from households 
with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. This result is critical to sustainable rural 
development in South Africa, since approximately 16 per cent of South Africa's agricultural 
land is characterised by some form of communal ownership. 
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This chapter critically analyses options for land reform in South Africa, including land 
reform policies proposed in the Government's Green Paper on South African Land Policy 
(Department of land Affairs, 1996) . The analysis is limited to an investigation of economic 
incentives under alternative tenure institutions resulting from likely land redistribution and 
tenure reforms in the South African small farm sector. The issues of land restitution and the 
financing of land reform, although critical to the success of a land reform programme in 
South Africa, are beyond the scope of this study and are only given limited attention. 
7.1 The redistribution and resettlement of commercial and state land 
The governments land redistribution proposals are set out in the Green Paper on South 
African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). Briefly, the proposals envisage 
that significant portions of commercial and state land will be transferred to poor and 
emerging farmers over the next ten years. Land from private individuals will be 
redistributed mainly through willing seller - willing buyer transactions, financially assisted 
by government land acquisition grants. 
The reliance on market mechanisms to achieve land redistribution is applauded. However, 
the policy bias towards assisting the landless poor, rather than promoting the emergence of 
market-oriented small-scale farmers, is cause for concern (Eicher and Rukuni, 1996). This 
is corroborated by empirical evidence from this study which suggests that, in the absence of 
an efficient credit market, farmers without sufficient capital (or liquidity) are less likely to 
undertake the necessary long-term investments in agriculture to ensure sustainable land use. 
Furthermore, the potentially large size of groups to be resettled may result in tenure 
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institutions unable to internalise externalities and facilitate land market transactions (sale or 
rental) (according to Cousins (1996), groups of up to 300 families have applied for 
government financing in areas of KwaZulu-Natal). 
7.1.1 Scenario one - Individual resettlement under formal private tenure 
Since land acquired for resettlement will presumable be unoccupied, policy makers should 
have greater leeway in designing land tenure institutions that decrease uncertainty in 
exchange and ownership. To ensure productive and sustainable land use, government 
assistance for the purchase of commercial and state land for redistribution should be given 
to emerging small-scale farmers, with secure individual title enforced by the legal system. 
Provided land titles are legally recognised and enforceable, and registration procedures are 
simplified to ensure that title deeds are updated upon transfer or inheritance, resettled land 
can enter the land market and will be assigned an opportunity cost. 
Problems characteristic of land titling elsewhere in Africa, notably the absence of legal 
support for and public recognition of registered title deeds (Barrows and Roth, 1990), are 
unlikely to arise since no conflicting secondary rights to the resettled commercial and state 
land exist. 
7.1.2 Scenario two - Group resettlement 
The subdivision of existing commercial and state land into the hands of private individuals 
will entail significant costs, both to the beneficiary and the State. Owing to prohibitive 
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physical costs associated with surveying and fencing land, and transaction costs incurred in 
negotiating and registering multiple land transactions, it is both likely and practical that 
groups of emerging farmers will become co-owners of freehold land following land 
redistribution. Furthermore, the mechanisms proposed by the government to achieve the 
stated objective of assisting the landless poor, rather than promoting small-scale 
commercial agriculture, provide individuals with the incentive to organise into large groups 
to access government financial assistance. 
Once land is settled by groups of individuals, the following options for further tenure 
development exist: 
1. The further subdivision of land into the hands of private individuals in the group. This 
is unlikely because of conflicting individual claims on the group owned resource and the 
high costs associated with the individual partitioning of land. 
If no further sub-division of the land occurs, the group owned resource characterises a 
common property land tenure institution. Two further tenure developments are identified: 
2. The group owned resource may be managed by a user group. Members of the group 
exercise their own management decisions within constraints established by the group as 
a whole. 
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3. Finally, non-user group management organisations may evolve . In this situation, 
members of the group surrender their use rights to an elected body, who manages the 
resource on behalf of the group. 
As outlined in Section 2.2.2, user groups must be small otherwise transaction costs - the 
costs of negotiating and enforcing rules - tend to cancel the benefits of collective action 
(Olson, 1971: 54). In addition, the group must be well defined otherwise the benefits of 
collective action may accrue to non-members (free-riders). 
In essence, user groups experience difficulties in satisfying the conditions necessary to 
ensure the efficient and sustainable use of agricultural land. Firstly, even small user groups 
will find it difficult to devise rules that distribute benefits of collective investments in the 
same proportions as members share costs. This decreases the likelihood of individual 
investments in fixed improvements because of the actions of free-riders. Secondly, user 
groups constrain the operation of the land market. Potential buyers or tenants wishing to 
secure exclusive rights to the land have to first find and then negotiate with all the land 
owners . The larger the group, the greater the transaction costs and the more the land 
market will be constrained. Finally, groups are not static and membership may become 
blurred if access to rights are transferred to multiple heirs. User groups may thus find it 
increasingly difficult to regulate access to the common resource and the benefits of 
collective action may accrue to non-members (free-riders). 
In large groups, the common property tenure institution may revert to open access because 
the institutional rules do not assign exclusive property rights to individuals or groups (a 
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minimum requirement for an efficient common property institution) , or because such rules 
are difficult to enforce. This is corroborated by evidence from the Zimbabwean Model A 
Resettlement Areas where groups of stock owners were unable to exercise exclusive control 
over villages' allocated grazing lands. Levels of investment in these areas were consistently 
lower than in neighbouring areas characterised by more exclusive grazing rights. Unless 
alternative institutions are provided to facilitate group decision making, this is the 
development pattern most likely to be followed in South Africa given the potentially large 
size of groups to be resettled (Moor and Nieuwoudt, 1996) . By ignoring these 
considerations , land redistribution policies initiated in South Africa aimed at alleviating 
rural poverty may undermine the economic benefits of owning land through institutional 
failure , since under conditions of group ownership and inclusive property rights , profit 
maximisation is only attainable through collective action (Lyne, 1994) . 
This raises important questions regarding collective management institutions best suited to 
ensure economic efficiency and sustainabilty on resettled land. Where user groups are not 
successful , certain non-user group arrangements could satisfy the conditions necessary for 
the efficient and sustainable use of resettled agricultural land (see Section 2.2.2). A 
potential solution requires that all members of the group surrender their individual use 
rights to an elected management committee , having exclusive use rights to the resource and 
managing it on behalf of the community (as occurred on Maori land in New Zealand (Lyne, 
1994». Importantly, ownership of the land is still vested with the community or group . 
Members have simply traded their inclusive use rights for inclusive benefit rights emanating 
from decisions made by the management body. This arrangement differs from user groups 
in that decisions are taken by a small number of people (the management committee) 
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regardless of the group's size, facilitating good management practices and land market 
activity (Wynne and Lyne, 1995). 
Such private institutions consist of groups constituted as private business organisations (for 
example, co-operatives and companies). Critical to the success of such institutions is the 
extent to which they curtail transaction costs and discourage free-riding. The constitution 
adopted by the management organisation must thus ensure that the management committee 
and community members are held accountable for their actions and that dealings are 
transparent. The constitution must further ensure that the cost of rule breaking is 
internalised to discourage free-riding . Different non-user group organisations are better at 
ensuring economic efficiency than others. Identifying non-user group management 
organisations suited to the management of group owned agricultural land is clearly an area 
that requires further research. 
Importantly , collective action problems resulting in prohibitive transaction costs may 
constrain the endogenous evolution of non-user group management organisations following 
group resettlement. Pro-active state intervention is thus urged in South Africa. It is 
recommended that the government facilitate the evolution of private institutions by 
vigorously disseminating information about alternative business organisations (companies 
and trusts) and facilitate collective action by reducing transaction costs. Government should 
actively ensure accountability of the representative body by sharing administration and 
transaction costs incurred in drafting a transparent constitution and brokering settlements 
where distributional problems arise. In addition to this, attention needs to be given to 
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reducing costs and simplifying procedures surrounding land registration and transfer, to 
promote the evolution of a land market. 
7.2 Tenure reform in communal areas 
Approximately 51. 7 per cent of South Africa 's population reside in rural areas (DBSA, 
1994 cited by Dushmanitch and Nieuwoudt, 1994) . Moreover, communal areas (including 
all the land held by the former South African Development Trust) account for 
approximately 16 per cent of South Africa 's agricultural land. A verage farm size in 
communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal is estimated by Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) to be 0.75 
hectares , while most farms are less than two hectares in size. This is considered 
exceedingly small for maize production, the dominant crop grown in these areas. These 
factors have resulted in excess demand for agricultural land in communal areas, yet large 
tracts of land lie fallow and per hectare investments and yields remain low (Lyne and 
Nieuwoudt, 1991) . 
Evidence from this study suggests that a programme of land redistribution alone is unlikely 
to be sufficient to solve the problems of overcrowding and resource degradation 
experienced in communal areas (also see Roth, 1993). After more than a decade of land 
redistribution and reforms aimed at decreasing population pressures and increasing 
agricultural productivity in Communal Areas of Zimbabwe, levels of on-farm investment, 
input application and yields are still significantly lower than those on neighbouring small 
scale commercial farms. Empirical analysis of Zimbabwean data indicates that tenure 
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security is a significant limiting constraint on agricultural conservation and productivity in 
the communal areas . 
This result suggests that tenure reforms increasing both the breadth (exclusivity) and 
assurance of property rights in communal areas of South Africa are required. This will 
facilitate the emergence of an active land market in communal areas, assigning an 
opportunity cost to the land. This in tum will provide individual economic agents with the 
necessary incentives and ability to invest in agriculture , and will ensure that land moves to 
its most valued use. 
7.2.1 The market for formal private tenure in communal areas 
The implementation of formal private tenure in communal areas of South Africa would 
entail taking property rights already recognised informally by the local community out of 
the realm of informal lineage and community ownership, making them fully legal by means 
of a registered individual title deed (Atwood, 1990: 659) . Such a formally registered title 
would be unimpeachable, relatively easy to define , and would release the land from group 
or secondary rights. In theory, this would reduce transaction costs, including risk, 
surrounding land transfers . The expected returns to potential buyers would increase, 
leading to an outward shift in the demand for land and the emergence of an active land sale 
or rental market. This would assign an opportunity cost to agricultural land in communal 
areas. 
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However, from an institutional perspective , it is essential that property institutions are well 
adapted to the particular needs and resource constraints facing a community. This 
represents an objective criterion whereby the relative efficiency of different property 
institutions may be measured, and is concerned with the extent to which the institutions of a 
society are responsive to the values and choices of individual citizens (Buchanan, 1986: 
99) . The implication is that land reform policies must focus on communal area reforms that 
explicitly recognise the status quo, to avoid conceptualising a complete restructuring of the 
small farm sector from within a vacuum. 
As a consequence of pervasive structural imbalances which have built up over the years in 
South Africa, together with a fundamental reorientation of household labour away from 
agricultural production in the small farm sector towards off-farm employment (Nieuwoudt 
et ai, 1996), perceived returns to economic interaction in the small farm sector may not be 
sufficiently high to engender a very large demand for the information provided by formal 
private tenure. The disincentive to engage in agricultural production is compounded by high 
transaction costs under existing tenure institutions , with the result that the agrarian 
economy is likely to remain weak in the South African small farm sector in the future . 
The poor state of animal production is also likely to mitigate against a great demand for 
formal private tenure . Existing circumstances in the communal areas virtually dictate that 
some form of communal grazing will continue to exist. The number of livestock owned by 
individual households is typically small , the vast majority comprise less than ten animals 
(Nieuwoudt et ai , 1996) . Individual producers consequently lack the incentive to provide 
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the capital for investments such as fencing and water facilities, as these fixed costs are 
spread over a small production. 
The dangers of instituting land (title) registration in a situation where the property rights 
market indicates that this would not be the optimal tenure system are explained in Section 
2.4 . Briefly, title registration may replace customary tenure institutions in the South 
African small farm sector, leading to conflict between 'new' and customary rights (often 
associated with secondary rights assigned to community members). In addition to this, 
individuals have to cope with expensive and complicated legal procedures. Poorer 
households may thus be disadvantaged as transaction costs associated with formal private 
tenure vary little according to farm size. 
7.2.2 Rental markets in communal areas 
As a second-best solution, it is suggested that reforms facilitating an active land rental 
market characterised by secure property rights and contracts enforceable through a court of 
law (land registration is not required for this) are more likely stimulate increased 
agricultural investments and conservation than 'replacement' policies introducing land ----
titling in communal areas (Lyne et ai , 1996) . The efficiency and equity advantages of a land 
rental market in communal areas are described in Section 3.1 .1. Rental markets assign an 
opportunity cost to land, ensuring it moves to those individuals more willing and able to 
utilise it. At the same time, equity is enhanced as poorer household entering into rental 
transactions on land they are unable to utilise in the short term earn rental income, while 
their long term social security is not jeopardised. Since the requirements for an efficient -----
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land rental market are almost the same as those for a land sale market - namely secure 
property rights and low transaction costs - the establishment of a rental market in communal 
areas can be viewed as a stepping stone towards the introduction of formal private tenure in 
these areas. 
To achieve the equity and efficiency advantages of an efficient land rental market in 
communal areas of ~outh Africa, endogenous institutional innovation towards more 
exclusive and assured individual land rights is required. However, strategies that ignore the 
problems of vested interest groups and collective action are consistent with a policy of 
'doing nothing', and are likely to have undesirable consequences (see Section 2.3.1). 
Accordingly, 'adaptive' policies facilitating incremental changes towards more exclusive 
individual property rights, while still retaining the safeguards provided by communal 
tenure, are suggested (Lyne, 1994) ._ Rather than by radical institutional change, this may 
best be achieved by improving the certainty of law in communal areas, establishing clear 
legal precedents to increase tenure assurance (Lyne and Roth, 1994). Crop farmers will 
thus be more assured of retaining the benefits from investments in crop production, leading 
to an outward shift in the demand for (rented) land. At the same time, perceived risks and 
transaction costs associated with rental transactions can be reduced by introducing rental 
contracts endorsed by tribal authorities. 
However, it was established in Section 2.3.1 that endogenous institutional change will be 
resisted by those benefiting from the existing structure of property rights. Therefore, to 
alter the evolution of land tenure institutions in the communal areas from an unpredictable 
process to a more pragmatic one, losers have to be compensated. If tenure is secured at the 
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expense of households who rely on secondary use rights , acceptable compensation may 
involve alternative forms of social security , like adequate pension and unemployment 
benefits , or options to exchange secondary use rights for serviced residential sites held with 
secure property rights (Lyne et ai , 1996). Where tribal authorities resist the evolution of a 
rental market it is essential that their co-operation is ensured, as the perceived risk of 
dispossession by the tribal authorities was identified as an important constraint on rental 
transactions in Section 6.4.2.1. In this situation, it may be necessary to offer incentives to 
tribal authorities. In KwaZulu-Natal , Thomson and Lyne (1993) found that chiefs willing to 
endorse rental contracts either benefited by entering into the rental market themselves, or 
raised tax revenue from the transactions . 
The role of Government is thus to decrease transaction costs inhibiting endogenous 
institutional change in communal areas (Ault and Rutman, 1979: 177). Pro-active 
government intervention is required, including the provision of institutions facilitating 
collective action (disseminating objective information and sharing transaction costs) and a 
supportive legal and administrative environment for the evolutionary change in indigenous 
law. together with compensation of people whose welfare is threatened by an institutional 
change. Clearly, further research into institutional requirements reducing risks and 
transaction costs associated with land transfers in communal areas of South Africa is 
required . 
.J// On grazing land in communal areas , the situation is somewhat different. Even though the 
community using the land may be well defined, rules governing access to grazing land are 
not enforced, with the result that grazing land is an open access resource. Negotiation costs 
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of reaching agreement between stock owners are infinite because the number of potential 
stock owners is infinite , preventing the transfer of land via either a sale or rental market. 
Stock owners do not have the incentive to limit stocking rates or to invest in improving 
pastures of herd quality as others (free riders) benefit from individual effort. 
On this land, neither formal private tenure nor traditional communal tenure will influence 
- .. 
the nature of animal production unless incentives are created for individuals to exercise 
their attendant rights of exclusion. This is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, given 
the limited area of grazing land available to communal area stock owners and small 
individual herd sizes , and prohibitive capital and transaction costs incurred with the 
'privatisation' of grazing rights required for the emergence of a (rental) market for 
individual grazing rights. However, the cost of enforcing group rights of exclusion to a 
consolidated grazing area may be affordable. This implies that animal production and 
resource utilisation would be better served by instituting common property management 
institutions, similar to those proposed for groups of individuals resettled on free hold land. 
The challenge facing grazing policy in communal areas is thus to revive , adopt and support 
endogenously sustainable common property institutions that control the access to and use of 
the grazing resource. Unless the net collective benefits of the proposed change are greater 
than the costs of enforcing· group rights of exclusion (unlikely in areas where resource 
degradation is already severe), communities are not likely to initiate these changes 
themselves owing to collective action problems experienced by large groups (Olson, 1971: 
48) . Government therefore has a significant role to play in facilitating institutional 
innovation, either by increasing the size of the net collective benefit or reducing the cost of 
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enforcing the groups rights of exclusion. This is clearly an area that requires further 
research, since little empirical evidence exists to support economic theory in this regard. 
7.3 The importance of the urban/rurallink 
Finally, although the question of urban land reform is beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
must be mentioned in so far as it would affect the structure of incentives operating in the 
small farm sector. In the light of rapid urbanisation and resultant insecure urban property 
rights, households moving to urban areas have the incentive to retain property rights to land 
in the small farm sector due to the benefit stream which this land provides. To ensure the 
continuation of these rural land rights , households have the incentive to assign people with 
a low opportunity cost of time (women, children and the aged) to agricultural production in 
the small farm sector, contributing to the low intensity of agricultural production in these 
areas. If both security of tenure and relatively inexpensive access to services and 
infrastructure were supplied in urban areas , the opportunity cost to urban dwellers of not 
transferring their rural land rights to more productive users would increase relative to the 
benefits derived from holding rural land as a source of social security, possibly to the point 
where it creates the incentive for them to relinquishing secondary rights to land in 
communal areas (Moor and Nieuwoudt, 1996). This would assist the emergence of a land 
market (sale or rental) and facilitate the movement of land into more intensive production. 
Moreover, increased education, improved employment opportunities and better access to 
urban markets following urbanisation may significantly increase the opportunity cost of 
womens ' time . This will result in a decrease in the number of children demanded, reducing 
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population growth and pressure in urban and rural areas (Dushmanitch and Nieuwoudt, 
f994) . 
Policies increasing the choice set of rural residents by increasing their access to urban 
opportunities are thus likely to have both economic and social spin-offs for those who 
prefer to stay in rural environments. The implication is that policies creating a stable 
business environment and stimulating economic growth in urban areas, together with the 
provision of alternative forms of social security, may enhance rural development. 
Competing demands on Government's limited financial resources must be considered, and 
land reform must fall within a holistic approach aimed at increasing both urban and rural 
access to secure property rights and employment opportunities. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Data from an interview survey of 119 households in the Zimbabwean small farm sector 
were analysed to investigate the relationship between tenure security and agricultural 
productivity in small scale agriculture. The study area was stratified so as to maximise the 
variation on the tenure variables measured. Three geographically adjacent strata were 
identified, namely the Small Scale Commercial Sector (40 households), the Communal Area 
(39 households) and the Model A Resettlement Area (40 households). 
Specifically, the analysis investigated the interaction between land tenure security and credit 
use , long-term on farm investments, complementary short-term input application and yield. 
The model was estimated as a simultaneous equation model using two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression analysis. Credit use, investments in long-term land improvements and 
levels of short-term input application were endogenous variables in the economic model. 
Unfortunately , credit use was too infrequent in the sample to warrant statistical analysis and 
was omitted from the final model . Other variables considered in the model were household 
characteristics, household head characteristics , farm characteristics and production 
characteristics for each household interviewed. 
For the estimation of long-term investments in fixed improvements and complementary 
short-term input use, data from arable and grazing land were included in the same model. 
This was not possible in the equation estimating yield because of data limitations. By 
considering both arable and grazing land in the same model, a greater variation in the 
tenure variables observed was achieved. This also permitted the study of investment 
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behaviour of the same individual under two different tenure institutions (on grazing and 
arable land). 
In the equation estimating an individual's investments in long-term on-farm improvements, 
the index measuring tenure security was significant at the 99 per cent confidence level (t = 
3.9) . The household's gross farm income (a proxy measure for farm size and liquidity) was 
also significant at the 99 per cent level (t=3.4). In the subsequent equation, investments in 
long-term land improvements were found to be a significant determinant of complementary 
short-term input application (t=2.2 which is significant at the 95 per cent confidence level). 
Finally, 2SLS estimation of yield in the sample - using principal component regression 
analysis to rid the estimation of multicolloinearity - revealed that tenure security has a 
positive and significant effect on recorded output (t = 2.96 which is significant at the 99 
per cent level). Households who invested more in human capital also attained significantly 
higher yields than those without post-school training, ceteris paribus (t = 2.91, which is 
significant at the 99 per cent confidence level) . Better educated or trained farmers are more 
able to assimilate information and are thus more likely to invest in yield enhancing 
management practices and technologies. The empirical result thus suggests that returns to 
investments in human capital and extension are likely to be enhanced by the provision of 
exclusive and assured property rights. 
Empirical results thus support the hypothesis that a limited breadth, duration and assurance 
of property rights is a significant constraint on economic incentives and agricultural 
productivity in the sample. Households with more secure property rights invested more in 
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long- and short-term investments and attained higher yields in the area studied, ceteris 
paribus. Given similarities between the Zimbabwean and South African agricultural 
sectors, the implication for land reform in South Africa is that communal tenure institutions 
in the small farm sector are likely to be a constraint on economic incentives and agricultural 
productivity in the region. Furthermore, land redistribution without cautious consideration 
of individual economic incentives reduces the likelihood of on-farm investments and 
sustained agricultural production on resettled land. 
It is thus necessary to initiate rural land reforms in South Africa at two distinct levels. At a 
national level it is necessary to address fundamental grievances regarding land access and 
rural infrastructure. The mechanisms outlined in the South African government's 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and Green Paper on South African 
Land Policy go some way towards addressing these concerns. Reform is simultaneously 
required to land tenure institutions at the individual level, to ensure economic incentives 
necessary to maintain levels of agricultural production and resource conservation on South 
Africa 's limited agricultural land. Reforms that do not take transaction costs and the needs 
of particular interest groups into consideration are unlikely to succeed at addressing the 
demands of those disadvantaged by past legislation, and at ensuring efficient and 
sustainable resource utilisation. 
Where commercial and state land is acquired of redistribution and resettlement, preference 
should be given to emerging small-scale commercial farmers with secure title enforced by 
the legal system. Secure title can be pledged as collateral to access capital required to make 
the requisite investments in agriculture. However, practical considerations and political 
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objectives are likely to dictate that land acquired for redistribution will be resettled by large 
groups of individuals. Unless the costs (both physical and transaction costs) associated with 
land registration and the transfer of property rights are curtailed, the further sub-division of 
land resettled to groups into the hands of private individuals is unlikely. It is thus essential 
that group resettlement be accompanied by innovative tenure reforms which facilitate 
economic interaction and the intemalisation of externalities. This is required given the high 
transaction costs associated with collective action in large groups, and free-rider incentives 
inherent in common property institutions. The establishment of private group management 
organisations, such as trusts or companies, is suggested in this regard. Such institutions 
have efficiency advantages in that decisions are made by a small management team, 
regardless of the size of the group. 
In addition to the redistribution of commercial and state land, rural land reform in South 
Africa requires a restructuring of agricultural tenure institutions in communal areas . Land 
market activity in communal areas is constrained by insecure tenure and costly transactions 
(property rights lack breadth and assurance). However, perceived low returns to 
agricultural production in the small farm sector, together with resistance from those who 
stand to lose from an institutional change, are likely to constrain any endogenous shift 
towards more secure property rights. This does not suggest that formal private tenure be 
imposed on communities . Such a replacement policy could aggravate uncertainty III 
communal areas if 'new' rights conflict with those established under customary law. 
Rather, adaptive tenure reforms allowing for proactive government assistance and 
incremental changes towards more secure property rights are proposed. A land rental 
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market can be viewed as a stepping stone towards private property rights. Rental 
transactions improve allocative efficiency by transferring land to households more willing 
and able to utilise it. At the same time, equity is enhanced as transactions are voluntary 
with lessors gaining rental income from land they do not require in the short-term. On 
allotted arable land in communal areas, the efficiency and equity advantages of a rental 
market may best be achieved by creating certainty of law regarding land rights, thereby 
decreasing uncertainty and transaction costs surrounding land transactions. The situation is 
different on grazing land in communal areas. Here the tenure institution represents an open 
access institution and the challenge facing policy makers is to revive, adopt and support 
endogenous sustainable common property management institutions that control the access to 




From an institutional perspective, it is hypothesised that the evolution of permanent and 
enforceable land rights is closely related to increasing population density, advances in 
farming technology and the emergence of agricultural markets . However, evidence from 
several African countries suggests that the endogenous evolution of tenure institutions may 
be constrained by the actions of vested interest groups and prohibitive transaction costs. 
Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa 's rapid population growth and declining 
agricultural productivity, this has resulted in growing debate about whether indigenous land 
tenure systems are a constraint on agricultural productivity and transformation in the 
region. Some argue that indigenous communal tenure institutions have arisen in response to 
the needs and resource constraints facing African communities, while others argue for the 
merits of individual ownership. Yet others contend that alternative, more binding, 
constrains result in land tenure having a limited impact on productivity and investment. 
Of primary importance in this debate is the role of property institutions in manifesting 
economic incentives within society. Property institutions facilitate economic co-ordination 
amongst individuals within a society by helping them form expectations that can be 
reasonably held in their dealings with others. By establishing expectations about resource 
use in economic activity and about the partitioning of the income stream resulting from 
economic activity, different property institutions can be expected to provide different 
economic incentives to individuals within a society. It is hypothesised that the effectiveness 
of a particular property institution in manifesting economic incentives depends on the level 
of tenure security afforded by the institution. 
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The objective of this study was thus to empirically investigate the interaction between land 
tenure security and agricultural productivity in small scale agriculture characteristic of 
much of sub-Saharan Africa, and to derive implications for proposed land reforms in South 
Africa. Specifically, the study investigated the relationship between land tenure security and 
credit use, long-term on-farm investments, short-term complementary input use and yield. 
if Data for the study were gathered by means of an interview survey of small scale farmers in 
= 
Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe, in April and August of 1994. The Zimbabwean small 
farm sector was considered appropriate for the study as it allowed the investigation of the 
interaction between land tenure security and agricultural productivity (economic incentives) 
under a wide range of geographically adjacent tenure institutions. Furthermore, Zimbabwe 
has experienced more than a decade of land reform and redistribution following 
independence in 1980, which is likely yield important implications for proposed land 
reforms in South Africa. The study area was stratified to maximise the variation on the 
tenure variables measured. In total, 119 households were interviewed from the three strata 
identified, namely the Small Scale Commercial Sector, the traditional Communal Area and 
the Government initiated Model A Resettlement Area. Data for the study were gathered 
from both arable and grazing lands . Amongst the variables measured were household 
characteristics, household head characteristics (for example, the household head's age, 
experience and level of education), farm characteristics (including the farm's size and 
agricultural potential), production characteristics (including the extent of on-farm 
improvements, the level of input application and yield) and tenure characteristics. 
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Throughout the study, tenure security was defined as an individuals perceptions of his/her 
undisturbed rights to a piece of land on a continuos basis , as well as the ability to reap the 
benefits of labour and capital invested in the land, either in use or upon alienation. The 
level of tenure security afforded by a particular tenure institution is thus a function of three 
components, namely the breadth, duration and assurance of property rights. The breadth of 
rights defines the legal bundle of rights held over the land (use, transfer and exclusion 
rights). The duration refers to the length of time for which the bundle of rights is legally 
valid, while assurance defines the degree of certainty with which the legal definitions of 
breadth and duration are held. From an economic perspective, if one of these conditions is 
lacking, tenure is not secure . Information pertaining to each of these characteristics was 
gathered in the questionnaire. 
The conceptual model to be estimated required four equations. Within the model, mutually 
dependent variables (endogenous variables) were correlated to the disturbance terms and 
were not independently distributed of them. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation under 
these conditions would have resulted in simultaneous equation bias, yielding biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates. For this reason, the simultaneous equation system was 
estimated using two-stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS) . This technique purifies 
the stochastic explanatory variable of the influence of the stochastic disturbance term by 
creating a proxy or instrumental variable for the endogenous variable, and involves two 
successive applications of OLS. In the empirical model , dummy dependent variables were 
estimated using probit analysis. 
161 
In the empirical analysis, tenure security was estimated as an index capturing the perceived 
breadth, duration and assurance of an individuals property rights to both arable and grazing 
land. Credit use was too infrequent in the sample to wa rant statistical analysis and was 
omitted from the final model. In the equations estimatin long-term investments in fixed 
improvements and complementary short-term input use, ta from arable and grazing land 
were pooled. This was not possible in the equation e timating yield because of data 
limitations. 
Empirical results from the 2SLS regression analysis su port the hypothesis that tenure 
security has a significant influence on economic incenti es and agricultural productivity. 
Households with more exclusive and assured property ights invested more in on-farm 
improvements (t=3.9, significant at the 95 per cent con dence level) and applied greater 
levels of short-term inputs (t=2.2, significant at the 95 pe cent confidence level) compared 
to those with less secure property rights, ceteris paribus. ouseholds who invested more in 
on-farm improvements and who applied greater levels of inputs achieved significantly 
higher yields. Unfortunately, severe multicollinearity prec ded the simultaneous estimation 
of the effect of long-term investments, input use and tenur security on yield. To overcome 
this, principal component regression analysis was used to purge the data of 
multicollinearity. Regressions on estimated principal co ponents, excluding two minor 
principal axes, were calculated and transformed back i to the original variables in the 
original scale. Although this technique resulted in loss in the models ability to accurately 
reproduce the estimation data (a reduction in R2), it inc eased the interpretability of the 
estimated coefficients. Results from this regression indi ate that long-term investments, 
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short-term complementary input application and tenure security all have a positive and 
significant effect on yield in the sample (all significant at e 99 per cent confidence level). 
Given similarities between the Zimbabwean and South African agricultural sectors, the 
implication for land reform in South Africa is that co unal tenure institutions in the 
South African small farm sector are likely to be a c nstraint on economic, incentives 
agricultural productivity in the region. Furthermore, la d redistribution without cautious 
consideration of individual economic incentives red ces the likelihood of on-farm 
investments and sustained agricultural production 0 resettled land. The latter is 
particularly important in South Africa where groups of p to 300 people are likely to be 
resettled on land in terms of the Governments proposed and reform policy outlined in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) an Green Paper on South African 
Land Policy. 
It is thus necessary to initiate rural land reforms in South Africa at two distinct levels. At a 
national level it is necessary to address fundamental gri vances regarding land access and 
rural infrastructure. Reform is simultaneously required to land tenure institutions at the 
individual level, to ensure economic incentives necessar to maintain levels of agricultural 
production and resource conservation on South Africa 's imited agricultural land. Reforms 
that do not take transaction costs and the needs 0 particular interest groups into 
consideration are unlikely to succeed at addressing the d mands of those disadvantaged by 
past legislation, and at ensuring efficient and sustainable r source utilisation. 
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Where commercial and state land is acquired of redistribu ion and resettlement, preference 
should be given to emerging small-scale commercial farm rs with secure title enforced by 
the legal system. Secure title can be pledged as collateral t access capital required to make 
the requisite investments in agriculture. However, pract cal considerations and political 
objectives are likely to dictate that land acquired for redist ibution will be resettled by large 
groups of individuals. Unless the costs (both physical and ransaction costs) associated with 
land registration and the transfer of property rights are cur iled, the further sub-division of 
land resettled to groups into the hands of private individu s is unlikely. It is thus essential 
that group resettlement be accompanied by innovative enure reforms which facilitate 
economic interaction and the internalisation of externalitie . This is required given the high 
transaction costs associated with collective action in large roups, and free-rider incentives 
inherent in common property institutions. The establishm t of private group management 
organisations, such as trusts or companies, is suggested n this regard. Such institutions 
have efficiency advantages in that decisions are made by a small management team, 
regardless of the size of the group. 
In addition to the redistribution of commercial and state and, rural land reform in South 
Africa requires a restructuring of agricultural tenure insti tions in communal areas. Land 
market activity in communal areas is constrained by insec e tenure and costly transactions 
(property rights lack breadth and assurance). Howe r, perceived low returns to 
agricultural production in the small farm sector, together with resistance from those who 
stand to lose from an institutional change, are likely to constrain any endogenous shift 
towards more secure property rights. This does not sugg st that formal private tenure be 
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imposed on communities. Such a replacement policy could aggravate uncertainty in 
communal areas if 'new' rights conflict with those establis ed under customary law. 
Rather , adaptive tenure reforms allowing for proact ve government assistance and 
incremental changes towards more secure property rig ts are proposed. A land rental 
market can be viewed as a stepping stone towards rivate property rights. Rental 
transactions improve allocative efficiency by transferring land to households more willing 
and able to utilise it. At the same time, equity is enhan ed as transactions are voluntary 
with lessors gaining rental income from land they do n t require in the short -term. On 
allotted arable land in communal areas, the efficiency a d equity advantages of a rental 
market may best be achieved by creating certainty of la regarding land rights, thereby 
decreasing uncertainty and transaction costs surrounding I nd transactions. The situation is 
different on grazing land in communal areas. Here the ten re institution represents an open 
access institution and the challenge facing policy maker is to revive, adopt and support 
endogenous sustainable common property management ins itutions that control the access to 
and use of the grazing resource . 
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Note: The information recorded during this interview is strictly confidential. The 
respondent should be a male or female household head. Respondents are not required to 
answer questions if they do not wish to do so. 
SECTION 1: Household characteristics 
1.1 Household head 
1.1.1 Is the household head male or female? 
1.1.2 How old is the household head? 
___ (M/F) 
____ (years) 
1.1.3 How many years farming experience does the household head have? 
1.1.4 Is the household head a full-time (F) or part-time (P) farmer? 
(P: builder, taxi owner, works in town etc.) 
1.2 Dependants 
1.2.1 How many people live on the farm? 
Adults Children 
1.2.2 How many family members work on the farm? 
1.3 Off-farm income 
____ (years) 
___ (F/P) 
1.3 .1 How much money does the household receive from non-farm income sources? (from 
any of the family members) 
Cash income (Z$/month) 
Cash remitted (Z$/month) 
Pension payment (Z$/month) 
SECTION 2: Farm characteristics 
2.1 What is the size of your land holding (specify units)? 
2.2 How far is your arable land from your house? 
2.3 Does the household have more than one plot of arable land, 
in different areas? 
2.4 Do you have access to water on your farm? 
Do you irrigate your arable land? 









In a normal season (i.e . 199311994), how much of the following is produced? 
Crop Area planted Yield
l








I ) Specify umts 
2.6 Agricultural production: Livestock 








2.7 How many cattle died as a result of the 1992 drought? 
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2.8 Farming expenses 
Inputs Used Quantity Total cost Bought with 








Hired: Contractor ****** 
Tractor ****** 
Draughts animals ****** 
Farm equipment ****** 
Farm labour ****** 
) Specify units 
2.9 Extension services 
2.9. 1 How many times in the last six months was a member of this household in contact 
with an extension official of: 






I) Does this household have any contact at all with the institution? 
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SECTION 3: On-Farm investments 
3.1 Land use 
3.1.1 What proportion of arable land was planted this season? 
Dryland % Irrigated % 
All (100 %) All (100 %) 
Most (75 %) Most (75 %) 
Half (50 %) Half (50 %) 
Some (25 %) Some (25 %) 
None None 
3.1.2 Why is some arable land left unplanted? 
3.2 Investments in land improvements (fIxed) 
What improvements have been made to the land by the current operator? 
Improvement Yes/No State of repair') 
Fencing: Arable 
Grazing 
Improved pastures or grazing 
Soil liming 







I ) i.e. good (G), bad (B) or unusable (U). 
2) i.e. plantations planted for household firewood (do not include trees planted at house) 
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3.3 Investments in capital equipment and assets (movable) 
Does the household own any of the following? 
Asset Yes / No Number owned State of repair l ) 










I) i.e. good (G), bad (B) or unusable (U) . 
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SECTION 4: Credit availability 
4.1 Has this household used credit in the past two years (1994/1995)? ____ (Y I N) 
If YES, go to questions 4.2. If NO, go to question 4.5 
4.2 What was the source of the credit used in the past two years? 
Source of credit Used Collateral Collateral used 
(Year) required (YIN) 







I) Please specify (e.g. group loan) 
4.3 What was the credit used for? 







I) Production credit, purchase machinery, purchase land, fmance land improvements, non-
farm use (housing, education) etc. 
4.4 After how long were you expected to repay the loan? (Tick where appropriate):] 
1 year 
2-5 years 
4.5 If the household does not use credit, would it like to? ____ (yes/no) 
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If YES, what has prevented the household from using credit? (TICK where applicable) 
a) there is no credit available 
b) credit is too expensive 
c) you cannot use land as collateral for credit 
d) creditors will not accept land as collateral 
e) Credit is too Risky 
SECTION 5: Tenure characteristics 
5.1 How long has the land been farmed by this household? ____ (years) 
5.2 How was the land acquired by this household? (TICK where appropriate) 
a) by inheritance 
b) by purchase 
c) lOIig term lease (option to purchase) 
d) government allocation (e.g. district council) 
e) tribal allocation (e .g. chief) 
e) other methods (specify) 




d) Other (specify) 
Grazing: 
5.3 .1 If your family owns the land, does it possess a registered 
title deed to the land? ____ eyes/no) 
If yes, in whose name is the title registered? (TICK where appropriate) 
a) present household head 
b) previous household head (ancestor) 
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5.4 Transfer rights 
5 A.l Can you specify the heir to this land? ____ (yes/no) 
5.4.2 Are there rules that prevent you from renting out or lending surplus land to other 
individuals? (yes/no) 
Arable: 5A.3 Can you sell you land? ---- Grazing: ----
If YES, does the household require permission from others? 
a) permission not required 
b) family members 
c) tribal authority 
d) government official 
5.5 Use rights 
5.5.1 Do you share the farm with any other farmers? (either family members or other 
farmers) 
Arable land (yes/no) 
Grazing land (yes/no) 
5.5.2 Is there a rule saying how many cattle you are allowed to own? 
If YES, what happens if you have too many cattle? 
Fined 
Cattle taken away 
Asked to reduce the herd size 
Nothing happens 
____ eyes/no) 
5.5 .3 Do cattle from neighbouring farms/other villages/other wards ever enter your !this 
villages/this ward's grazing land? (yes/no) 




Report owner to the authorities 
(magistrate/tribal court/resettlement officer) ----
5.5A Have you ever fenced in your grazing land to protect it from 
stray cattle? 
If NO, why not? (tick where appropriate): 
Not allowed to fence off grazing land 
Community steals fence 
Fencing is too expensive 
No need for fencing 
____ eyes/no) 
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5.5.5 Are other households allowed to use your arable land for any part of the year (e.g. 
grazing livestock in winter)? (yes/no) 
5.5.6 Can other households use your unutilized land (to graze cattle, collect wood and 
thatching grass etc.)? (yes/no) 
5.5.7 Have cattle ever strayed into you arable lands after you 
have planted them? 




Report owner to the authorities 
(Magistrate/tribal court/Resettlement officer) ___ _ 
5.5.8 Have stray cattle ever destroyed your crops? 
If YES, what happened? (tick where appropriate) 
Stock owner fmed in court 
Settled out of court (with compensation) 
Settled out of court (without compensation) 
Took no action against stock owner 
5.5.9 Have you ever fenced in your arable land to protect it from 
stray cattle? 
If NO, why not? (tick where appropriate): 
Not allowed to fence off arable land 
Community steals fence 
Fencing is too expensive 
No need for fencing 
5.6 Land disputes 
5.6.1 Have you or your family ever had a dispute over land ownership 
or boundaries? 





How are such disputes settled? (TICK where appropriate) 
a) Resolved ourselves 
b) Tribal authority 
c) Magistrate 
d) Government official 






Was the dispute between FAMILY members , or between family and OTHER 
households in the community? 
5.6 .3 Do you know of anyone in the last five years who has been dispossessed of their 
land as a result of a dispute? (yes/no) 
SECTION 6 Land Transactions 
6.1 Rental transaction: Land Rented In 
6 .1.1 Does this household rent in additional land? ____ (yes/no) 
If YES, go to question 6.1.2. If NO, would this household consider renting in more 
land if it were able to? (yes/no) 
If the household would like to rent in more land, what has prevented the household 
from doing so? 
a) there is no land to rent 
b) the rent is too expensive 
c) tribal authorities do not allow the renting in of land 
d) the government does not allow the renting in of land 
e) other reasons (please specify) 
6.1.2 If land is rented in, do you have a written contract? ____ (yes/no) 
If yes, what is the length of the contract? ____ (years) 




6 .1.3 Do you require family approval to rent in land? ____ (yes/no) 




d) others (specify) 





6.2 Rental transactions: land rented out 
6.2.1 Does this household rent out land? ____ (yes/no) 
If YES, go to question 6.2.2. If NO, would this household consider renting out land if 
it were able to? (yes/no) 
If the household would like to rent out land, what has prevented the household from 
doing so? 
a) there is no one willing to rent in the land 
b) there is no one willing to pay your price 
c) tribal authorities do not allow the renting out of land 
d) the government does not allow the renting out of land 
e) other reasons (please specify) 
6.2.2 If land is rented out, do you have a written contract? ____ (yes/no) 
If yes , what is the length of the contract? ____ (years) 
6.2.3 Can you remove the tenants from your land if they do not pay their rent or misuse the 
land? (yes/no) 
6.2.4 Do you require family approval to rent out land? ____ (yes/no) 




d) others (specify) 




6.3 Land sales 
6.3.1 Has this household ever bought additional land? 




6.3 .2 If this household does want to buy more land but has not, what has prevented it from 
doing so? (TICK where appropriate) 
a) there is no land to buy 
b) land is too expensive 
c) tribal authorities do not allow land to be bought 
d) government does not allow land to be bought 
6.3.3 Has this household ever sold any land? ____ (yes/no) 
APPENDIX A.2 LIST OF VARIABLES 
HHOLD Respondent (household head) number within each stratum 
STRATA Stratum number: 
Small scale commercial sector 
Model A Resettlement Area 
Communal Area 
NR Natural Region: 
Natural Region 2: NR2 = I 
Natural Region 3: NR3 = 1 
Natural Region 4: NR4 = 1 
=2 
=3 
SOIL Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5: 
1 = Sandy soil (lowest potential soils 
2 = Sandy loam soil 
3 = Sandy clay loam 
4 = Sandy clay soil 
5 = Clay soil (Highest potential) 
= 1 
P/F Dummy variable scoring I if the household head is a full time farmer 
SEX Dummy variable scoring I if household head is a male 
188 
MF Dummy variable scoring 1 if household head has a Master Farmer certificate 
EDU Respondent's education in years of schooling 
AGE Respondent's age in years 
EXP Respondent's farming experience in years 
ADULT Number of adult family members living on the farm 
CHILD Number of children living on the farm 
WORK Number of family workers employed on the farm 
LQD Off-farm income (Cash income, wage remittances, pension payments) 
DISTI Distance in kilometres between homestead and closest arable land 
DIST2 Distance in kilometres between homestead and furthermost arable land 
HECTARE Total size of allotted arable holding (hectares) 










Hectares of maize planted in the 1993/1994 season 
Maize income from the 199311994 season (Z$) 
Hectares of other crops planted in the 1993/1994 season 
Crop income (excluding maize) from the 1993/1994 season (Z$) 
Total crop income for 1993/1994 season (Z$) 
Number of cows, oxen and bulls presently owned 
Number of goats, sheep and pigs presently owned 
Number of cows, oxen and bulls that died in the 1992 drought 

















R1 - R4 
R1 
R2 
Number of cows , oxen and bulls sold in the last 12 months 
Income from livestock sales (Z$) 
Gross Farm Income (Z$) = (CRINC + HSINC) 
Total kilograms fert purchased for the 1993/1994 season 
Cost of hired animals (1993/1994) 
Cost of hired labour (1993/1994) 
Total cost of hired inputs (1993/1994) (includes hired machinery) 
Total crop expenditure (1993/1994) 
Total expenditure on veterinary supplies (1993/1994) 
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Dummy variable scoring 1 if seen ~tension officer in the last six months 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if household used 100 % of allotted arable land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if household used 75 % of allotted arable land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if household used 50 % of allotted arable land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if household used 25 % of allotted arable land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if household used 0 % of allotted arable land 
Reasons for not using all allotted arable land (dummy variable scoring 1 if the 
reason applies): 
Drought 
Lack of draught power 
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R3 Manpower or input shonages 
R4 Crop rotation including fallow 
TREE Investments in tree crops 
FENCEA Investments in fencing on arable land 
FEN CEG Investments in fencing on grazing land 
INVA Investments on arable land (conservation contours and/or lime) 
INVG Investments on grazing land (pastures and/or hay crops) 
INVB Investments in farm buildings and/or residential housing 
INVM Investments in movable assets (vehicles and machinery) 
CR1 Credit use (Z$): Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
CR2 Credit use (Z$): Commercial banks 
CR3 Credit use (Z$): Non-institutional sources (family members etc.) 
COLI Dummy variable scoring I if land used as collateral 
COL2 Dummy variable scoring I if movable assets used as collateral 
CRST Dummy variable scoring I if the loan was repayable after 1 year 
CRMT Dummy variable scoring I if the loan was repayable after 2-5 years 
RC 1 - RC4 Reasons why land not used as collateral (Dummy variable scoring I if the 
reason applies): 
RCI Collateral not required 
RC2 Land not accepted as collateral 
RC3 Land not available for collateral (i .e. no title) 
RC4 
USE 



















Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household would like to use credit 
Reasons why household does not use credit (Dummy variable scoring 1 if the 
reason applies): 
Credit is not available 
Credit is too expensive 
Cannot use land as collateral 
Land is not accepted as collateral 
Repayment risk is too high 
Number of years since the farm was acquired by the household 
Mode of acquisition (Dummy variable scoring 1 if mode applies): 
Inheritance 
Purchase 
Long term lease 
Government allocation 
Tribal allocation 
Dummy variable, scoring 1 if the arable land is owned by the family 
Dummy variable, scoring 1 if the arable land is owned by the Chief 
Dummy variable, scoring 1 if the arable land is owned by the Government 


















Dummy variable, scoring I if the grazing land is owned by the Chief 
Dummy variable, scoring I if the grazing land is owned by the Government 
Dummy variable scoring I if the family has title deeds to the land 
Dummy variable scoring I if the title deed is registered in the current 
household head's name 
Dummy variable scoring I if the household is able to specify the heir to the 
land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household shares arable land with other 
farmers (family members or other households) 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household shares grazing land with other 
farmers (family members or other households) 
Dummy variable scoring I if the household rents in additional land 
Dummy variable scoring I if the household would like to rent in additional 
land 
Reasons why households did not rent III additional land (dummy variable 
scoring I if the reason applies) : 
No land available to rent 
rent is too expensive 
Prohibited by tribal authority 
Prohibited by government authority 
Risk 



















Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household rents out excess land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household would like to rent out excess land 
Reasons why households did not rent out excess land (dummy variable scoring 
1 if the reason applies): 
No one willing to rent in land (no tenants available) 
Noone willing to pay the asking rental 
Prohibited by tribal authority 
Prohibited by government authority 
Risk of damage to property leased out 
Risk of dispossession 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if rental transaction is accompanied by a written 
contract 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the contract is enforceable 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household would like to buy more land 
Reasons why more land has not been purchased (dummy variable scoring 1 if 
the reason applies): 
There is no land to buy 
Land is too expensive 
Prohibited by tribal authority 





















Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household is allowed to sell arable land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household is allowed to sell grazing land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if no pennission is required to sell land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if family pennission is required to sell land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the Chiefs pennission is required to sell land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if government pennission is required to sell land 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household recalled disputes surrounding use 
and ownership of the land 





Settlement mechanism (dummy variable scoring 1 if the mechanism applies): 
Resolved privately 
Resolved by tribal authority 
Resolved in the courts (magistrate) 
Resolved by government authority 
Dispute remains unresolved 



















Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household knows of anyone who has been 
dispossessed of their land as a result of a dispute 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household is aware of the recommended 
stocking rate or any rule prescribing how many cattle they can own 
Consequences of overstocking/breaking stocking rules (dummy variable 
scoring I if the consequence applies) 
Household fined 
Cattle impounded 
Voluntarily reduce herd size 
No action taken 
Dummy variable scoring I if cattle from neighbouring farms/villages/wards 
stray into respondent's grazing land 
Action taken by the household (dummy variable scoring I if the action applies) 
Leave the cattle 
Chase the cattle 
Impound the cattle 
Report the stockowner to the magistratelresettlement officer/tribal authority 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if the household does not have exclusive rights over 
arable land for the full duration of the year 
Dummy variable scoring I if the household does not have exclusive use rights 















Dummy variable scoring 1 if stray cattle ever entered into the household's 
arable land after it has been planted 
Action taken by the household (dummy variable scoring 1 if the action applies) 
Leave the cattle 
Chase the cattle 
Impound the cattle 
Report the stock owner to the magistrate/resettlement officer/tribal authority 
Dummy variable scoring 1 if stray cattle have destroyed the households crops 
Action taken by the household (dummy variable scoring 1 if the action applies) 
Stock owner fined in court 
Settled out of court (with compensation) 
Settled out of court (without compensation) 
Took no action against stock owner 
Stock owner fined , but has not paid yet 
